

VISEGRAD DEVELOPMENT AID IN THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP REGION

Zsuzsanna Végh



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INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) launched its Eastern Partnership (EaP) program in 2009, bringing together the member states of the Union and the six countries of its Eastern neighborhood (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) under a common initiative with the aim of contributing to their democratization and bringing them closer to the European Union politically, economically and on the level of societies. More than four years later, after the 3rd reunion of the Presidents and Prime Ministers of the group (held under the Lithuanian EU Presidency in November 2013) and after Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich refused to deepen his countries relations with the EU by signing an Association Agreement, hopes have significantly dropped and the program faces serious challenges.¹

The EU is under pressure to convince skeptics about the further legitimacy of the program. Likewise, certain EU member states such as the four Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), who were among the initiators and midwives of the program several years ago, hope to see tangible results. Moreover, the region being in the foci of their foreign policies, it is in these countries' utmost interest that the European Union continues to support democratization, as well as the economic and social reform processes of their Eastern neighbors.

While Vilnius is certainly an important milestone, the EaP program does not end there. Accordingly, the necessity of the EU's continued support and commitment is echoed in the V4 and EaP countries' common declaration of May 17, 2013.² While the EU's support as such is certainly important, the V4 countries themselves also need to move beyond political declarations, and consider how they can further improve their contributions to the region's reforms. One of the most important tools for enhancing the reform processes and for bringing

¹ Reforms conducted in the earlier EaP "frontrunner," Ukraine, have been stagnating since 2010, and the government still has to deliver on several specific requirements in order to be able to sign the Association Agreement (AA), including the Agreement about a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The recent "star-reformer," Moldova, sank into a political crisis in spring 2013, which risked slowing down the association process between the country and the EU. By now, it is clear that the country cannot sign, but can only initial the AA, along with Georgia and Armenia. At the same time, not much progress can be seen in Azerbaijan and Belarus, two states remaining under authoritarian rule.

² Joint Statement on the Eastern Partnership of the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Group, Ireland and Lithuania. MFA of the Republic of Poland, 2013. <https://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/odada40c-3212-4889-acc7-45a96ef1a3bo:JCR>

the Eastern partners closer to the European Union is through the assistance provided as part of the countries' international development cooperation (IDC) policy through which all four Visegrad countries are active in the region. It has been often mentioned that to pursue their interest in the region the V4 countries should coordinate their IDC policies, should invest more resources, and possibly even create a common development fund for such purposes.³

This paper seeks to assess the possibilities for enhancing cooperation in the field of the international development cooperation policies of the Visegrad countries with the aim of furthering the goals of the EaP program. It builds on the analysis of primary sources (official strategy papers and reports of the V4 countries) as well as on interviews with representatives of national governments and the International Visegrad Fund. In order to lay the foundation for recommendations, the paper will give a brief overview about the specificities of the Visegrad countries' bilateral development activities in the EaP region and their common actions through the International Visegrad Fund.⁴ Based on this analysis, the paper will assess the potential for the improvement of cooperation in the EaP countries. Lastly, the paper will conclude with a short list of recommendations for the V4 countries concerning tangible steps that could be taken to strengthen the Visegrad impact in the Eastern Partnership region through the V4 countries international development cooperation activities.

³ E.g.: Mateusz Gniazdowski, Visegrad cooperation in Polish foreign policy: as it stands and the outlook for the future, [In:] *Panorama of Global Security Environment 2010*, CENAA, Bratislava 2010, 55-57, Dariusz Kałan, East of Center.: Can the Visegrad Group Speak with One Voice on Eastern Policy? PISM Policy Paper 53 (2013). <http://www.pism.pl/Publications/PISM-Policy-Paper-no-53>

⁴ Although development aid is also provided through EU channels, the present paper does not intend to analyze these multilateral modalities of Visegrad IDC.

I. VISEGRAD IDC POLICIES TOWARDS THE EAP COUNTRIES

The Visegrad countries are often referred to as emerging or re-emerging donors due to the fact that their international development cooperation policies have only been (re-)launched long after their regime changes, in the early 2000s.⁵ While in general their strategic documents refer to internationally accepted norms, standards and agreements in the field of IDC, their actual policy practices show significant differences compared to those of established donors. Although the traditional focus of established donors, the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and poverty reduction, appears to varying degrees in the national IDC strategies and concepts of the Visegrad countries, when looking at the target countries of their official development aid (ODA), it becomes apparent that more attention is devoted to middle income countries rather than the least developed countries of Africa or Asia. Thus, even if their official documents suggest otherwise, the focus of the Visegrad countries is first and foremost not poverty reduction.⁶

As the Visegrad countries entered the international donor community, they sought to find a niche in the international arena where they can capitalize on their unique experiences. The systemic changes after the fall of their communist regimes gave them a specific knowledge concerning political, economic and social transformation and transition, which even the European Union decided to incorporate into its community-level international development policy in 2005.⁷ This body of knowledge, the so-called transition experience, naturally cannot be directed towards regions with completely different socio-political backgrounds. Hence, the V4 countries turned their attention to countries that were going through or had just embarked on a similar systemic transformation: the countries of Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. By aiming to transfer this experience, the Visegrad countries also pursue their foreign policy goals of having stable and secure democracies in their neighborhood.


⁵ More on this in: Lightfoot and Lindenhovius Zubizarreta. *The Emergence of International Development Policies in Central and Eastern European States*, [In:] *European Development Cooperation. In Between the Local and the Global*, edited by Paul Hoebink, 175-193. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010. 175-193.

⁶ For a more detailed analysis see a paper prepared by a consortium of non-governmental organizations (FORS, MVRO, Grupa Zagranica and HAND) *Development Cooperation of the Visegrad Group in the context of the European Union*. Briefing Paper, May 2011. http://www.fors.cz/user_files/fors_brief_v4_final.pdf

⁷ *Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council. On Accelerating Progress Towards Attaining the Millennium Development Goals: EU Contribution to the Review of the MDGs at the UN 2005 High Level Event*. 9266/05. General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, May 24, 2005. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/pl/05/sto9/sto9266.pl05.pdf>

The composition of their ODA also reflects the fact that the V4 countries are new donors. For each country, the amount of multilateral ODA still outweighs that of the bilateral ODA. As Annex I shows, the multilateral ODA generally amounts to about 2/3 of the official development aid in each country. The bilateral aid is then further divided among the target counties of the Visegrad states' development policy. Annex II shows that the relative weight of the EaP countries in the bilateral ODA disbursement of the V4 countries varies from one Visegrad country to the other. Figures clearly show that Poland's bilateral ODA is focused on this region the most, with spending of USD 43.06 million (47.78% of the bilateral aid) here in 2011. Poland is followed by the Czech Republic and Hungary which spent USD 11.4 million (14.26%) and USD 4.17 million (12.58%) respectively, and further behind is Slovakia with only USD 1.32 million (6.16% of its bilateral ODA) disbursed in the region in 2011. To further compare the proportions by also taking into account the economic potential of the countries, it is worth looking at the countries' bilateral ODA spent in the EaP region in relation to the countries' GNI: here again, Poland leads with 0.009%, followed by the Czech Republic with 0.006%, Hungary with 0.003% and Slovakia with 0.001% in 2011 (Annex II). This data further reflects the differences among the resources invested by the V4 countries invested in the region.

