Ukrainian counterattacks in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Day 1455 of the war

Ukrainian forces have intensified their attacks in the eastern part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast and the neighbouring part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Additional forces (according to some sources, two brigades) were deployed, which allowed them to regain some of the territory west of the Haichur River (and thus reduce the bridgehead built by the Russians in previous weeks), as well as south of Velykomykhailivka in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, where the Ukrainians crossed the Vovcha River. Up to four settlements were to return to the control of the defenders. A Ukrainian counterattack was also reported in the western part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast, between Stepnohirsk and Prymorsk. These actions are reported by unofficial sources, as they are taking place in areas which, according to the Ukrainian General Staff, are under continuous Ukrainian control (according to some Ukrainian observers, however, they are in a grey zone beyond anyone’s control).

Russian forces pushed the Ukrainians out of more towns north of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but failed to break through Ukrainian defences in the direction of Dobropillia and in Hryshyne, northwest of Pokrovsk. No significant change in the situation was caused by further Russian advances in the triangle between Lyman, Siversk and Chasiv Yar, south and east of Kostiantynivka, and on the border between the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.

The Russians intensified the destruction of energy and transport infrastructure in Odesa and Odesa Oblast. As a result of damage to an electrical substation on 11 February, 95,000 consumers in 42 settlements in the oblast were cut off from electricity. A day later, another infrastructure facility was hit, resulting in power and heating outages in Odesa and its surroundings, and 250,000 consumers lost their water supply. Attacks in the following days hampered the work of repair crews – several areas of Odesa and other towns in the region remain without electricity, water and heating. In addition, on 15 February, another railway station in the city was damaged, and on 17 February, the 330 kV substation was hit again.

In a massive strike on 17 February, further facilities of Ukraine’s energy system and railway infrastructure were damaged. In addition to the aforementioned Odesa Oblast, the Burshtyn Thermal Power Plant in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, a substation in Dnipro, and energy facilities in Sumy and the Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts were hit, exacerbating problems with the electricity, water and heating supplies in the attacked regions. Damage to railway infrastructure was reported in the Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts. Ukraine declared high effectiveness – according to the Ukrainian Air Force Command, it intercepted all 24 cruise missiles and 367 out of 396 unmanned aerial vehicles. Four Iskander-M ballistic missiles were reportedly hit.

On 12 February, Kyiv and Dnipro were the targets of a massive air strike. In the former, the TETS-5 and TETS-6 thermal power plants were damaged (in previous attacks, the capital’s third power plant, TETS-4, was almost completely destroyed), as were the production and storage facilities of two companies. At least 125,000 consumers were cut off from electricity, and 2,600 buildings were cut off from heating. In Dnipro, the Prydniprovska thermal power plant was hit and, as a result of the attack, heating was turned off in other areas of the city. The Dnipro authorities reported four people injured, including two children. Despite repairs carried out in the following days, the situation did not improve significantly. On 16 February, 1,500 apartment blocks in Kyiv were still without heating, and it was considered temporarily impossible to restore it in 1,100 buildings on the left bank of the city. On that day, Russian missiles again struck the 750 kV Kyiv substation, located to the west of the Ukrainian capital, which secures, among other things, energy supplies from nuclear power plants. In Dnipro, power, water and heating shortages became permanent.

In the border and frontline regions, Russia carried out further strikes on transport infrastructure. In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, these took place on 11, 14, 15 and 16 February, damaging, among other things, railway facilities in Synelnykove and Kryvyi Rih. On 11, 13 and 15 February, the Russians struck infrastructure in Sumy Oblast (including twice in Konotop), on 13 and 15 February in Mykolaiv Oblast (the target of the second attack was Kulbakyne air base), and on 16 February in Kharkiv Oblast (the locomotive depot in Lozova). According to some sources, on 11 February, Russia carried out an attack on the airport in Lviv, using Kinzhal hypersonic missiles. On 11 February, a drone struck a residential building in Bohodukhiv in Kharkiv Oblast, killing a father and his two children. According to Ukrainian data, from the evening of 10 February to the morning of 17 February, Russia used a total of 1,155 unmanned aerial vehicles (including 740 strike drones) and 68 ballistic and cruise missiles. A total of 985 drones were reportedly neutralised and 43 missiles shot down.

