Charting its own course: How post-colonial Kazakhstan’s identity is being forged

Contemporary Kazakhstan is gradually becoming a Kazakh nation-state, a process that is reshaping its national identity policy. Although the country remains multi-ethnic, the proportion of ethnic Kazakhs continues to rise, as do proficiency in Kazakh and the language’s importance. According to the 2021 census, ethnic Kazakhs accounted for 70.4% of the population (up from 63.1% in 2009), while 71.8% of the population reported proficiency in the state language.^[1] Both figures are likely higher today. These changes have been driven by demographic trends, active government policies – including the repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs – and grassroots initiatives, notably those promoting the wider use of the Kazakh language.

For years, fears of ethnic conflicts and retaliation from Russia deterred Astana from pursuing more extensive Kazakhisation of public life or attempting to curb the influence of the Russian language and culture. Two developments marked turning points: the unrest in January 2022, suppressed with the help of an intervention by the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Faced with security threats, the authorities have taken steps to strengthen state cohesion and continue to pursue this objective. They have acted consistently but cautiously, seeking to avoid a crisis in relations with Moscow while retaining control over a society that is becoming increasingly assertive and pressing for change.

Against this backdrop, a debate is developing over Kazakhstan’s centuries-long dependence on Russia, viewed through the lens of colonialism, although the term itself is rarely used. The scope of this debate is shaped by the interplay between three actors: Kazakhstan’s authorities, its society and its northern neighbour, which is increasingly perceived as a threat to Kazakh statehood.

The starting point: Kazakhs as a minority

As the Soviet Union neared collapse, Kazakhstan was the only Soviet republic whose titular ethnic group made up less than half its population. According to the last Soviet census, conducted in 1989, Kazakhs made up 39.7% of the population, compared with 37.8% for Russians, 5.8% for Germans and 5.4% Ukrainians.^[2] In Alma-Ata, then the capital,^[3] Kazakhs accounted for just 22.5% of the population, while Russians made up 59.1%.^[4] This demographic structure was the result of repressive policies towards the Kazakhs pursued by the central authorities, first under tsarist rule and later during the Soviet period. It also reflected Soviet social engineering, including forced migrations, for which Kazakhstan served as a proving ground.

Acts of extermination included the killing of participants in the anti-Russian uprising of 1916, the Bolsheviks’ elimination of the first generation of the Kazakh intelligentsia and several waves of deliberately induced famine. Finally, the collectivisation campaign of 1931–1933, which involved the forced settlement of nomads and the confiscation of livestock, claimed at least 2.5 million lives. Estimates suggest that the Kazakhs’ proportional losses may have exceeded those recorded in twentieth-century genocides. Only a third of the Kazakh population is believed to have survived these decades of extermination when potential natural population growth and the flight of Kazakh refugees to neighbouring countries are considered.^[5]

Inward migration, however, was the main factor behind the changes in Kazakhstan’s ethnic composition. In the final quarter of the nineteenth century, the tsarist government backed an organised settlement campaign that brought more than 1.5 million settlers to Kazakh lands. Millions more settled there during the Soviet period, mainly as part of two major campaigns: the cultivation of ‘virgin lands’, aimed at turning the steppes into farmland, and industrialisation. The former involved exploitative agricultural practices that led to soil erosion and an environmental disaster. Kazakhstan also became a destination for ethnic groups deported as perceived threats to Soviet rule, including Koreans from the Far East, Poles from the western USSR and Volga Germans. They were joined by prisoners held in the region’s numerous labour camps, who were forced to remain there after serving their sentences.

In total, as many as 8.5 million people arrived in Kazakhstan,^[6] voluntarily or otherwise, following the Russian conquest. According to the 1959 census, Kazakhs made up just 30% of the population of their own republic, while Russians accounted for 42.7%.^[7] Furthermore, ethnic Kazakhs were unevenly distributed across the country, with their share of the population lowest in the northern regions bordering Russia.

Due to its demographic make-up, Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity was called into question from the very outset of its independence. The country was the last Soviet republic to declare independence, doing so on 16 December 1991. Russian politicians and commentators were at the forefront of these challenges. A striking example was Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who openly argued that Kazakhstan’s northern territories should be separated from the country.^[8] In the years and decades that followed, senior Russian politicians, including Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, continued to question Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, portraying it as an ‘artificial’ state lacking a tradition of statehood. They maintained these claims despite Kazakhstan’s formal status as Russia’s ally.

