Baku–Ankara rift: headscarf row exposes divisions over Israel
In mid-October, a serious diplomatic rift emerged between Azerbaijan and Turkey. The immediate trigger was the introduction of new school dress regulations by the authorities in Baku, which effectively prohibited clothing associated with Islam, particularly headscarves. The move drew criticism from conservative circles in Turkey, including figures close to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This, in turn, provoked a sharp response from Azerbaijan, which denounced the criticism as unacceptable interference in its domestic affairs.
The dispute brought into sharp relief the differences between the two allies, particularly over regional policy and their respective positions towards Israel. Baku maintains close ties with Israel, while Ankara regards the country as a threat to its national security. Nevertheless, the strategic alliance between Azerbaijan and Turkey remains firmly in place, as neither side sees a viable alternative to it. The relationship is further underpinned by close ethnic, cultural and linguistic ties.
Headscarf ban at the heart of the dispute
Regulations introduced by the Azerbaijani government in September, initially applying to pupils and extended to teaching staff in early October, prohibit the wearing of clothing deemed incompatible with the principle of secular education on school premises (pupils are required to wear school uniforms). The regulations appear intended to tighten state control over society, although they make no explicit reference to hijabs or headscarves. Nevertheless, school principals responsible for implementing them have begun refusing entry to women wearing such head coverings. This has sparked public discontent and spontaneous protests, which the police have moved to suppress. Nearly 40 people have been detained across the country. In some locations, protests turned violent, with school principals physically assaulted and their cars attacked. Amnesty International condemned the new regulations as discriminatory on religious grounds and called on the Azerbaijani authorities to release those detained.
The restrictions have also provoked outrage among conservative circles in Turkey, which have drawn parallels with similar bans imposed by the Turkish military following the 1997 coup. Those restrictions remained in force until the mid-2000s, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) lifted them – a move the party continues to portray as one of its greatest achievements. Public pressure prompted Ankara, which generally refrains from commenting on Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs, to take a firm stance. In a post on X, presidential adviser Oktay Saral described the Azerbaijani regulations as ‘unacceptable’ and demanded their withdrawal. Numerous politicians from the ruling camp echoed his position, prompting a sharp response from Baku.
The New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) and the parliamentary working group on Azerbaijani–Turkish relations condemned the criticism as unacceptable interference in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs and an unwarranted attack on its constitutional foundations and the principle of secularism. Amid the dispute, Ankara downgraded its representation at the summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), held in Baku on 14–15 October. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan attended instead of President Erdoğan. Furthermore, on 21 October, Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry published a list of 31 Turkish citizens deemed unwelcome in the country, most of them journalists from conservative media outlets and individuals affiliated with religious organisations.
The ‘school uniform dispute’ has provoked such strong reactions because the leaderships of both countries generally present a united front, both internationally and to their domestic audiences, and consistently emphasise the strength of their alliance. Their willingness to exchange accusations publicly on this occasion reflects deeper tensions and differences over foreign policy, particularly their assessments of regional developments and their respective approaches to Israel. Baku regards Israel as a close partner and arms supplier. Ankara, by contrast, sees it as a destabilising force in the region and views its territorial and political expansion as a threat to Turkey’s national security. These concerns have been further heightened by confrontational and hostile remarks about Turkey from Israeli decisionmakers. Furthermore, Turkish public opinion has firmly sided with the Palestinians in the Gaza conflict, while the Turkish authorities have repeatedly accused Israel of committing genocide. During Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address to the UN General Assembly in September, the Turkish delegation walked out alongside representatives of more than 70 other countries. The Azerbaijani delegation, however, remained in the chamber, a move that was poorly received in Turkey. Israeli President Isaac Herzog subsequently travelled to Baku for the CICA summit on a scheduled Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) flight, as Turkey does not allow Israeli government aircraft to use its airspace. This was a clear signal from Baku that it would prioritise its own national interests.
The alliance holds despite differences
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Baku and Ankara have maintained close ties, formalised in a strategic alliance. Regardless of its domestic political evolution, Turkey has remained not only a key political partner for Azerbaijan but also its most important security partner. For much of this period, it also served as a model for the country’s development. Having regained control over Nagorno-Karabakh with Turkish support between 2020 and 2023, Azerbaijan has begun to position itself as a regional power.
