China-Russia Dashboard:
a special relationship in facts and figures

Sino-Russian relations are closer today than they have been in decades. In these times of historic geopolitical tensions, it is all the more important to understand the nature and elements of the relationship of two of the world’s most influential powers. This dashboard aims to contribute to a better understanding by tracking and analyzing the economic, political, security, and societal dimensions of China-Russia relations and their changing quality over time. It is a collaborative research effort of the Swedish National China Centre (NKK) and the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) and the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS).

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Economics

China-Russia bilateral trade has grown steadily over the last decade and has intensified since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Following a sharp surge in 2022 and 2023, China–Russia bilateral trade stabilized in 2024 at USD 245 billion, more than double its 2020 level. In 2025, total trade declined 6.9 percent year-on-year, despite record monthly trade levels in December.

The trade balance has been relatively even in value terms, with only a slight Russian surplus. However, it is structurally imbalanced in the types of goods traded. Russia’s exports to China mainly consist of fossil fuels and other natural resources, while China’s exports consist of manufactured goods such as cars, tractors, electronics, and other consumer products. The value of Russian exports is thus sensitive to volatile energy markets, and a large part of the initial post-invasion increase was due to higher energy prices.

Shipments of dual-use items from China to Russia surged in late 2021, likely driven by stockpiling and year-end production peaks. Exports then fell sharply after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine amid concerns about sanctions, yet quickly recovered, remaining historically high throughout 2022 and 2023. A renewed decline occurred following the US Treasury’s announcement in December 2023 of potential secondary sanctions on entities assisting Russia’s military-industrial base. However, Chinese exports rebounded in the second half of 2024, suggesting adjustments to circumvent these restrictions. As a result, dual-use shipments from China to Russia once again exceeded USD 4 billion in 2024. At the beginning of 2025, they declined again — mirroring the overall trend in China-Russia trade — but rebounded in the following months, and over the full year rose back above USD 4 billion.

Note: The data refers to dual-use goods included in the Common High Priority List, developed jointly by the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The list categorizes 50 items, each identified by a six-digit Harmonized System (HS) code, into four tiers. The full list is available on the website of the US Bureau of Industry and Security. The values represent a 3-month moving average and have been adjusted to reflect the HS 2022 Nomenclature amendments.

Russia’s energy exports to China form the backbone of their bilateral trade, steadily increasing in both value and volume. After 2022, China’s market acted as a safety net, allowing Russia to redirect fossil fuel exports from the West. However, the slowing growth rate in 2024 highlights political and economic constraints on further expansion. Additionally, the value of these exports remains highly dependent on global energy prices.

This chart shows Russian oil exports to China surged from 2022 onwards, reaching more than 108 million tonnes in 2024 – an increase of about 30 percent since 2022. The growing share of Russian oil in China’s imports is largely a consequence of Western sanctions, which forced Russia to redirect its crude exports – even at a certain discount. While China has become a key buyer, the value of this trade remains highly sensitive to price fluctuations.

Russia’s coal exports to China have grown steadily, with a notable acceleration in 2023 due to Western sanctions. As Russian exporters lost access to EU markets, they intensified shipments to China. However, after reaching a record high in 2023, volumes started to decline and eventually leveled out in 2025, suggesting certain limitations on further growth due to the rise in domestic output in China and diversification of coal imports.

Russian LNG exports to China have grown steadily, with a temporary dip in 2021 due to pandemic-related constraints. Chinese LNG imports from Russia nearly quadrupled between 2019 and 2025, reaching a record 9.9 million tonnes. The staggering growth in 4Q 2025 is due to China’s willingness to import cargoes from the sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 facility, showing its readiness to ignore the US sanctions regime.

Russia began exporting pipeline gas to China in 2019 with the launch of the Power of Siberia-1, earmarked to reach its nominal capacity of 38 billion cubic meters per year by 2025. Gazprom indeed reached that level in 2025, exporting 38.8 bcm. With of the loss of Russia’s European market, China has become a crucial recipient of Russian gas. However, Russia needs additional pipelines to expand its market share further. So far, China has been hesitant to approve new projects while Moscow tries to push the project of the Power of Siberia-2 with its 50 bcm/y design capacity.

The share of Chinese yuan (CNY) in Russia’s international trade increased sharply following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions. Before the war, settlements in CNY accounted for less than 2% of Russia’s total trade but rose quickly, reaching nearly 40% in January 2024. However, this growth trend halted after the US Treasury announced that it could impose secondary sanctions on third-country entities assisting Russia’s military-industrial base. Since then, the Central Bank of Russia has stopped publishing specific data on the yuan’s share. According to our estimates based on available official data, the share of CNY in Russia’s international trade has since dropped to approximately 30%. Meanwhile, the role of Russia’s domestic currency, the ruble, has increased notably.