Nazarbayev: Kazakhisation through Kazakhstanisation

Against this backdrop, the authorities, led by Kazakhstan’s first president Nursultan Nazarbayev, made preventing ethnic conflict and preserving the country’s territorial integrity their main priorities. They accepted Kazakhstan’s multi-ethnic character and the privileged position of the Russian language as fundamental principles. Unlike in other post-Soviet states, the authorities thus derived their legitimacy not from ethnic nationalism but from an inclusive policy aimed at maintaining stability in a multi-ethnic society. They deliberately promoted Kazakhstan abroad as a ‘common home for many peoples’. Given the fragility of the post-Soviet order, they also avoided publicising research into Stalinist crimes or commemorating their victims on a wider scale for many years.

To ease tensions between different national and ethnic groups, Nazarbayev established the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, an advisory body comprising representatives of ethnic minority organisations and associations and assumed its chairmanship. The Assembly filled nine seats in the Mazhilis, then the lower house of parliament (Kazakhstan has had a unicameral parliament since 2026).^[9] At the same time, Nazarbayev firmly suppressed any signs of separatism, including those evident in the statements and activities of Cossack activists in the early 1990s.^[10]

While promoting civic Kazakhstani patriotism rather than ethnic Kazakh patriotism, the authorities also sought to strengthen the ethnic Kazakh community and its position in society. A particularly important step was the relocation of the capital in 1997 to Akmola (now Astana), a city in an area traditionally dominated by Russians and Russified members of other ethnic groups, including Poles. The influx of Kazakh-speaking officials into the capital and regional centres helped reshape the ethnic composition of northern Kazakhstan. The authorities also repeatedly changed the number and boundaries of administrative regions to ensure that Kazakhs did not constitute a minority in any of them. They indirectly favoured Kazakhs in recruitment for civil service positions by requiring candidates to demonstrate proficiency in the state language.

The shift in the ethnic balance was also driven by higher birth rates among Kazakhs than among Slavs and Germans, the emigration of ethnic minorities and a government programme to repatriate ethnic Kazakhs from abroad. Most returnees did not speak Russian and were directed to areas where the proportion of ethnic Kazakhs was lowest. An estimated quarter of Kazakhstan’s ethnic Russians (around 1.5 million) left the country in the 1990s, while members of the Ukrainian, German, Jewish and Polish minorities also emigrated in large numbers.^[11] Meanwhile, around 1.2 million ethnic Kazakhs arrived in Kazakhstan between 1991 and 2025, mainly from China and Uzbekistan.^[12]

Nazarbayev avoided measures that would openly favour ethnic Kazakhs or distance Kazakhstan from Russia, whether in practical or symbolic terms. This caution stemmed partly from fears that Moscow might respond by encouraging separatist movements and partly from his own political background. He had come to power through a decision by the Soviet centre, on which he had depended while serving as the republic’s Communist Party leader from 1989 to 1991.

The approach to the Kazakh language taken by Nazarbayev, and later by his successor Kassym-Jomart Tokayev illustrates the extent of this caution. Unlike other former Turkic Soviet republics,^[13] Kazakhstan has continued to postpone its transition to the Latin alphabet. Although the initial decision to make the switch was taken in 2012, Astana has repeatedly missed subsequent deadlines. Under the latest plan, the transition is due to be completed by 2031. Both Cyrillic and Latin scripts are currently used in public life, although the final version of the Kazakh Latin alphabet has yet to be agreed. Cyrillic still prevails.^[14] Even announcements of plans to change the alphabet have provoked strong objections in Russia.^[15]

Other measures taken by Kazakhstan’s first president were reactive. For example, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Vladimir Putin claimed that Nazarbayev had created the Kazakh state. In response, Kazakhstan staged lavish celebrations in 2015 to mark the 550th anniversary of Kazakh statehood, dating back to the establishment of the Kazakh Khanate.

To ensure external security, Nazarbayev involved Kazakhstan in a network of post-Soviet integration initiatives, seeking to prevent other states, particularly Russia, from challenging its territorial integrity. Kazakhstan actively participated in all such initiatives and launched several of them. On 21 December 1991, an expanded Commonwealth of Independent States was established in Almaty, followed by the Eurasian Economic Community in Astana in autumn 2000. As early as 1994, Nazarbayev had proposed establishing a Eurasian Union. However, while Russia sought to establish supranational governing bodies, Kazakhstan opposed efforts to turn economic integration projects into platforms for political integration, with Russia acting as both the leader and representative of the member states. For Astana, maintaining economic ties was, and remains, important, particularly given that around 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports pass through Russian territory.^[16]

