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First exercises by the Ukrainian support force contingent. Day 1,721 of the war

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The situation on the frontline

Operations on the front have not brought about any significant changes ifor either side. Ukrainian forces extended their offensive operations to the border between the Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts, attacking Russian positions in the Borova area. They were also tasked with driving Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups (SRG) out of Orikhiv in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The Russians continued to drive Ukrainian forces out of Dobropillia. They also expanded the area of SRG activity to the north and west of that town, and their presence was recorded 17 km from Russian-controlled areas. According to OSINT sources, Russian sabotage operations are facilitated by Ukraine failing to make use of drones for tactical reconnaissance over areas they control. Russian SRGs that are not detected and destroyed whilst approaching Ukrainian defensive positions thus gain considerable freedom of action once they have crossed them.

Russian air attacks

Russian forces carried out a series of concentrated attacks on energy infrastructure in the Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. From the evening of 3 November until the morning of 10 November, attacks took place daily, often targeting the same facilities repeatedly. In Kyiv Oblast, Russian drones and missiles struck, amongst other targets, the Trypilska Thermal Power Station (5, 7 and 9 November), causing significant damage to the facility, as well as the Kyiv 750 kV substation (4, 5 and 7 November) and the 330 kV Bilotserkivska, Brovarska and Novokyivska substations. The attacks led to a deterioration of the situation in Kyiv. In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, the Russians continued to destroy the decommissioned Prydniprovska Thermal Power Station (5 and 6 November) and power substations in Dnipro and the Kamensk, Kryvyi Rih, Pavlohrad and Samara districts. As a result of the attacks, on 8 November, over 600,000 customers in that oblast were left without power, and it took more than 24 hours to restore supply in Dnipro. Logistics, transport and industry were also

affected by Russian air strikes in Kyiv and the Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. **One of the consequences of the missile strike on Kyiv during the night of 6–7 November was serious damage to the North Bridge**. Traffic across it was completely halted for over a day.

The Russians continued their attacks on the energy sector, logistics and transport in regions behind the front line and in the oblasts through which the main supply routes from the West pass. Infrastructure in the Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts was targeted with particular intensity. In the former, strikes hit, amongst others, the Ladyzhyn Thermal Power Station (5 November) and power substations (7, 9 and 10 November). In Zhytomyr Oblast, targets included substations in the capital region, as well as in the Korosten and Zviahel districts (4, 6 and 7 November). The 330 kV Ovruch substation in the Korosten district is reported to have been almost completely destroyed. In Zhytomyr, amongst other places, in addition to power shortages, there were problems with heating, and on the evening of 3 November the city faced a blackout. A total power cut resulting from a Russian attack also occurred on 7 November in Chernihiv. Furthermore, damage to infrastructure was reported in Kharkiv and Kharkiv Oblast (5, 6, 7 and 9 November), Khmelnytskyi (7 and 9 November), Cherkasy and Cherkasy Oblast (8 and 9 November), Kropyvnytskyi and Kirovohrad Oblast (4, 6 and 10 November), Kremenchuk and its surroundings (5, 7, 8 and 9 November), Odesa (3, 4, 7 and 8 November), Poltava (9 November), Sumy (6 and 10 November), Zaporizhzhia (as a result of the strike on 8 November, the road section of the Preobrazhenskyi Bridge was completely closed) and the following oblasts: Mykolaiv (9 November), Odesa (5, 8 and 9 November; targets included, amongst others, Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi (on the Dniester), Izmail and Kilia) , Rivne (7, 8 and 9 November), Ternopil (4 November) and Volyn (on 4 November, there was a temporary power cut in Kovel).

The number of attack drones used by the Russians may be around 100 higher per day than reported in the statements issued by the Ukrainian Air Force Command (UAFC). According to OSINT sources, between the evening of 3 November and the morning of 10 November, Russia may have deployed 2,200 of them. The UAFC reported 1,561 drones, of which 1,327 were said to have been neutralised. This may be due to official reports being limited to accounts of night-time attacks, whilst the UAFC publishes information on daytime attacks only sporadically (and not at all during the aforementioned period). The Russians pursue a different information policy, periodically inflating the figures for the number of drones used by the Ukrainians in an attempt to highlight the effectiveness of their air defences (an instance of this occurred on 20 September this year, when they inflated the figure to 1,600, which was 300 more than the estimates of independent observers). During the week of 3–10 November, Russia is also reported to have used 40–42 missiles, mainly ballistic missiles, in an attack on Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast on the night of 6–7 November, of which 2–4 were shot down.

Ukrainian operations against Russia

Ukrainian drones struck four Russian refineries. Major fires broke out at the Surgutneftegaz facility in the town of Kirishi in Leningrad Oblast (9 November). Fires were also reported at Rosneft refineries in Saratov (7 November) and Ryazan (5 November), as well as at the

Safmar refinery in Afipsk in Krasnodar Krai (6 November). **Neptun cruise missiles struck the Proton plant in Oryol** (6 November), which manufactures components used, amongst other things, in Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Ukrainian drones struck the Morozov Plant in the St Petersburg area, which produces fuel for these missiles (9 November). On 4 November, they caused a fire at the OZON logistics centre in Adygeysk, and according to some sources, also at the Wildberries warehouse complex in Ryazan the following day. On 10 November, an aircraft repair facility in Staraya Russa in Novgorod Oblast may have been the target of a Ukrainian attack.