Graph 1. Net ODA disbursement of V4 countries in EaP countries



	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Poland	32.86	34.19	41.3	35.82	43.06
Czech Republic	8.78	10.72	16.49	14.26	11.4
Hungary	2.76	3.04	2.18	4.5	4.17
Slovakia	0.33	0.97	1.29	1.52	1.32
V4 Total	44.73	48.92	61.26	56.1	59.95

Source: OECD DAC data; www.aidflows.org

After studying the data from 2011, Graph 1 shows how the Visegrad countries' absolute bilateral disbursements changed over time in the Eastern Partnership region as a whole.⁸ It shows that the differences among the V4 countries were and remained significant. Nonetheless, it is also noteworthy that all V4 countries increased their contributions in the EaP countries in absolute terms compared to the pre-crisis years of 2007-2008 when the EaP program of the EU was not yet running. Although we do not see a linear growth in the absolute amounts, this may be explained by the effects of the financial and economic crisis. Additionally, the data in Annex II also proves that the EaP region became more important in the individual Visegrad countries' bilateral development policies: looking at the proportion of the countries' bilateral ODA spent in the EaP region in terms of their total bilateral ODA, we find that in all four cases the shares have increased since the pre-crisis years.

Considering the aggregated share of the V4 countries' bilateral ODA spent in the region, we see that USD 59.96 million, i.e. 26.68% of their overall bilateral ODA,⁹ was spent in the six partner countries in 2011. While the absolute amount is still modest, proportionally it already represents a significant share of the four countries' bilateral development aid. As Annex III shows, this aggregated share of V4 ODA in EaP countries in relation to the total V4 bilateral ODA gradually increased since 2007. Bearing in mind this aggregated increase of proportion, and that over time all V4 countries increased their individual shares both in absolute and proportional terms, one can argue that altogether the region is gaining importance in the Visegrad countries' IDC policies.

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic set up a completely unique IDC system in 2007, when it institutionalized the division in its development focus between traditional issues of development cooperation policy on the one hand and transition policy on the other. This way, the Department for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid became responsible for the traditional development activities in line with the global goal of poverty reduction, and the Department of Human Rights and Transition Promotion Policy is focused on formulating a strategy in order to share the Czech Republic's transition experience. The current

⁸ The data used in this paper is from the period 2007-2011. The starting point is chosen to show the data before the crisis. 2012 is not listed yet, as only preliminary OECD DAC data is available as of May 2013.

⁹ See Annex III for the percentages.

development strategy outlines the country's priorities for 2010-2017, which is an unusually long planning period among the Visegrad countries. Similarly, the Transition Promotion Program covers the same eight years. In line with the different focus of the two programs, the circle of their target countries is also different. The traditional development policy of the Czech Republic selected only Moldova as a program country and Georgia as a project country¹⁰ from among the six EaP partners, while the Transition Promotion Program involves Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.¹¹

After Moldova became a program country, a cooperation program was signed between Chisinau and Prague in 2011 that laid out a detailed strategy for the 2010-2017 period, defining the exact priority areas to be targeted by Czech development aid. Being a traditional development program, the activities outlined in the cooperation program are more technical in nature and are in line with the MDGs. The priorities include environmental protection, social development (education, social and health services) and agriculture, water supply and sanitation, governance and civil society development.¹² The implementation of the development program is in the hands of the Czech Development Agency, which manages technical cooperation projects selected through public procurement and grant calls. Since technical cooperation often means infrastructural projects, cooperation with the government or with local authorities in the target country is absolutely necessary. Additional modalities, as defined in the Development Cooperation Strategy, are scholarships and small-scale projects which are better suited to target the society of the target country, either because they involve citizens in the former case, or because they target specific local needs in the latter.¹³

The Transition Promotion Program, implemented through the MFA Department of Human Rights and Transition Promotion Policy, is also aimed directly at civil society. The main areas of the program are support for civil society,

¹⁰ The Development Cooperation Strategy of the Czech Republic 2010-2017. MFA of the Czech Republic, 2010. 15. http://www.mzv.cz/file/762314/FIAL__Development_Cooperation_Strategy_2010_2017.pdf


¹¹ Target Countries. MFA of the Czech Republic, 2013. http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/human_rights/transition_promotion_program/target_countries/index.html

¹² Development Cooperation Programme. Moldova. 2011-2017. MFA of the Czech Republic, 2011. http://www.mzv.cz/public/44/29/ba/698495_600996_Development_Cooperation_Programme_Moldova_2011_2017.pdf

¹³ Unfortunately, no data is available about the number of scholarship recipients broken down by country of origin.

youth, media and human rights defenders as well as cooperation with local authorities. Here, all EaP countries are eligible for project support, and according to the last available report from 2010, all EaP countries benefited from the program to some extent with the exception of Azerbaijan and Armenia.¹⁴

Graph 2. Net ODA disbursement of the Czech Republic in EaP countries



	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Ukraine	2.69	3.14	5.29	3.22	3.03
Moldova	2.82	2.88	3.26	4.25	4.28
Georgia	1	2.32	5.86	4.17	2.05
Belarus	1.7	1.67	1.58	1.77	1.78
Armenia	0.5	0.67	0.43	0.73	0.21
Azerbaijan	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.12	0.05

Source: OECD DAC data; www.aidflows.org

As Graph 2 shows, in line with being a program country, the amount of bilateral ODA provided for Moldova has increased steadily so far. It is noteworthy that the Czech Republic is currently the biggest donor in Moldova from the Visegrad Group, even ahead of Poland. In 2011, the Czech Republic provided USD 4.28 million to Moldova in bilateral ODA, while Poland – the country which is otherwise the biggest donor from the V4 – disbursed “only” USD 1.71 million in the country. At the same time, despite its project country status, the allocation

¹⁴ The most support was provided for Belarus (EUR 321,052), then Georgia (EUR 273,060), Moldova (EUR 247,118) and finally Ukraine (EUR 159,656). Projects Implemented in 2010. MFA of the Czech Republic, 25.08.2011. http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/human_rights/transition_promotion_program/about_us/summary_of_program_activities/projects_implemented_in_2010.html

for Georgia gradually decreased after having peaked in 2009.¹⁵ A decrease can also be noted in Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan, while a slight increase occurred in the absolute amounts spent in Belarus between 2009 and 2011. All in all, the absolute amount of Czech bilateral ODA spent in the region decreased between 2009 and 2011, which can be suitably explained by the effects of the crisis, as the country's overall bilateral ODA also decreased during this period.

