Protests in Serbia: the government and its opponents close ranks
Since the beginning of 2026, attempts have intensified to remobilise the Serbian student movement – the driving force behind the mass demonstrations that erupted following the construction disaster at the Novi Sad railway station on 1 November 2024. Participants continue to demand accountability for those responsible for the tragedy and the holding of a snap parliamentary election. In addition to reactivating the protests, they are also seeking to establish a new political movement. President Aleksandar Vučić, however, has been postponing the announcement of an election, and it cannot be ruled out that it will take place no earlier than 2027 (the constitutional deadline falls at the end of that year). The growing consolidation of governmental control over the remaining independent state institutions, combined with the renewed activism of the student movement, may in the coming months lead to a further escalation of social tensions.
Attempts to reactivate the mass protest movement…
Students, supported by members of the academic community, continue to be the principal driving force behind the movement. Over the past two months, they have sought to remobilise citizens to participate in public gatherings on a mass scale. Following an escalation of violence involving uniformed services and pro-government vigilante groups in the summer of 2025 (see ‘Protests in Serbia: government’s provocations and escalation of violence’), the strength of social opposition diminished slightly. In the autumn, after months of blockades, universities returned to relatively normal operation. On 1 November, the most recent large-scale demonstration took place in Novi Sad, attracting more than 100,000 participants; however, it was primarily commemorative in nature, marking the victims of the construction disaster.
An early indication of the impending mobilisation was the signature-collection campaign organised on 28 December in support of calling a snap parliamentary election. In a single day, nearly 400,000 signatures were gathered nationwide. The students reserved the right to contact the signatories in order to engage them in monitoring the conduct of any potential election. In January, the movement returned to its established formula of large-scale nationwide gatherings, albeit in a modified form. Events have thus far been held in Novi Sad, Belgrade, Kragujevac, and Niš, though they have attracted fewer participants than in the previous year. They increasingly diverge from the model of conventional protests. Their central component now consists of speeches delivered by students and invited experts, who propose specific measures to be implemented following the removal of the regime (including lustration). At the same time, commemorative events marking particularly brutal suppressions of demonstrations have contributed to the formation of a distinct ‘martyrology of the movement’, serving as a unifying and mobilising force among citizens.
Moreover, previously initiated activities continue to be pursued, including the ‘A Student in Every Village’ campaign aimed at increasing the movement’s visibility. As part of this initiative, activists familiarise themselves with the problems faced by residents of smaller localities and inform them of the movement’s demands. There has also been an increase in ad hoc, smaller-scale protests organised in response to specific decisions taken by the authorities or to acts of violence perpetrated by law enforcement agencies and pro-government vigilante groups.
…and its political articulation
The modification of the movement’s existing operational formula is intended to transform the protest movement into a political project that will contest the forthcoming parliamentary election. The ‘student list’ is expected to include independent experts, academics, athletes, and representatives of civil society organisations. Proposals for specific individuals are put forward by the students and their plenary assemblies (see ‘Students vs. the system – protest strategies in Serbia’), and are subsequently considered by a nationwide team coordinating the movement’s activities. The names of the candidates will remain confidential until the election is called, in order to shield them from harassment by the authorities and pro-government media outlets. According to speculation, the list could be headed, for example, by Vladan Djokić, the Rector of the University of Belgrade, who has expressed support for the students.
The mass and heterogeneous student movement is united by slogans advocating internal reform. It is focused on removing Vučić and the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) from power, followed by the depoliticisation of state institutions, the restoration of their functionality, and the eradication of systemic corruption. The protesters refrain from articulating positions on European integration, relations with Russia, or the independence of Kosovo. In doing so, they hope that a broadly acceptable reformist agenda will attract the widest possible electorate – both those of liberal orientation and those espousing nationalist-conservative views. It appears that the overarching demand for systemic change also serves to unify the internally diverse student movement. On the one hand, its representatives have met with Members of the European Parliament and European Commissioners; on the other hand, Orthodox symbolism and slogans calling for the reintegration of Kosovo are sometimes visible at demonstrations.