Tokayev: moderate progress

The debate over Kazakhstan’s past and its present-day implications intensified around the turn of the decade, amid the transfer of power from Nazarbayev to Tokayev in 2019.^[17] That year also saw a wave of pro-democracy protests sweep the country, giving rise to the Oyan, Qazaqstan! (Wake Up, Kazakhstan!) movement. This was one of the first expressions of political activism among a generation that had grown up in independent Kazakhstan but lacked representation in decision-making circles. Alongside demands to end Nazarbayev’s influence over the state, protesters called for greater public participation and greater independence from Russia. The activists deliberately used Kazakh as their primary language of communication.^[18]

The unrest of January 2022 marked a turning point in Kazakhstan’s recent history, claiming more than 200 lives. It entered the country’s collective memory as ‘Bloody January’ (Kazakh: Qandy Qantar). The unrest began with spontaneous mass protests in western Kazakhstan over an increase in the price of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). The demonstrations soon spread across the country, with political demands added to the initial economic grievances. The revolt subsequently escalated into large-scale riots, during which rioters seized control of several sites, including Almaty airport. These riots were most likely instigated by Tokayev’s opponents within the ruling elite.

A military mission from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), deployed at the president’s invitation, brought the unrest to an end. The intervention was accompanied by the arrest of senior National Security Committee officials who had proved disloyal to Tokayev. These developments paved the way for Nazarbayev’s complete marginalisation from political life and enabled Tokayev to consolidate control over the state, despite lacking a broad political support base or substantial financial assets. Once the situation had stabilised, Tokayev sought to hold selected disloyal members of the ruling elite to account, while refraining from launching a broader campaign of repression against the Kazakh public.^[19]

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 came as another shock to Kazakhstan. The authorities regarded it as a dangerous precedent that could be used to challenge the country’s own borders under the pretext of protecting its Russian-speaking minority. These fears were reinforced by statements from Russian politicians, including Dmitry Medvedev, who claimed in a social media post in August 2022 that Kazakhstan was an artificial state occupying former Russian territories. The post was quickly deleted.

In response, the authorities in Astana took a series of measures aimed at reinforcing national identity and strengthening the state’s resilience. These included a substantial increase in funding for an archaeological project, under way for several years, to catalogue Kazakhstan’s tangible cultural heritage. The project focuses on the northern regions, with its findings intended to demonstrate that the ancestors of present-day Kazakhs inhabited these territories. Other measures included dubbing Russian films screened in cinemas and limiting cooperation with Russian academic institutions.

These measures are politically significant and have prompted negative reactions and pressure from Russia, leading Astana to adjust its course periodically. The status of the Russian language and the situation of Kazakhstan’s Russian-speaking population were among the main issues discussed during Putin’s visit in November 2024, when Tokayev presented himself as the guarantor of their rights. Plans to open new Russian-language schools and a branch of MGIMO University were also announced during the visit.^[20] A seven-volume history of Kazakhstan, still being prepared to mark the 35th anniversary of independence in December 2026, was also subject to last-minute changes. The term ‘colonialism’ was reportedly removed from references to Russia’s policies towards Kazakhstan, while asharshylyq, the Kazakh term used to describe the genocidal famine (deliberate starvation) of 1931–1933, was replaced with asharshyq, a less emotionally charged word referring simply to the feeling of hunger.^[21]

The government’s efforts to strengthen the position of ethnic Kazakhs in society, increase Kazakhstan’s autonomy in relations with Russia and develop a new narrative of statehood can therefore be characterised as limited progress. This approach may also reflect concerns about losing control over Islam in the future, particularly given the religion’s role as an important reference point for Kazakh national identity.

Against this backdrop, Tokayev has maintained a consistent stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Astana has remained neutral towards the war while recognising Ukraine’s territorial integrity. During a panel discussion with Putin at an economic forum in St Petersburg in June 2022, the Kazakh president declared that he would not recognise the self-proclaimed republics in Donbas. In July 2026, during a meeting in Omsk, Tokayev called on Putin to end the war and described the deaths of young people as ‘a shame’, prompting a nervous reaction from the Russian dictator. Such statements serve a dual purpose: they communicate Astana’s position on the war to international audiences while seeking to convince ethnic Kazakhs at home that the authorities represent their views. Audiences of Kazakh-language media tend to be more supportive of Ukraine.

Kazakhstan’s government remains under constant pressure from sections of the Kazakh population with a strong sense of national identity, who demand more extensive Kazakhisation of the state. The mass protests of December 1986, which were brutally suppressed and marked the first major episode of unrest of the perestroika era in the Soviet Union, were triggered by the appointment of a Russian rather than a Kazakh as first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. In the following decades, pressure from groups associated with publications such as Arai and the Russian-language Mysl forced the authorities to take specific measures, including replacing Soviet-era place names.

