The Kremlin’s powerlessness: Russia’s response to the US operation in Venezuela

The US military operation in Venezuela on 3 January, which resulted in the capture of the Russia-aligned dictator Nicolás Maduro, took the Kremlin by surprise and prompted only a diplomatic response. In an official statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation criticised Washington’s actions, describing them an act of aggression. It also expressed regret, called for dialogue and a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and declared solidarity with the Venezuelan people. It further appealed for Maduro’s release and a meeting of the UN Security Council. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke by phone with acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez, pledging continued support for Caracas.

The forcible removal of Maduro by the United States represents a reputational blow to Russia, as it has exposed its limited capacity to protect its partners. For the Kremlin, this situation presents both political risks, including a decline in Russia’s influence in the region, and economic risks, such as a potential drop in revenues from raw materials. However, it also offers potential advantages, particularly in the political and propaganda sphere, by damaging the image of the United States and potentially exacerbating divisions within the Western community.

Commentary

• Russia’s response to the removal of Maduro underscores Moscow’s powerlessness. As with the Israeli-US strikes on Iran last June (see ‘Moscow’s response to Israeli attacks on Iran’), it failed to provide any tangible support to its partner or to intervene effectively on its behalf at the political level. This occurred despite the fact that, in recent years, Russia had asserted its presence in Venezuela by temporarily deploying strategic bombers and sending Wagner Group mercenaries. According to some reports, 120 Russian military instructors were operating in the country in 2025, and new air defence systems had also been delivered covertly to Venezuela. However, given its ongoing talks with the United States regarding Ukraine, Russia cannot currently afford to strain its relationship with Washington. Venezuela has touted its close ties with Russia, but it remains a secondary partner for Moscow. Cooperation between the two countries has occurred primarily in the political sphere, with more limited engagement in military matters (Venezuela’s armed forces have relied on Russian weaponry, particularly in aviation and air defence) and in the economic domain. According to existing plans, bilateral trade is expected to reach only $400 million by 2030. In the short term, Russia may attempt to position itself as an intermediary between Washington and the successors to the Maduro regime.
• The US operation has also exposed Russia’s unreliability as an arms exporter. A significant portion of Venezuela’s air defence systems was either neutralised during the operation or was inoperative, as Russia, focused on its war effort in Ukraine, had failed to deliver spare parts or carry out the necessary maintenance and repairs.
• The potential collapse of the regime in Caracas, or a shift in its political orientation, could also entail negative economic consequences for Russia. For example, it could complicate efforts to recover outstanding debt. Between 2006 and 2017, Russia reportedly extended loans and made direct investments in Venezuela totalling $17 billion. In 2017, the two sides agreed that Venezuela would repay $3.5 billion in debt between 2024 and 2027. Should the country, with US support, increase its oil supply (it currently accounts for just 1.5% of global exports), this could drive down global oil prices and, consequently, reduce Russia’s oil export revenues – a critical stabilising factor for its economy.
• However, Russia may reap political benefits from Washington’s actions. The US operation in Venezuela is likely to strengthen the impact of Russia’s anti-Western propaganda, which frequently employs ‘anti-colonial’ and sovereignty-focused rhetoric, aimed in particular at countries in the Global South. It may also serve to justify the invasion of Ukraine, framed as an operation to defend Russia’s ’legitimate security interests’. By portraying the United States as a power that enforces its sphere of influence through the use of force, the Kremlin could relativise its own conduct in the so-called post-Soviet space and Eastern Europe.

• Any further military actions by the Donald Trump administration would serve Russia’s interests by antagonising other countries and risking a crisis among Western nations. This would be especially true if Washington took similar steps in relation to Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark (see: ‘Greenland: a unity government in Nuuk and the American dream of the Arctic’). Such a move would trigger a serious escalation of transatlantic tensions and threaten NATO’s internal cohesion, amounting to a strategic success for Russia in its confrontation with the West.