On 11 February, Ukrainian drones hit a refinery in Volgograd, a day later in Ukhta in the Komi Republic, and on 17 February in the Ilsky refinery in Krasnodar Krai, causing fires there. These were the first successful attacks on Russian refineries after a several-week hiatus. In Volgograd, one of the processing facilities was damaged, resulting in the plant halting production. The strike on Ukhta set another record for the range of Ukrainian drones – 1,750 km. The attack was carried out by the SBU’s “Alpha” unit. On 12 February, Ukrainian drones caused a fire at the Progres plant in Michurinsk in Tambov Oblast, and on 15 February, they damaged the Tamaneftegaz oil terminal, a tank and a warehouse in Volna in the Krasnodar Krai.

On 12 February, a combined Ukrainian missile and drone attack targeted the arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence in Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast. Explosions occurred at the facility, but no serious damage was confirmed. The Russians confirmed for the first time that Ukraine had used FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. However, it remains unclear whether the arsenal was hit by one of the six missiles (according to Russian sources, all of them were shot down) or by a drone. In a conversation with journalists on 14 February in Munich, President Volodymyr Zelensky announced the use of Flamingo missiles a few days earlier in an attack on the Oreshnik system base (without specifying the location) and that he was “awaiting the results of the attack”.

On 15 February, the Ukrainians struck a substation in Bryansk, cutting off electricity and heating to part of the city, and – once again – a thermal power plant and one of the substations in Belgorod. As a result of this and previous attacks, the Russians are unable to provide stable electricity and heating supplies to part of Belgorod Oblast and its capital.

On 12 February, the 33rd meeting of countries providing military support to Ukraine in the Ramstein format was held in Brussels. The total value of aid pledged for 2026 is expected to reach $35 billion (according to British Defence Secretary John Healey) or $38 billion (according to Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov). In information previously provided to the media, Mr Healey announced that the UK would participate in the joint purchases for Kyiv in the US under the PURL (Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List) mechanism and allocate £150 million ($205 million) for this purpose and the purchase of an additional thousand “light multi-purpose missiles” for the British-made air defence system for €448 million ($531 million). The next military aid package prepared by London is expected to be worth €574 million ($680 million) and will include missiles and air defence equipment.

German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has announced that Germany will provide Ukraine with five PAC-3 missiles for Patriot systems if other partners provide 30 more. Kyiv is expected to receive them soon. However, no information has yet been disclosed on what decisions have been taken in this regard by other countries with PAC-3 missiles, which are the most effective in combating Russian ballistic missiles. Pistorius’s proposal confirms that European countries have exhausted their capacity to transfer missiles to Patriot systems (Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul admitted this on behalf of the German government on 16 February). Thirty-five missiles would be enough for only one Patriot battery to repel one major strike. Pistorius emphasised that Germany had transferred five of its 12 batteries of this system to Ukraine. In total, the defenders have so far received ten Patriot batteries, at least two of which have been destroyed or seriously damaged. Pistorius noted that in 2026 Berlin intends to provide Kyiv with military support worth €11.5 billion (over $13.6 billion), including additional IRIS-T short-range air defence systems. He also estimated the amount of funds needed to defend Ukraine this year to be at least $50 billion.

Norway and France will jointly finance the purchase of a “large number” of French guided aerial bombs for Kyiv, according to Norwegian Defence Minister Tore O. Sandvik. Norway’s contribution will amount to NOK 4.2 billion ($441 million), while Paris will “guarantee a loan” of NOK 3 billion ($315 million). In 2026, Lithuania intends to allocate €223 million ($265 million) for Ukrainian air defence, drones and artillery ammunition. This was announced the day after a meeting with the country’s Minister of National Defence, Robertas Kaunas.