With the discontinuation of official disclosure after February 2024, the estimate can no longer be reliably calibrated to a consistent methodology, creating a structural break in the underlying data. At the same time, the growing use of routing through third jurisdictions and alternative payment mechanisms dilutes the mapping between “friendly-currency/ruble settlements” and actual yuan usage, making point estimates misleading.

China’s imports from Russia mainly consist of natural resources. Since February 2022, on average, more than 70 percent of the total trade value has been composed of mineral fuels (primarily crude oil). Other mineral products accounted for a further five percent, base metals seven percent, animal and vegetable products and foodstuffs six percent, and wood and paper four percent. Due to falling global oil prices and higher sanction-driven discounts on Russian oil, the value of mineral fuel exports declined in 2025, while the shares of other categories grew correspondingly.

China’s exports to Russia are more diversified and consist primarily of manufactured goods. Since February 2022, on average, machinery and mechanical appliances made up around 24 percent of the total trade value. Vehicles (mainly passenger cars) accounted for 16 percent, electrical machinery and equipment 15 percent, and textiles, footwear, and headgear approximately 11 percent.

Security

Joint Russia-China military exercises have grown significantly in number, size, complexity and geographic scope since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since their first joint exercise in 2003, the two countries have conducted 96 joint exercises – 31 of them, or one third since the war began on February 24, 2022.

In 2024, they held 11 joint exercises across ground, naval and aerial domains, including their first joint naval patrol in the Arctic Ocean, the first joint coast guard patrol, and the first joint aerial patrol that entered the US air defence identification zone. In September, China participated in Ocean-2024, Russia’s largest naval exercise since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In 2025, the number of joint drills was lower – seven in total – but these broke some new territory. Russia and China held their first joint submarine patrol in August. In multilateral formats, they conducted a joint border defense drill with Mongolia in September, and held the first-ever multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) exercise in Iran in December. At the same time, joint exercises are becoming more routine, with some exercises now taking place annually.

Since 2003, Russia and China have conducted 96 joint military exercises across various domains and formats. These include ground, naval, aerial, para-military and multi-domain exercises, as well as army competitions and computer simulations. The number of exercises per year has increased in recent years, reaching an all-time high of 11 in 2024, although decreasing in 2025.

Since 2022, a large majority of joint exercises – 20 of 33 – have consisted of naval drills and patrols, accounting for all the recent growth in joint exercise activity. Starting from their joint naval exercise in 2009, Russia and China conducted only a few such exercises annually. However, in 2024 alone, 7 out of 11 total exercises were naval, and in 2025, 4 of 7 have been naval drills and patrols.

China has significantly reduced its arms imports from Russia in recent years. This trend is driven by China’s growing self-sufficiency in military production and has been accelerated by Russia’s declining arms exports amid the war in Ukraine. While Russian deliveries still account for the largest share of China’s arms imports (76% in 2023), their overall importance has diminished, as reflected in the decreasing volume.

Politics

This timeline tracks China-Russia bilateral engagements in three key domains – heads of state, diplomatic, and military – since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022. The frequency of these interactions surpasses that of any other bilateral relationship for both China and Russia. Between February 2022 and February 2026, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin interacted 19 times through in-person meetings or phone calls. Top diplomats Wang Yi and Sergey Lavrov met 30 times, including bilateral discussions and within multilateral settings. Military leaders from both sides – such as Sergei Shoigu, Andrey Belousov, Dong Jun, Li Shangfu, and Wei Fenghe – held 14 engagements during this period. Other than the frequency of engagements, the trend in key messaging shows growing alignment on strategic coordination in multilateral platforms and a stronger tone in opposing unilateral actions such as sanctions and military interventions by the United States.

The graph shows that voting alignment between China and Russia declined in both the General Assembly and the Security Council from 2018 to 2024, with the steepest drop after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In 2025, however, this trend reversed, and voting alignment increased in both bodies. The number of adopted resolutions in the General Assembly also increased sharply that year to 192, up from around 85 to 100 in the years prior.

Voting coordination remains stronger in the Security Council, where the two countries almost never cast directly opposing votes, though one such case occurred in November 2024. Resolutions rarely proceed to a vote when a permanent member has signaled its intention to veto, meaning some disagreements are not shown in recorded voting. In this graph, which only shows adopted resolutions, divergence in the Security Council occurs when one votes yes and the other abstains.