Hungary

The Hungarian IDC policy is strategically and institutionally the least developed of the V4 countries. As of May 2013, a decade after the recommencement of the country's IDC activities, there is still no overarching legislation and strategy that serves to guide policy. Thus, when assessing the Hungarian IDC contribution in the EaP countries, one has to rely on documents adopted at the launch of the policy in 2003 and on the yearly reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for its coordination and implementation. The Hungarian IDC system is, in consequence, centered on the MFA, works without a development agency and currently does not include any re-granting organization.


In its 1/2003. decision, the IDC Inter-Ministerial Committee named Moldova and Ukraine priority countries of the Hungarian development policy in 2003.¹⁶ Officially, this selection has not changed ever since, and the other four EaP countries have barely appeared on the spectrum of Hungarian IDC policy. According to a publication of the MFA from 2008, Moldova became a program country with a cooperation program for 2009-2011.¹⁷ Nevertheless, unlike in the case of other program countries, this cooperation program was never published. In the same document from 2008, Ukraine is listed as a project country. This is somewhat controversial, since Ukraine has always been the biggest beneficiary of Hungarian bilateral ODA in the EaP region (Graph 3). Moldova is far behind; slightly ahead of the other EaP partners in absolute amounts until 2011, when both Georgia and Belarus took over.

¹⁵ Due to the war between Georgia and Russia, more attention was suddenly paid to the country. Such a tendency can also be noted in the ODA provided by Poland. Hungary's and Slovakia's ODA for Georgia peaked in 2008.

¹⁶ 1/2003. Decision. International Development Cooperation Inter-Ministerial Committee, 2003. http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/Nemzetkozi_fejlesztes/nemz_fejl/NEFE_TB.htm

¹⁷ Hungary. Inspired by Experience. International Development Cooperation. MFA of the Republic of Hungary, 2008. 20. <http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/NR/rdonlyres/09524B2E-76D7-4DCC-ADF6-67D3E1A14FA7/0/InspiredByExperience.pdf>

Graph 3. Net ODA disbursement of Hungary in EaP countries



	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Ukraine	2.49	2.25	1.92	4.12	3.62
Moldova	0.27	0.42	0.17	0.23	0.1
Georgia	0	0.26	0.05	0.03	0.13
Belarus	0	0.08	0.01	0.05	0.16
Armenia	0	0	0	0.02	0.06
Azerbaijan	0	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.1

Source: OECD DAC data; www.aidflows.org

Lacking a strategic vision with regards to its international development cooperation policy so far, the activities directed at the EaP region remain very limited and *ad hoc* in nature. Based on the annual reports of 2009 and 2010, Hungary places emphasis on sharing its transition experience with its partners, thus mainly with Moldova and Ukraine.¹⁸ With regards to Moldova, the reports list a couple of technical assistance projects where Hungary supported its partner in adopting the *acquis communautaire* of the EU. Such projects still continue in the field of agriculture and, more recently, energy. Additionally, the Ministry provides project support for NGOs, albeit on a rather irregular basis. One of the major organizations active in Moldova, whose projects stemming from such project support are even mentioned in the MFA's annual reports, is the International Center for Democratic Transition (ICDT).¹⁹

¹⁸ The annual report about 2011 and 2012 are not available on the governmental website as of May 2013.

¹⁹ The International Center for Democratic Transition (www.icdt.hu) is a non-profit organization, which functions as a unit with an independent legal entity under the Center for Democracy Public Foundation (www.demkk.hu/en). Its goal is to collect the experiences of political and economic transitions originally in the Central European region and to share these with countries undergoing similar processes. ICDT mostly works in Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and most recently North Africa.

Source: Introduction. ICDT. <http://www.icdt.hu/about-us/introduction>

Discussing some details of the implemented projects, it becomes clear from the reports that in Ukraine the priority is not cooperation with Kyiv, but rather with organizations and local authorities in certain cities of the Transcarpathian region, inhabited by a significant Hungarian minority. An important amount of ODA directed to Hungarian communities living in Ukraine mainly focuses on the development of education and health care e.g. through the so-called Szülőföld Alap (Homeland Fund),²⁰ which has now been replaced by the Bethlen Gábor Fund. Interestingly, support for the Hungarian minorities living abroad had several separate lines over the years in the annual budgets of the MFA which were not listed under the budgetary line of international development aid and humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, activities financed from resources listed under these separate budgetary lines were accounted for as official development assistance in the annual IDC reports. Such a focus by the Hungarian IDC, however, does not come as a surprise, since the Hungarian government laid down, in the very first IDC concept in 2001, the provision of support for Hungarians living abroad as one of the goals of IDC policy.²¹

The Hungarian development cooperation policy is currently undergoing a revision and strategic planning process at the request of the Hungarian Parliament. The draft strategic document that was circulated in May 2013 marked out Ukraine and Moldova as priority countries in the Eastern Partnership region, but it did not yet specify in what form and based on what principles cooperation would continue. However, judging from recent trends, the transfer of transition experience and technical assistance in support of the countries' European aspirations will most likely remain significant, while support for the Hungarian minority through IDC will also not disappear in Ukraine's case.²²

²⁰ Report about the Activities of the Official Hungarian International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid in 2010. MFA of the Republic of Hungary, 2011. 42. http://www.kormany.hu/download/1/2d/50000/beszamolo_magyarorszag_2010_evi_nefe_tevekenysegerol.pdf#!DocumentBrowse

²¹ Concept about the International Development Cooperation of the Republic of Hungary. MFA of the Republic of Hungary, 2002. http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/Nemzetkozi_fejlesztés/nemz_fejl/koncepcio.htm

²² The question might arise whether other Visegrad countries also consider supporting their minorities living abroad (especially in Eastern Europe) as part of their IDC activity. It is especially relevant in the case of Poland, which, according to official estimates, has a 15-20 million member Polish diaspora (people of Polish origin) living abroad. Out of this about 249,500 live in Belarus (2009 census) and 144,100 in Ukraine (2001 census). While it would be hard to say with absolute certainty that no IDC projects support the Polish minority in these countries, the official IDC documents do not enlist providing support for these groups among the goals of Polish international development cooperation. Indirectly, of course, these groups might also benefit. Poland runs a separate program (Polish Com-