The purchases planned by Ukraine’s partners in the US through the PURL mechanism will cover 90% of the country’s air defence missile needs, as announced on 14 February by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha. He recalled that, according to Kyiv’s estimates, the demand for purchases under the PURL in 2026 will amount to $15 billion. In 2025, $4 billion was spent through the PURL mechanism, contributed to by 20 countries. The largest donors were Germany, the Netherlands and Norway.

The skies over Kyiv are defended by a squadron of F-16 fighter jets piloted by veterans of the US and Dutch armies, in addition to Ukrainians. This was reported by the Intelligence Online portal on 16 February. The multinational unit was created specifically to defend the Ukrainian capital against Russian cruise missiles and drones. However, the American and Dutch pilots are not participating in operations directly against Russian army units on the front line. The Ukrainian Air Force has thus managed to partially make up for its shortage of pilots.

On 11 February, parliament passed a law postponing military service for conscripts and reservists aged 18-25 who signed a one-year contract during martial law and have already been discharged from service. They are not subject to automatic mobilisation for 12 months from the date of discharge. During this period, they can only be called up for service upon providing their own consent. The “Contract 18–24” programme for young volunteers, launched in February 2025, covers only combat positions, and training lasts more than 80 days.

Also on 11 February, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence announced that the one-off cash payment for those signing a contract for service in 2026 will be 26,600 hryvnia (approximately $700) for privates, 29,900 hryvnia (approx. $780) for sergeants and non-commissioned officers, and 33,200 hryvnia (approx. $870) for officers.

In February, Ukrainian Armed Forces brigades received additional funding of over 4.5 billion hryvnia (approx. $115 million) for the purchase of drones and electronic warfare equipment via the DOT-Chain Defence digital platform. This allows units to independently select the necessary weapons and electronic warfare equipment. Currently, over 470 models of equipment from 135 manufacturers are available on the platform. Over the past six months, approximately 350,000 pieces of equipment with a total value exceeding 16 billion hryvnia (approximately $400 million) have been delivered through the system. Units on the front line receive monthly funding to order the necessary equipment and ensure its timely delivery.

On 13 February, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence clarified the rules for the reorganisation of foreign volunteer units, refuting allegations that they were being disbanded. The ministry emphasised that the International Legion is not a single military unit, but a network of volunteer formations operating in various structures of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, most often the Land Forces and the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine. These units are currently undergoing a transformation: instead of functioning as separate light battalions, they are being incorporated into the Armed Forces’ assault brigades. The ministry provided assurances that foreign volunteer formations continue to carry out combat missions. Foreign combatants are also being incorporated into the National Guard, including operational units such as the Khartiia brigade.

On 14 February, President Zelensky announced that there are approximately 7,000 Ukrainian prisoners of war in Russian captivity, while Ukraine has taken more than 4,000 Russian soldiers prisoner. He noted that Kyiv is ready to exchange all prisoners if Moscow agrees, and would also agree to a smaller, partial exchange.

According to South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) data from 13 February, approximately 6,000 North Korean soldiers who fought on Russia’s side in the war with Ukraine have been killed or wounded. According to the NIS, approximately 11,000 North Korean soldiers are currently stationed in Kursk Oblast.

On 12 February, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) indicated that Russians are attempting to restore access to the Starlink communication system by offering to pay Ukrainians to register the terminals which they (the Russians) use. They claim to be Ukrainian soldiers who allegedly bought the terminal at their own expense but cannot register it themselves, so they are asking their fellow citizens for help. The SBU also notes an increase in attempts by the Russian intelligence services to recruit Ukrainians to carry out arson, sabotage and terrorist attacks. The Russian services operate, among other things, through so-called “false flag” operations, impersonating employees of the Ukrainian intelligence services and law enforcement agencies. These methods include contacting citizens by telephone or online to persuade them to engage in illegal activities, impersonating law enforcement officers offering “assistance” in criminal proceedings, using dating sites to obtain personal data and contacts, and using blackmail and coercion to obtain cooperation.