In search of new interpretations: the contentious term ‘colonialism’

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the role of tsarist and Soviet Russia in Kazakhstan’s history has become an established subject of public debate. Within this debate, Russia has increasingly been portrayed as a colonial power that subjugated the peoples of Central Asia, including the Kazakhs.^[22] However, the use of the term ‘colonialism’ itself remains contentious.

The debate draws on the transformation of national consciousness in Ukraine^[23] and on post-colonial studies, which have gained prominence in the humanities worldwide. It takes place primarily on social media. However, political caution and the focus on history mean that calls for a reorientation of Kazakhstan’s current policies, such as loosening Astana’s alliance with Moscow, rarely feature in the discussion.

The decolonisation of Kazakhstan would centre on reshaping historical memory: reassessing Russia’s role in the country’s history, filling gaps in the historical record and seeking new models of statehood. This involves challenging myths rooted in Russian and Soviet historiography, including stereotypes about the Kazakhs themselves.^[24] The most prominent is the narrative of Russia’s positive role in modernising the territory of present-day Kazakhstan, which overlooks the costs of this process.

This discourse gives renewed prominence to the Kazakh Khanate (1465–1847) as an early form of Kazakh statehood and to local intellectual movements such as Jadidism, a nineteenth-century Muslim reform movement. Dinmukhamed Kunayev, who served as first secretary of Kazakhstan’s Communist Party from 1964 to 1986, is also viewed increasingly favourably. His time in power is associated with stability and the republic’s development. His dismissal triggered the 1986 protests, which were violently suppressed. In 2022, the city of Kapshagay was renamed Qonaev.^[25] The leaders of Alash Orda, a Kazakh autonomous entity that existed from 1917 to 1920, were later victims of the Great Terror and are also being incorporated into the national pantheon.^[26] This reinterpretation of history portrays Nazarbayev and Tokayev as continuing the work of their distinguished predecessors rather than as the founders of the state.

Conclusions and forecast

The process of building Kazakhstan’s national and state identity has been under way since 1991, shaped by demographic and linguistic changes as well as shifts in collective identity. Until Nazarbayev was removed from power, the state apparatus largely directed this process, although strong grassroots pressure from ethnic Kazakhs also played an important role. This began to change under Tokayev, as a new generation came of age, ready to challenge established assumptions and ways of thinking. This shift has also been reflected in popular culture, where the Kazakh language has become increasingly prominent. One example is the pop group Ninety One, named after the year Kazakhstan gained independence.

Calls for decolonisation gained momentum in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Following the invasion, the authorities expanded their efforts to strengthen the position of the Kazakh language, reinforce historical memory and promote state symbols. These domestic policy changes were accompanied by a greater willingness to publicly emphasise the distinct interests of Kazakhstan and Russia. Ultimately, however, the desire to avoid a deterioration in relations with Moscow prevailed.

The authorities’ caution was reinforced by their assessment that Russia would not lose its war against Ukraine. These considerations prompted Kazakhstan to adopt a more security-focused approach to domestic policy, seeking to dampen anti-Russian sentiment and avoid challenging its northern neighbour’s demands on cultural and historical issues, while highlighting its own achievements. At the same time, public messaging in Kazakh is more hard-line than in Russian. For example, Kazakh-language communications openly describe Russia as an aggressor.

The shifts in national identity seen in recent years are likely to continue along their current trajectory. The discourse on decolonisation reflects a deeper transformation of society and its growing sense of agency. This process is reinforced by demographic trends favouring ethnic Kazakhs. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan is unlikely to become an ethnic Kazakh ‘national project’ along the lines of Kyrgyzstan or Turkmenistan in the foreseeable future. The authorities will have to manage tensions between the ethnic Russian minority and the Kazakh majority as they arise, particularly as Moscow may seek to exploit them. Alongside pressing social issues, these tensions represent the most significant challenge facing the state and will affect its relations with Russia.

Although social changes are making Kazakh society more resistant to Russia’s neo-colonial and imperial worldview in the long term, the authorities will continue to avoid confrontation with Moscow in their day-to-day policymaking. This will require considerable flexibility. Astana may make symbolic concessions to Moscow on cultural and historical issues, such as reinstating the 9 May parade, but frame them in national terms, for example by highlighting the contribution of Kazakh soldiers. The ruling elite, led by Tokayev, will continue to have a much greater need to take Moscow’s sensitivities into account than Kazakhstan’s ethnic Kazakh population.