The operation of border checkpoints serves as a barometer of China-Russia bilateral relations. Traditionally, the Chinese side has been more proactive in promoting trade through these checkpoints, while the Russian side has shown more caution, primarily due to concerns over China’s growing role in the development of the Russian Far East. As a result, infrastructure improvements on the Russian side have progressed slowly. However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the end of China’s COVID lockdowns, these checkpoints have become significantly busier, with trade volumes reaching record highs. There has also been notable progress in expanding capacity to facilitate bilateral trade – for instance, the construction of bridges across the Amur River and the expansion of checkpoint facilities. The increasing activity at these checkpoints reflects a broader trend of China-Russia alignment and highlights Russia’s growing dependency on China, suggesting Moscow is now prioritizing its relationship with Beijing, while becoming less concerned about China’s influence in the development of the Russian Far East.

Society

The number of Chinese exchange students in Russia has grown steadily over the years, increasing from approximately 30,000 in 2020 to over 50,000 in 2024, a 72% increase. Similarly, Chinese students have accounted for a growing share of all foreign exchange students in Russia, rising from 9.4% in 2020 to 13.6% in 2024. As a result, China has surpassed other countries and is now the third-largest country of origin – its student numbers nearly matching those of the top two, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

While Chinese students at the bachelor’s level make up the largest group in absolute numbers, China is by far the leading country of origin for master’s students. In 2024, its 16,411 master’s students represented approximately 36% of all master’s students in Russia.

Explainer paragraph: Key figures in China-Russia bilateral relations indicate a closer alignment across various domains, highlighting stronger strategic coordination in political narratives and military cooperation. Both Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have set the tone for these relations, not only based on their respective geopolitical positions but also by promoting a shared worldview and ambition to build an alternative global order – one in which China and Russia play a greater role as stabilizing powers. This ambition is further articulated by their chief diplomats, Wang Yi and Sergey Lavrov, who emphasize the goal of establishing a multipolar world order and the democratization of international relations. Military leaders from both sides have also called for deeper cooperation, aiming to enhance stability not only between China and Russia but also within the broader global system.

Sources:

Quotes from Chinese representatives: CNN, SCMP, Chinese Ministry of Defense, SCMP,

Quotes for Russian representatives: CNBC, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Reuters, Global Times

The number of tourist visits between Russia and China grew steadily for years, peaking in 2019 with nearly 1.9 million Russian visits to China and over 2.3 million Chinese visits to Russia. However, tourism between the two countries collapsed during the COVID-19 pandemic and further declined following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with visits dwindling to just a few thousand in 2021 and 2022.

In 2023, tourism rebounded significantly in both directions, though it remained far below pre-pandemic levels – less than a third of the peak recorded in 2019. As a share of total tourist visits to Russia, Chinese tourist visits peaked at 7.7% in 2019, plummeted to 0.3% in 2021 and 2022, and recovered to 5.8% in 2023.

The Iran-related views from key Chinese and Russian figures suggest they are aligned on Israel’s attack on Iran and how to address the Iranian nuclear issue. Their statements highlight a shared worldview and hint at the outlines of a Chinese-Russian “strategic coordination” in the case of a major geopolitical crisis such as the military conflict between Israel and Iran. Both sides condemned Israel and indirectly called out the United States. Their language also reveals the contradictions and ambiguities in how international law and sovereignty are interpreted in global politics. While China condemned Israel’s strike on Iran, it has remained silent on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – mirroring the West’s silence on Iran and its support for Ukraine. By positioning themselves on the moral high ground in contrast to perceived Western double standards, China and Russia are advancing an anti-hegemonic narrative against unilateralism and justifying the disruption to the international order. In doing so, they credit themselves as the stabilizers of the international order.

Sources:

Quotes from Chinese representatives: Xinhua, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Xinhua
Quotes from Russian representatives: Reuters, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Xi-Putin phone call: Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Al Jazeera

The presidents of China and Russia were relatively restrained in their public statements after the US capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026. They spoke largely in generalized terms about international order and sovereignty, refraining from explicitly mentioning Venezuela in subsequent weeks. However, their foreign ministry officials and representatives at the United Nations directly named and condemned Washington for its actions. They consistently framed these as violations of international law, as destabilizing for the international order, and as undermining the interests of the broader international community. Chinese and Russian representatives also depicted the United States as a unilateral bully, using the Venezuela episode to present themselves as more restrained, law-abiding, and responsible great powers.