Initially, Turkey was primarily an ally for Azerbaijan in its confrontation with Armenia and a gateway to the West, given its position as a key NATO member. Since the turn of the century, the two countries have also developed close cooperation on major infrastructure projects, particularly the construction of oil and gas pipelines, which have reshaped the energy landscape in this part of Eurasia. These projects have enabled Azerbaijan to export hydrocarbons to global markets while bypassing Russia and Iran. Turkey, for its part, has secured access to these resources and established a foothold for further expansion into the South Caucasus and Central Asia. This cooperation has also strengthened both countries’ positions vis-à-vis Moscow, a benefit that has gained even greater significance since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As Erdoğan consolidated his hold on power, Ankara also became a model for Baku in terms of its assertive foreign policy and highly personalised style of governance.
The first significant strains in relations between the two countries emerged in the late 2000s, as Islam began to play an increasingly prominent role in Turkish politics. In Azerbaijan, by contrast, state secularism remains an inviolable foundation of the political system and a fundamental principle of the Aliyev family’s rule. Baku also viewed Ankara’s first attempt to normalise relations with Yerevan in 2008–2009 with unease. Following the outbreak of the First Karabakh War in 1992, Turkey had imposed a blockade on Armenia and closed its border with the country in a show of support for Azerbaijan, seeking to pressure Yerevan into making concessions. The Turkish–Armenian protocols, which envisaged the establishment of diplomatic relations and the reopening of the border, were ultimately not ratified, largely due to pressure from Baku, including threats to withdraw Azerbaijani deposits from Turkish banks. Despite being the smaller and weaker partner in the Turkic alliance, Azerbaijan demonstrated its ability to defend its interests and assert its independence. Nevertheless, the dispute did not prevent the two countries from signing the Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance in 2010, partly in response to the Russia–Georgia war. The agreement provides for mutual assistance in the event of an attack on either country. The Shusha Declaration, signed in 2021, several months after the end of the Second Karabakh War, reaffirmed their strategic partnership and formalised their alliance.
Ankara currently maintains that it will not fully restore ties with Yerevan until Armenia and Azerbaijan conclude a formal peace agreement.
Two states, two distinct nations
The Azerbaijani–Turkish alliance is encapsulated in the propaganda slogan ‘two states, one nation’, first used by Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s long-serving leader and father of the current president, Ilham Aliyev. Despite this rhetoric, Baku is determined to assert its distinct identity and autonomy, seeking to avoid becoming dependent on Turkey or being relegated to the role of a ‘younger brother’. Azerbaijan’s highly assertive foreign policy serves this purpose. The current crisis should also be understood in this context, although mutual misunderstandings have contributed to the dispute. Turkish politicians lack a full understanding of Azerbaijan’s domestic realities and the wider post-Soviet context, while Azerbaijani elites underestimate the importance of public opinion in Turkey. Bringing these underlying tensions into the open set off a chain reaction that further escalated the dispute.
The current tensions are likely to subside over time without undermining the multifaceted alliance the two countries have built over decades. Both countries need each other and neither has a viable alternative to their partnership, even if their positions and interests do not always align. Moreover, their professed cultural affinity is genuine, with roots dating back to the emergence of the modern Azerbaijani nation. Nevertheless, their divergent relations with Israel will remain a source of friction and could trigger further crises. Baku can also be expected to seize every opportunity to assert its equal standing in its relationship with Ankara.
President Ilham Aliyev’s attendance at the summit of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), scheduled for 29–30 October in Ankara, would signal a return to normal relations between the two countries. Erdoğan himself has sought to secure Aliyev’s participation. On 21 October, he telephoned the Azerbaijani president to extend a personal invitation, after Baku had already published its list of unwelcome Turkish nationals. On 26 October, Erdoğan’s adviser Oktay Saral was dismissed from his post, a move welcomed by Baku. Against this backdrop, Aliyev is now likely to attend the summit, despite earlier media speculation that Azerbaijan would be represented at a lower level.