Poland

Poland's international development cooperation policy underwent a major reform in 2011, and received a fresh impetus under the new Act on Development Cooperation and the 2012-2015 Multiannual Development Cooperation Program the following year. A specific aspect of the Polish IDC system is that it continues working without a development agency. The policy area is managed by the Department of Development Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (under the aegis of Polska Pomoc/Polish aid), which deals both with strategic tasks of policy planning and programming, as well as the managerial tasks of project selection and supervising implementation.²³ The importance of the EaP region is already reflected by the structure and the task division of the department, where one unit focuses only on the Eastern Partnership region, while another one concentrates on development projects and programs for countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Western Balkans, that is, every other geographic priority.²⁴ The new strategic document also highlights the Eastern Partnership region as a whole as a geographic priority. Incorporating the entire region constitutes an extension of the previous focus, which until 2010 listed only Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine under priority countries.²⁵ Despite the current broader focus, however, Armenia and Azerbaijan still remain of lower importance for Poland.²⁶

munity Abroad) in support of the Polish diaspora, which was under the supervision of the Senate from 1990. In 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took over the task and now runs the program under the Department of Cooperation with Polish Diaspora and Poles Abroad. In 2013, the budget for this program stood at PLN 52 million (about USD 16.4 million).

Source: End of Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Competition - "Cooperation with Polish Diaspora". European Foundation of Human Rights, 1.02.2013. <http://media.efhr.eu/2013/02/01/ministry-foreign-affairs-competition-cooperation-polish-diaspora-2/>


²³ Interview with Polish MFA officials. May 2013. See: www.polskapomoc.gov.pl

²⁴ The Development Cooperation Department Team, Polish Aid, <http://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Zespol,Departamentu,Wspolpracy,Rozwojowej,51.html>

²⁵ Poland's Development Cooperation. Annual Report. 2010. MFA of the Republic of Poland, 2011, 12. https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/files/dokumenty_publicacje/PUBLIKACJE_2011/www_raport_roczny_2010_MSZ.pdf

²⁶ This geographic extension is not reflected on the website of Polska Pomoc (<http://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl>) either, which provides specific information about Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, but not about Armenia and Azerbaijan. This might change, however, once the report concerning 2012 becomes available.

Graph 4. Net ODA disbursement of Poland in EaP countries



	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Ukraine	13.12	12.46	10.02	11.53	12.04
Moldova	1.84	2.06	1.16	1.2	1.71
Georgia	1.62	2.57	12.29	6.49	6.58
Belarus	15.57	16.36	17.03	15.82	21.21
Armenia	0.22	0.45	0.56	0.59	1.12
Azerbaijan	0.49	0.29	0.24	0.19	0.4

Source: OECD DAC data; www.aidflows.org

Graph 4 shows that, based on the absolute amount of ODA disbursement, Belarus is the most important partner country of Poland. The other Visegrad countries largely lag behind Poland in terms of aid provided for Belarus.²⁷ Unlike in other partner countries, Polish development aid is primarily invested in the development and empowerment of civil society in Belarus, and in counterbalancing Alexander Lukashenko’s propaganda by funding a television (Belsat Television) and two radio stations (Belarusian Radio Racyja, European Radio for Belarus) airing their program in the country. There is no development aid provided to the central administration, which presents a unique situation since in all other partner countries Polish development aid is directed both at governmental bodies and civil society. Regarding the absolute amount of aid, Belarus is followed by Ukraine and Georgia, while the contribution in Moldova is significantly lower compared to the former two.

²⁷ See Graphs 2-5 and Annex II.

With regards to the modalities of aid disbursed in the EaP countries, three categories should be mentioned: technical assistance to governmental bodies (except in Belarus), scholarships, and direct project support. According to the Annual Reports of Poland's Development Cooperation between 2009 and 2011, Poland supports the partners' European aspirations in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia through providing aid to the administrations, governmental bodies generally in the form of technical assistance, sharing Poland's transition experience, and by helping the adoption of the EU's *acquis communautaire* in line with the partners' EaP Action Plans and Association Agreement negotiations. This means that the actual content of the assistance differs from country to country, and takes into account the individual needs. Additionally, Poland offers a very significant support for scholarships, which has high importance in building connections between the donor and the partner country and can be an important tool for socialization. The scholarships are most popular among Belarusians and Ukrainians, who form the two biggest groups of foreign students in the country.²⁸

Since 2011, project support – a modality mainly targeting the civil society – is provided in all EaP countries through calls for projects run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 2012, the International Solidarity Fund (ISF),²⁹ a re-granting organization, has also been involved in Polish development cooperation activities in Eastern Europe. It is in charge of supporting democratization and the transition process in those partner countries of Poland that qualify as 'partly free' or 'not free' under the categorization of Freedom House. It distributes, through open calls for proposals, grants for Polish non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who in partnership with civil society organizations in the partner countries implement short term projects. This program again only covers Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine from the EaP region. Azerbaijan and Armenia were not target countries, either in 2012 or in 2013.³⁰ For now there are overlaps between the calls of the MFA and those of the ISF: namely, in certain cases, the same NGOs are eligible to apply for both calls with projects

²⁸ Poland's Development Co-Operation. Annual Report 2009. MFA of the Republic of Poland, 2010, 54. https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/files/2010%20!/MSZ_raport_roczny_2009_www.pdf

²⁹ The Development Cooperation Act refers to the International Solidarity Fund as the Polish Foundation for International Development Cooperation "Know How". The legal basis of the two organizations is the same. The ISF took over the registration of the latter and was (re-) launched in 2012.

³⁰ All in all, USD 2.57 million is available for Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Tajikistan and Tunisia in 2013.

having very similar goals implemented in the same countries. Although it is a problem that should be overcome in the near future, according to MFA officials, the activities of the ISF represent added value in the Polish IDC system. The ISF can further the goals of the Polish IDC policy by cooperating with local actors even in such sensitive cases where the involvement of Polish governmental representatives would be problematic or undesirable (e.g. cooperation with representatives of the political opposition in a given target country).


Slovakia

Considering both the absolute amounts of ODA (USD 1.32 million in 2011), and the bilateral ODA spent in the EaP region in proportion to the country's GNI (0.0001% in 2011), Slovakia is by far the smallest Visegrad donor in the EaP region. Its presence through ODA is very limited: in Azerbaijan and Armenia, Slovakia is practically not present at all, and in Belarus it is barely visible, as shown by Graph 5. The current strategic framework of development cooperation is the second mid-term IDC strategy of the Slovak Republic, and is valid for the period of 2009-2013. This strategy defines the priority countries, which are divided into program and project countries. Reflecting Slovakia's stronger focus on the Western Balkans, as opposed to Eastern Europe, in its foreign and consequently also development cooperation policy, none of the six Eastern partners were selected as program country – although admittedly funds directed to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have increased since the start of the EaP initiative.³¹ Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are project countries, where the development activity of Slovakia is implemented through the Slovak Development Agency. Bratislava mostly seeks to contribute to building democratic institutions and civil society, market economy and infrastructure, and contributing to the social development of the partners³² through sharing Slovakia's transition experience with the partners.