On 7 November, the Ukrainians carried out an attack on energy infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. As a result of this strike, 300,000 customers were temporarily left without power. Due to the damage to infrastructure, power shortages are also being felt in other Russian-occupied areas occupied.

Russian operations against Ukraine

On 5 November, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) detained a woman in Sumy who had been assisting the Russian Armed Forces in shelling the city. Acting on the enemy's orders, she reconnoitred the deployment of Ukrainian State Border Guard Service posts, as well as checkpoints around the city, documenting her findings in photographs and maps. She passed on the material she had prepared in this way to her clients.

On the same day, the Ukrainian courts sentenced four Ukrainian citizens, who had fought on the Russian side in the Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, to 15 years' imprisonment. A day later, the SBU detained two people in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The first was arrested in Kamianske on suspicion of planning a bomb attack on a chemical plant. An improvised explosive device and approximately 1.5 kg of hazardous materials were found at her home. The second person was detained in Dnipro on suspicion of carrying out a bomb attack in that city a year earlier, which resulted in the death of a local councillor. Another person from Dnipro was detained on 9 November on suspicion of assisting the Russian Armed Forces in carrying out attacks on fuel and energy facilities, as well as those used by the armed forces.

On 10 November, the SBU detained a resident of Cherkasy Oblast who had been passing on information to the Russians regarding the locations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) in the central part of the country. He was particularly interested in facilities used by Ukrainian units during rotations to and from the front line.

The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR) continues to carry out propaganda operations targeting Kyiv. On 6 November, during a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in the 'SCO Plus Dialogue' format in Samarkand, SVR Deputy Director Mikhail Maksimovich stated that international terrorist organisations were interested in acquiring unmanned technology from the Ukrainian authorities. He called for the pre-emptive countering of such threats, without, however, presenting any evidence or details to support his claims. Meanwhile, on 9 November, the same agency reported that the authorities in Kyiv are working closely with the European Union to develop mechanisms to encourage Ukrainian citizens to return to their homeland. They would then be subject to

mobilisation and would bolster the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Western support for Ukraine

On 9 November, the land and air phase of the exercise by the so-called coalition of the willing, codenamed 'Coalition 26.2', began at the Nowa Dęba training centre in Poland. This is the first major test of the forces supporting Ukraine (Multinational Force–Ukraine, MNF-U) **ahead of a possible deployment to its territory in the event of a ceasefire or the conclusion of a peace agreement**. **The naval phase of the exercise is taking place simultaneously in Istanbul**. The exercise involves land, air and naval contingents, as well as space force elements from France and the United Kingdom, which jointly command the exercise (the commander of the MNF-U is British General Tom Bateman), with Poland acting as the host nation for the land and air components, as well as Belgium, Estonia, Spain, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Germany, Sweden and also Turkey, which is the sole active participant in the naval component. A total of 4,800 troops are taking part in the exercise, including 2,000 from Poland, 1,100 from France (according to the Ukrinform agency) and 300 from the United Kingdom. Other countries have sent significantly smaller contingents. For example, Germany has deployed a logistics sub-unit, two air-tankers and ten staff officers. The land and air component of the exercise is designed to test the process of reception, staging and onward movement (RSOM) of forces, whilst the naval component is intended to test mechanisms for clearing waterways of mines and reopening sea routes to Ukrainian ports. The entire exercise will run until 22 November.

On 5 November, the European Commission disbursed a loan of €4.36 billion to Ukraine under the Ukraine Support Loan programme, of which €658 million is earmarked for defence procurement. The funds will be used to purchase unmanned aerial vehicles, missiles and ammunition for air defence, as well as radars and electronic warfare systems, mostly from Ukrainian companies. To date, Kyiv has received €16.4 billion from this programme for defence expenditure, primarily for procurement and investment in the Ukrainian defence industry, with €11.9 billion still available for use by the end of 2026.

On 3 November, the Norwegian government announced plans to allocate $107 million (1 billion kroner) over three years for private investment in the Ukrainian defence industry. Funds from the Nansen Programme are to be managed by the state-owned investment company Investinor. They are intended to help attract additional Norwegian private capital for Ukrainian companies and will be channelled through Norwegian investment funds investing in this sector.

The war and the internal situation in Ukraine

On 4 November, the SBU detained three individuals linked to the riots that had taken place a day earlier in the village of Petropavlivska Borshchahivka outside a building occupied by

the Ukrainian National Guard (UNG). According to the findings, two of these individuals instigated the riots in order to secure the release of one of the mobilised soldiers, whilst the third took an active part in the clashes with the UNG. One of the instigators of the events also posted calls on social media to storm the building, which further inflamed the situation.