The protesters’ restraint in expressing views on international affairs has attracted criticism from traditional opposition parties. The students have rejected the possibility of running on a joint electoral list with them, regarding these parties as part of the existing system and as partly responsible for the country’s problems. The majority of the pro-European opposition (a conglomerate of forces brought together in 2023 within the Serbia Against Violence bloc) argues that the movement’s lack of an unequivocally pro-EU profile, together with the nationalist slogans appearing at demonstrations, makes it more difficult to secure support within the EU and indirectly facilitates Vučić’s self-presentation as the guarantor of the state’s nominally pro-European course. By contrast, far-right and conservative parties (described by their liberal opponents as ‘phantom’ groupings and accused of maintaining backstage arrangements with the regime) hope to attract voters disillusioned with the government’s foreign policy through more radical positions on issues such as Kosovo or the Russian–Ukrainian war. Some of these parties have, however, announced their intention to withdraw from the forthcoming election and to endorse the ‘student list’, including the centre-left Democratic Party (which holds eight parliamentary seats) and the extra-parliamentary nationalist movement Dveri.
The authorities’ position: discreditation and increased pressure
The government continues its efforts to discredit the student movement. The ruling camp and media outlets aligned with it accuse protest participants, among other things, of preparing a coup d’état, supporting alleged separatist aspirations in Vojvodina, or acting on behalf of (largely unspecified) foreign forces. This strategy appears to have limited potential to attract new supporters to the SNS and instead serves to mobilise its core electorate and intensify social polarisation. In parallel, instances of arbitrary detention of protesters and repression targeting members of the academic community supporting them may become more frequent.
At the same time, the authorities are seeking to bring the remaining relatively independent state institutions under their control. Particular attention has been directed at the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime (TOK), which is conducting the investigation into the construction disaster in Novi Sad and is also acting as the prosecutor in proceedings against the Minister of Culture, who is suspected of document forgery. A package of legislative amendments adopted at the end of January will result, among other developments, in the dismissal of investigators temporarily seconded to TOK, thereby limiting its operational effectiveness. The authorities have also increased their control over the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Cybercrime, raising concerns about potential reprisals against citizens on the basis of their activity on social media. These legal changes have prompted sharp criticism from representatives of the EU (for example, the Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos), but this has not led to the withdrawal of the controversial legislation.
Political pressure is also intensifying within the security services, as evidenced by recent personnel reshuffles in the police Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SAJ). It cannot be ruled out that the previously elite SAJ may, contrary to its designated purpose, be deployed to suppress protests. Last year, for example, the unit responsible for the protection of senior state officials was used in this manner. The subordination of specialised police units suggests that the authorities are preparing for a potential escalation in the spring, which may occur in the event of a renewed wave of mass student demonstrations and a further intensification of pressure by the government.
Prospects for political confrontation
Vučić has announced the holding of a snap parliamentary election in the final quarter of this year; however, he has already altered its date on several occasions (under the regular schedule, it is due to take place no earlier than the end of 2027). Likely owing to the governing camp’s low approval ratings, he has been postponing the formal announcement of a snap election (although in previous years he resorted to this instrument more readily). It cannot be ruled out that he will decide to do so only in 2027 – possibly in conjunction with the presidential election scheduled for April (in which he himself cannot stand owing to term limits) – at which point he could head the party list in order to enhance the mobilisation of his electorate.
It is difficult to estimate the actual level of support for the principal political actors due to the limited availability of reliable opinion polls. According to a survey conducted by the independent organisation CRTA in October 2025, 44% of respondents would vote for the ‘student list’, while 32% would support Vučić’s movement (he has announced his intention to abandon the SNS label). The survey further indicates that 58% of respondents support the protests, whereas 39% oppose them.
The local elections held in 2025 in five municipalities (Kosjerić, Mionica, Negotin, Sečanj, and Zaječar) indicate that the ruling party’s position remains strong, albeit weakening. The SNS won in all of them, yet in each case it secured markedly fewer seats than in the previous election. The unification of the opposition provided voters with a genuine alternative, which translated into increased turnout across all the municipalities. In Kosjerić, the joint list formed by the opposition and the students secured only one seat fewer than the governing camp. These victories required the authorities to form broad coalitions and to intensify the engagement of party structures and the propaganda apparatus. Outside the major cities, access to independent media is highly limited, and local communities are subordinated to the clientelist networks established by the SNS. Independent observers also pointed to a number of irregularities in the electoral process.
On 29 March this year, voting will take place in a further nine municipalities, representing another test of the governing camp’s strength. Results that are unsatisfactory from Vučić’s perspective may further contribute to the postponement of the parliamentary election. Of particular significance may be the outcomes in municipalities where the SNS, the ‘student list’, and the united pro-European opposition compete against one another. These results will likely reflect the probable balance of forces in any potential snap parliamentary election.