³¹ Serbia in the Western Balkans is a program country. Medium-Term Strategy for Official Development Assistance of the Slovak Republic for the years 2009-2013. MFA of the Slovak Republic, 2009. 13. <http://eng.slovakaid.sk/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Medium-Term-Strategy-2009-2013-EN.pdf>

³² The list is based on focus areas posted on the website of Slovak Aid (www.slovakaid.sk).

Graph 5. Net ODA disbursement of Slovakia in EaP countries



	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Ukraine	0.06	0.48	1.02	0.35	0.49
Moldova	0.19	0.17	0.13	0.49	0.27
Georgia	0	0.12	0.09	0.51	0.51
Belarus	0.08	0.2	0.03	0.17	0.05
Armenia	0	0	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	0	0	0.02	0	0

Source: OECD DAC data; www.aidflows.org

Graph 5 shows that, in line with identifying them as project countries in 2009, assistance provided for Georgia, Belarus and Moldova increased after 2009, albeit in the latter two cases it dropped again in 2011. ODA disbursed in Ukraine, on the other hand, decreased significantly in 2010 and did not reach the 2009-level in 2011 either.

The element of experience transfer was strengthened by the establishment of the Center for Transfer of Experiences from Integration and Reforms (CETIR), which was set up in 2011 with the aim of “intensifying contacts of Slovak experts with representatives of state authorities in countries of the Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership or other transition countries.”³³ While it does not exclude civil society organizations from the circle of beneficiaries, it primarily targets public administration and supports bilateral cooperation with actors of the governmental administration in Slovakia. Therefore, CETIR dif-

³³ CETIR. Center for Experience Transfer in Integration and Reform. Program of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Slovak Republic for transfer of experience in integration and reforms. MFA of the Slovak Republic, 2013. [http://www.mzv.sk/App/WCM/ZU/Belehrad-ZU/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_ABE54FAFE6C6C54FC1257B2500430423_EN/\\$File/CETIR.pdf](http://www.mzv.sk/App/WCM/ZU/Belehrad-ZU/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_ABE54FAFE6C6C54FC1257B2500430423_EN/$File/CETIR.pdf)

fers in this regard both from the International Solidarity Fund of Poland and the Czech Transition Promotion Program.

All in all, the Visegrad countries' IDC policies towards their Eastern partners show many substantial similarities. Fundamentally, they all focus on various aspects of the political and economic transition of the partners. In different forms and to various degrees, they also all support the development of an open society in the partner countries. It can also be observed that development aid allocated for the countries of the South Caucasus is virtually non-existent. Even in Georgia, the strength of support varies among the V4 countries. Belarus is an obvious priority for Poland, but the other Visegrad countries hardly get involved in providing bilateral development assistance either for the government, or for the society. Ukraine and Moldova are the only two countries where all V4 members are present and are gradually engaging more and more. The channels through which these activities are conducted vary from country to country, and at this stage there is no coordination among the Visegrad countries, either concerning strategic programming or the allocation of their funds.³⁴

Common presence – the International Visegrad Fund

The International Visegrad Fund (IVF) was established in 2001 in order to deepen the internal cohesion of the Visegrad Group by providing an opportunity to civil society organizations from the V4 to work together on projects of common interest. Ten years later, the idea of institutionalizing a framework for common IVF activities in the EU's Eastern neighborhood arose, based on the success of the Fund's work and the Visegrad countries' common foreign policy objectives in Eastern Europe. Occasionally, there were projects prior to this which included partner organizations from Eastern Europe, but in 2011, the governments of the four countries established the Visegrad 4 Eastern Partnership (V4EaP) program designed specifically for the region. The program was launched the following year.³⁵

³⁴ The sole document that referred to the importance of donor coordination in the target country was the Czech Republic's country strategy on Moldova.

Development Cooperation Programme. Moldova. 2011-2017. MFA of the Czech Republic, 2011. 5-6, 11-13. http://www.mzv.cz/public/44/29/ba/698495_600996_Development_Cooperation_Programme_Moldova_2011_2017.pdf

³⁵ Joint Statement on the Enhanced Visegrad Group Activities in the Eastern Partnership. V4 Prime Ministers' Summit, 2011. <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/joint-statement-on-the>

At the same time, the Visegrad states' contribution to the IVF's budget was raised from EUR 1.5 million to EUR 1.75 million per country per year, which effectively increased the overall budget by EUR 1 million. The V4EaP program was launched with a budget of EUR 1,456,800 and received an additional sum of approximately EUR 1.5 million from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. This amount is divided between grant programs available for consortiums of NGOs from the Visegrad and the EaP countries, and scholarships for students from the EaP countries in order to pursue studies in a Visegrad country of their choice. The real added value of the grant and the scholarship programs is their socialization effect on the participants, which is central to deep-reaching and sustainable changes in the targeted societies.

The first successful project applications of the new program are still under implementation, and therefore an assessment of the program's success would be premature. However, according to a representative of the International Visegrad Fund, there have already been significantly more applicants for the second call for projects, and so far both the V4 governments and the external funder seem to be satisfied with the results. While at this stage the Fund has mostly selected projects for support with lead partner organizations in a Visegrad country, increasing the number of projects led by organizations from the Eastern Partnership countries should be a goal for the future.

The scholarship program was launched in parallel with the grant calls and it replaced the previous scholarship schemes for Ukrainian and Belarusian students, as well as part of the In-Coming scholarship program which also targeted the EaP countries previously. Following the first call for application in 2012, 76 students were awarded scholarships and 73 after the second call in 2013. Annex IV sums up the number of scholarship recipients coming from the EaP region to study in V4 countries, and indicates that with the launch of the new scholarship scheme a slight decrease occurred in the numbers (7-10 recipients less, equating to a decrease of 8-12%). As before, the biggest recipient groups remain the Belarusian and Ukrainian ones. What is troubling, though, is that in several cases there were no candidates at all from the countries of the South Caucasus and from Moldova applying for scholarships in some of the Visegrad countries. As a result, awareness-raising about the program in these countries should be a priority for the Fund.³⁶

³⁶ Approved Scholarships & Fellowships 2003-2013. International Visegrad Fund. http://visegradfund.org/scholarships/approved_scholarships/

While it is too early to judge the success of the V4EaP program *per se*, certain positive and negative characteristics already become evident when we evaluate it from the perspective of individual V4 countries. On the upside, the IVF program appears as an additional tool in the implementation of the common foreign policy objective of the Visegrad Group. It can also further the goal of the Eastern Partnership initiative – especially with regards to building a stronger, more open civil society in the EaP countries. The Fund also advocates the importance of strengthening internal cohesion through mutual cooperation and by sharing experiences. This principle appears in the V4EaP program too, but besides internal cohesion within the groups, the creation of stronger ties between the V4 and the EaP regions is also among the desired goals. An additional advantage of the IVF program is that it requires the EaP NGOs to work with multiple V4 NGOs on the supported projects, therefore the added-value is higher than in the case of the project support schemes of the individual V4 countries.

