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Kosovo: dissolution of parliament

Michał Kucharski

The Assembly of Kosovo failed to elect a president by the 28 April deadline set by the Constitutional Court. Prime Minister Albin Kurti (Self-Determination) was unable to persuade the opposition to attend the session, so the quorum required for a vote was not reached. As a result, parliament will be dissolved. Although outgoing president Vjosa Osmani had earlier issued a decree to this effect, it was challenged by the Constitutional Court, which granted several additional weeks to complete the presidential election. Extensive consultations led by Kurti during this period did not produce a breakthrough. The opposition rejected an offer from Self-Determination, the winner of the most recent elections, to join the government (see: ‘New government in Kosovo: the end of the political crisis’). It also declined Kurti’s compromise proposal without putting forward its own candidate. Kurti ultimately withdrew strictly party-based nominations and proposed an independent candidate: a doctor who heads a foundation supporting victims of persecution in the 1990s. Consequently, the December elections, despite delivering Self-Determination a record level of support in the country’s history, have proved a Pyrrhic victory for the party.

The next parliamentary elections, which must be held by 12 June, are unlikely to resolve the current deadlock. Despite the political impasse, parliament has adopted the budget for the current year. However, it has not passed key reforms required to secure EU pre-accession funds.

Commentary

  • The failure to elect a president has highlighted structural weaknesses in Kosovo’s political system. It is characterised by deep polarisation, low levels of trust between the main political actors, and a reluctance to compromise. These trends were especially visible in 2025, when it took months to form a parliamentary majority, eventually forcing early elections (see: ‘Snap elections in Kosovo: Kurti regains support’). Opposition parties have increasingly used boycotts of parliamentary sessions as a political tactic, preventing the quorum required for votes. While the Constitutional Court has sought to support stability and has strengthened its position within Kosovo’s legal system, it cannot resolve fundamentally political crises in the long term. It blocked President Osmani’s March decree dissolving parliament and suspended its implementation pending a ruling, allowing it to provide a key interpretation of ambiguous constitutional provisions.
  • New elections are unlikely to resolve the crisis. The opposition expects Self-Determination to lose support after failing to form a stable government and elect a head of state. It also anticipates a reduced role for the diaspora, which largely supports Kurti’s party and turned out in large numbers in December 2025 during the holiday period, when many Kosovars return home temporarily. Turnout will be critical. Lower participation could favour the opposition. It is likely aiming to win additional seats to strengthen its leverage over Kurti, making him reliant on opposition votes not only to elect a president but also to form a parliamentary majority capable of sustaining the government.
  • The dissolution of parliament places Kosovo under time pressure to secure €96 million from the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. The country received the first tranche in February after adopting a framework agreement with the EU. It must implement 13 reforms by the end of June to unlock further funding. Holding elections, submitting the reforms, and adopting them within this timeframe will be highly challenging.
  • State institutions continue to function despite the political crisis. The Constitutional Court remains active, and its rulings have not been challenged by any political party. The Election Commission has also acted efficiently, conducting a swift recount of votes following reports of irregularities. In the first months of the year, parliament adopted the 2026 budget, avoiding a provisional arrangement and the risk of disruptions to public sector salaries. At the same time, the government has continued reform of the defence forces, which are to be transformed into an army, and has prevented tensions linked to the integration of Serbian education and healthcare systems in the north. A compromise allows Serbs to continue working, for example, at the Serbian university in Mitrovica.