On the other hand, providing project support through a common channel also means that instead of the individual country, the regional cooperation gets additional visibility in the EaP region. This might not be attractive for some of these emerging donors, when they are still in the process of establishing themselves by increasing their own visibility through bilateral ODA as opposed to funding new multilateral cooperation. Despite the obvious advantages, gaining more support and resources for such multilateral programs can therefore pose a challenge. All in all, however, whether V4 countries will be willing to invest more into the V4EaP program still remains to be seen and will depend both on the success of the program and on whether the common understanding prevails that the EaP is the primary common foreign policy priority of the regional cooperation.


II. POTENTIAL FOR ENHANCING IDC COOPERATION TOWARDS THE EAP REGION

The international development cooperation systems of the Visegrad countries are all rather new, in most cases only about a decade old. They are still undergoing reforms and the countries are striving to strengthen their own profiles as development donors in the world by gradually increasing their bilateral ODA. Nevertheless, their resources are very limited and were further cut due to the financial and economic crisis. Still, as Annex III showed, the bilateral ODA ratio of the Visegrad countries as a group spent in the EaP region gradually increased after 2009. However, given that the individual systems are still developing and the countries are focusing on creating their own brand, it is highly unlikely that in the near future it would be in their interest to set up a common development fund – either for the EaP region or in general. The political will and the financial resources are missing for such a common initiative at the present stage.

Instead of creating new institutions, however, a rationalization of the current cooperation systems and a consolidation of existing resources is feasible and should be considered. As the previous section has shown, the Visegrad countries are all involved to various extents in the Eastern Partnership region through their IDC policies. There are similarities between these policies, hence one can find overlaps, and there are differences, thus complementarities. Therefore, there is indeed a rationale for cooperating and coordinating better in order to improve the Visegrad countries' development presence in the EaP region.

For such cooperation and coordination, the best entry points would be Ukraine and Moldova. All four Visegrad countries already have a significant presence in these two partners – relative to their size, of course. At the same time, their IDC presence is virtually non-existent in Armenia and Azerbaijan; Hungary and Slovakia are hardly visible in Georgia; and Belarus, the most challenging of all partners, is Poland's exclusive “playground” when it comes to development cooperation. As Graph 6 shows, the absolute amount of the total Visegrad ODA allocated for Ukraine was maintained even during the crisis, which in relative terms, in fact, represents an increase, while the accumulated V4 bilateral ODA disbursed in Moldova actually increased even in absolute amounts (Graph 7). Hence, initiating stronger cooperation where the conditions are already ripe is a logical step.


Graph 6. Net ODA disbursement of V4 countries in Ukraine



	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Poland	13.12	12.46	10.02	11.53	12.04
Czech Republic	2.69	3.14	5.29	3.22	3.03
Hungary	2.49	2.25	1.92	4.12	3.62
Slovakia	0.06	0.48	1.02	0.35	0.49
V4 Total	18.36	18.33	18.25	19.22	19.18

Source: OECD DAC data; www.aidflows.org

Graph 7. Net ODA disbursement of V4 countries in Moldova



	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Poland	1.84	2.06	1.16	1.2	1.71
Czech Republic	2.82	2.88	3.26	4.25	4.28
Hungary	0.27	0.42	0.17	0.23	0.1
Slovakia	0.19	0.17	0.13	0.49	0.27
V4 Total	5.12	5.53	4.72	6.17	6.36

Source: OECD DAC data; www.aidflows.org

In Ukraine and Moldova, all Visegrad countries provide assistance both for the central and local administration, and for civil society. The following table collects the main foci of the V4 development activities outlined in the respective countries' current multi-annual development strategies. In the case of Hungary, the list relies on the annual development reports of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 2009 and 2010, as there is no strategy document available.

Table 1. Main development foci of V4 countries in Ukraine and Moldova under their current development strategies

	Ukraine	Moldova
Poland (2012-2015)	Public security and border management; regional development, strengthening public administration and local government; SMEs and job creation	Public security and border management; regional development, strengthening public administration and local government; agriculture and rural development
Czech Republic (2010-2017)	Through the Transition Promotion Program, support for civil society, youth, media, human rights defenders, cooperation with local authorities	Environment; social development (education, social and health services); agriculture, water supply and sanitation; government and civil society Through the Transition Promotion Program, support for civil society, youth, media, human rights defenders, cooperation with local authorities
Hungary (based on annual reports, 2009-2010)	Strengthening public administration and local government; adoption of European standards (economy); public security and border management; strengthening civil society in Transcarpathia	Strengthening public administration and civil society (Dniester Euroregion); adoption of European standards (customs, phytosanitary standards)
Slovakia (2009-2013)	Building democratic institutions and civil society; market economy and infrastructure; social development	Building democratic institutions and civil society; market economy and infrastructure; social development

Strengthening public administration, institution building or supporting the adoption of European standards (explicitly or implicitly – e.g. through customs, agriculture reform) are all present in each program. The modality of aid in such categories is usually technical assistance managed through the central administration of the donor country targeting governmental bodies in the recipient country. Nevertheless, apart from the Czech country-strategy for Moldova, none of the strategy documents refer to the importance of international donor coordination.³⁷ While there is no doubt that Moldova and Ukraine may benefit from all the currently running technical assistance projects, stronger coordination should be considered among the Visegrad partners. The benefit of such coordination from the Visegrad perspective would be the potential for cutting costs by pooling resources, and transferring more knowledge by pooling experience. From the recipients' point of view, the benefit is that they would get more concentrated support with higher added-value.

Currently, the institutional requirements are not present for such coordination as there are no consultation procedures in place among the Visegrad countries in this regard. However, since these projects are generally launched by central administration agencies, ministries responsible for the given areas in which support is provided should consult each other to find potential synergies among the four donors. If forward-looking strategic planning was in place and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with the implementation agencies, oversaw the whole process in each country (which should in any case be the long-term goal), then the relevant departments of the MFAs could coordinate such consultations among each other.

Updating and extending the European Transition Compendium (ETC) with current data could lay the ground for such coordination. The ETC is a database created by the European Commission in cooperation with the new member states in order to collect information about their so-called transition experience, and thus help its incorporation into the European development coopera-

³⁷ Development Cooperation Programme. Moldova. 2011-2017. MFA of the Czech Republic, 2011. 5-6, 11-13. http://www.mzv.cz/public/44/29/ba/698495_600996_Development_Cooperation_Programme_Moldova_2011_2017.pdf

The Slovak development strategy emphasizes the potential role of trilateral (sic!) donor cooperation in the Eastern Partnership region, although for different reasons. Trilateral development cooperation is considered an advantageous form of providing assistance given the country's limited resources and new donor status.

Trilateral Development Assistance. MFA of the Slovak Republic, 29.07.2013. http://www.foreign.gov.sk/en/foreign_policy/slovak_aid#trilateraldevelopmentassistance

tion policy.³⁸ While this database certainly has some significant shortcomings (outdated contacts, superficial information), the initial idea is very constructive. Moreover, the database is accessible online for anyone and can be updated by the authorities of the EU member states. Therefore, the infrastructure already exists to create a more meaningful and useful tool both for internal coordination among the Visegrad countries and for informing the partners about the areas of expertise of the given donor.

Even though the Visegrad Cooperation started with the goal of strengthening internal cohesion, in recent years it has embarked on the road to develop its external dimension, too. While the Eastern Partnership as such has been high on the agenda of the Visegrad Presidencies in the past years, international development cooperation – which could be a tool to support the goals of the EaP – still has only a limited visibility in the presidential programs.

A common aspect of V4 development activities in Moldova and Ukraine is support provided for the development of civil society, which is a crucial element of democratization. Without a strong civil sector, endorsing European values and standards, the sustainability of democracy will be endangered in Ukraine and Moldova. Without detailed data, however, it is hard to tell exactly how much is invested into such activities (e.g. civil society support, scholarships) by each Visegrad country. Nevertheless, it would be advisable to concentrate sufficient resources in these fields as they have a socialization and multiplier effect.

Continuing the scholarship schemes is also an essential investment, possessing good socialization potential. Currently, Poland runs a successful scholarship scheme that is highly popular in Ukraine but considerably less so in Moldova. The language factor and the geographical proximity, of course, can explain this. Hungary also provides scholarships both in Ukraine and Moldova, but the outreach is very limited. Therefore, Visegrad countries should provide further possibilities for students coming from both countries to study at V4 colleges and universities by providing access to education in English or potentially in the host country's language after intensive language training.

Ground projects strengthening civil society are implemented through various organizations. In Poland, the International Solidarity Fund is in charge, in the Czech Republic the Transition Promotion Program as part of the MFA, in Slo-

³⁸ The European Transition Compendium is available online at: www.eustransition.eu

vakia the Slovak Development Agency, while in Hungary the MFA coordinates the projects. With such a diverse institutional background and with the responsible institutions having different levels of authority, it is more problematic to coordinate these programs and projects among the Visegrad countries than their technical assistance. Therefore, two separate paths could be considered: aligning the frameworks of direct project support in the different countries to allow for Visegrad NGOs to cooperate when applying for the calls of the individual MFAs or agencies, or, while keeping the current channels, strengthening in addition the IVF's V4EaP program after the first round of projects will have been evaluated.

The main advantage of building on the IVF is that the institutional framework is already in place with a proven record of being able to manage international projects. While it would not increase the bilateral share of the Visegrad countries' ODA and might not raise the profile of an individual country, the IVF's practice of funding mutual projects of multiple Visegrad and EaP partners provides better opportunities for the participating organizations to exchange experience and good practices in a wider group, allowing room for more diverse input. Engaging with several organizations at once opens more channels to different networks for the project participants. Such a result contributes significantly to the goal of the EaP program by increasing and deepening people-to-people contacts between EU member states and Eastern partner countries.

After identifying and elaborating on certain entry points for enhanced IDC coordination between Visegrad countries for fostering the goals of the Eastern Partnership program, the following brief list will recap the conclusions of the paper in the form of policy recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Visegrad countries should maintain political support for the Eastern Partnership program on the European level and advocate for the increase of funds.
- The V4 should move further beyond political declarations and should enhance the effectiveness of the international development cooperation policies of the Visegrad Group directed towards the EaP countries through coordination and cooperation.
- While the rhetoric is that of clear support, based on their IDC figures the Visegrad countries should engage more resources to contribute to the success of the Eastern Partnership program.
- Setting up a new, common Visegrad Development Fund for such purposes is not realistic at the moment. Instead, the V4 should focus on using existing instruments better.
- The Visegrad countries should firstly narrow the scope of enhanced coordination to the two most advanced partner countries: Ukraine and Moldova.
- The Visegrad countries should start strategic consultations about creating coordination procedures among their institutions responsible for strategic planning of IDC and the management of technical assistance programs.
- Making use of the already existing tools is pivotal. Update the on-line version of the European Transition Compendium to define the areas where the V4 countries have valuable transition experience and share this information among each other and partners.
- Through coordination and using the updated tools, V4 countries and their EaP partners should find new synergies for cooperation.
- Pooling financial and knowledge-based resources for specific commonly identified technical assistance programs and projects could be a step ahead.
- And finally, increasing the support for civil society through scholarships and further project funding opportunities at the International Visegrad Fund should be considered in order to further people-to-people contacts and enhance the socialization effects of such programs.

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Annex I. Official Development Assistance of the Visegrad Countries

Million USD Constant prices, 2011	Czech Republic					Hungary				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GNI*	190,984.24	197,159.91	188,888.87	192,536.2	200,934.29	141,354.81	136,097.87	130,065.23	132,059.42	129,699.89
ODA*	209.5	244.86	225.77	243.79	250.46	108.92	102.27	123.86	121.92	139.73
Bilateral ODA*	94.81	115.1	106.23	85.02	79.96	34.77	14.77	31.36	30.24	33.15
Multilateral ODA*	114.69	129.76	119.54	158.77	170.5	74.15	87.5	92.5	91.68	106.58
ODA/GNI	0.11%	0.12%	0.12%	0.13%	0.12%	0.08%	0.08%	0.10%	0.09%	0.11%
Bilateral ODA/GNI	0.05%	0.06%	0.06%	0.04%	0.04%	0.02%	0.01%	0.02%	0.02%	0.03%
Multilateral ODA/GNI	0.06%	0.07%	0.06%	0.08%	0.08%	0.05%	0.06%	0.07%	0.07%	0.08%
Bilateral ODA/ODA	45%	47%	47%	35%	32%	32%	14%	25%	25%	24%
Multilateral ODA/ODA	55%	53%	53%	65%	68%	68%	86%	75%	75%	76%

Million USD Constant prices, 2011	Poland					Slovakia				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GNI*	373,234.91	441,466.44	460,357.74	474,241.03	495,985.96	85,451.23	92,666.12	88,868	92,057.21	94,205.82
ODA*	378.51	332.64	411.55	396.02	416.91	79.51	92.73	76.9	78.65	86.02
Bilateral ODA*	162.47	74.86	100.86	100.68	90.12	32.64	41.21	20.22	21.28	21.43
Multilateral ODA*	216.04	257.78	310.69	295.34	326.79	46.87	51.52	56.68	57.37	64.59
ODA/GNI	0.10%	0.08%	0.09%	0.08%	0.08%	0.09%	0.10%	0.09%	0.09%	0.09%
Bilateral ODA/GNI	0.04%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	0.04%	0.04%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%
Multilateral ODA/GNI	0.06%	0.06%	0.07%	0.06%	0.07%	0.05%	0.06%	0.06%	0.06%	0.07%
Bilateral ODA/ODA	43%	23%	25%	25%	22%	41%	44%	26%	27%	25%
Multilateral ODA/ODA	57%	77%	75%	75%	78%	59%	56%	74%	73%	75%

* Source of data: OECD

Annex II. Official Development Assistance of the Visegrad Countries in the Eastern Partnership Countries

Million USD Constant prices, 2011		Czech Republic					Hungary				
		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GNI*		190,984.24	197,159.91	188,888.87	192,536.2	200,934.29	141,354.81	136,097.87	130,065.23	132,059.42	129,699.89
Bilateral ODA*		94.81	115.1	106.23	85.02	79.96	34.77	14.77	31.36	30.24	33.15
Bilateral ODA in	Armenia**	0.5	0.67	0.43	0.73	0.21	0	0	0	0.02	0.06
	Azerbaijan**	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.12	0.05	0	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.1
	Belarus**	1.7	1.67	1.58	1.77	1.78	0	0.08	0.01	0.05	0.16
	Georgia**	1	2.32	5.86	4.17	2.05	0	0.26	0.05	0.03	0.13
	Moldova**	2.82	2.88	3.26	4.25	4.28	0.27	0.42	0.17	0.23	0.1
	Ukraine**	2.69	3.14	5.29	3.22	3.03	2.49	2.25	1.92	4.12	3.62
	Eastern Partnership	8.78	10.72	16.49	14.26	11.4	2.76	3.04	2.18	4.5	4.17
Bilateral ODA in EaP/Bilateral ODA		9.26%	9.31%	15.52%	16.77%	14.26%	7.94%	20.58%	6.95%	14.88%	12.58%
Bilateral ODA in EaP/GNI		0.005%	0.005%	0.009%	0.007%	0.006%	0.002%	0.002%	0.002%	0.003%	0.003%

Million USD Constant prices, 2011		Poland					Slovakia				
		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GNI*		373,234.91	441,466.44	460,357.74	474,241.03	495,985.96	85,451.23	92,666.12	88,868	92,057.21	94,205.82
Bilateral ODA*		162.47	74.86	100.86	100.68	90.12	32.64	41.21	20.22	21.28	21.43
Bilateral ODA in	Armenia**	0.22	0.45	0.56	0.59	1.12	0	0	0	0	0
	Azerbaijan**	0.49	0.29	0.24	0.19	0.4	0	0	0.02	0	0
	Belarus**	15.57	16.36	17.03	15.82	21.21	0.08	0.2	0.03	0.17	0.05
	Georgia**	1.62	2.57	12.29	6.49	6.58	0	0.12	0.09	0.51	0.51
	Moldova**	1.84	2.06	1.16	1.2	1.71	0.19	0.17	0.13	0.49	0.27
	Ukraine**	13.12	12.46	10.02	11.53	12.04	0.06	0.48	1.02	0.35	0.49
	Eastern Partnership**	32.86	34.19	41.3	35.82	43.06	0.33	0.97	1.29	1.52	1.32
Bilateral ODA in EaP/Bilateral ODA		20.23%	45.67%	40.95%	35.58%	47.78%	1.01%	2.35%	6.38%	7.14%	6.16%
Bilateral ODA in EaP/GNI		0.009%	0.008%	0.009%	0.008%	0.009%	0.000%	0.001%	0.001%	0.002%	0.001%

* Source of data: OECD; ** Source of data: AidFlows.org

Annex III. Aggregated Visegrad Official Development Aid Data

V4 ODA	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	V4 Bilateral ODA	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Czech Republic*	209.5	244.86	225.77	243.79	250.46	Czech Republic*	94.81	115.1	106.23	85.02	79.96
Hungary*	108.92	102.27	123.86	121.92	139.73	Hungary*	34.77	14.77	31.36	30.24	33.15
Poland*	378.51	332.64	411.55	396.02	416.91	Poland*	162.47	74.86	100.86	100.68	90.12
Slovakia*	79.51	92.73	76.9	78.65	86.02	Slovakia*	32.64	41.21	20.22	21.28	21.43
TOTAL*	776.44	772.5	838.08	840.38	893.12	TOTAL*	324.69	245.94	258.67	237.22	224.66

V4 Bilateral ODA in EaP	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	V4 Total	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Czech Republic**	8.78	10.72	16.49	14.26	11.4	ODA*	776.44	772.5	838.08	840.38	893.12
Hungary**	2.76	3.04	2.18	4.5	4.17	Bilateral ODA*	324.69	245.94	258.67	237.22	224.66
Poland**	32.86	34.19	41.3	35.82	43.06	Bilat. ODA in EaP**	44.73	48.92	61.26	56.1	59.95
Slovakia**	0.33	0.97	1.29	1.52	1.32	ODA in EaP/ODA	5.76%	6.33%	7.31%	6.68%	6.71%
TOTAL*	44.73	48.92	61.26	56.1	59.95	ODA in EaP/Bilat.ODA	13.78%	19.89%	23.68%	23.65%	26.68%

All data is in Million USD, constant prices, 2011

*Source of data: OECD

** Based on OECD data from AidFlows.org

Annex IV. Visegrad Scholarship Recipients from the Eastern Partnership Countries

Note: The numbers indicate the number of students and scholars whose application was approved for the scholarship. Neither does it contain their substitutes, nor can it take into account those who did not accept the scholarship.

	2004	2005*	2006	2007	2008	2009**	2010	2011	2012***	2013	Total
Armenia	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	8	6	6	30
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	5	3	5	19
Belarus	3	0	4	12	11	29	28	23	23	21	154
Georgia	0	0	0	0	0	7	9	9	5	5	35
Moldova	0	0	1	2	1	9	2	1	4	3	23
Ukraine	0	29	28	73	63	67	34	37	35	33	399
Total	3	29	33	87	75	119	82	83	76	73	660

* Ukraine scholarship scheme starts. No data about other scholarships for this year online.

** Belarus scholarship scheme starts.

*** Visegrad Eastern Partnership scholarship scheme starts.