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Russians cut off from the Starlink system. Day 1448 of the war

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The situation on the frontline

On 8–9 February, Ukrainian forces launched an attack in the eastern part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast, threatening Russian positions around Dobropillia and Ternuvate. According to some sources, this marked the beginning of larger-scale offensive operations, though this was denied by Ukrainian military sources. The offensive slowed down, but in the Dobropillia area, it is thought that Ukraine penetrated 5 km into positions controlled by Russia. This report was disputed by some Ukrainian sources (including DeepState), which reported that these towns had not been captured by the Russians and were in a grey zone. Russian forces were said to have repelled the Ukrainians from Huliaipole, and on 10 February, some sources reported that they had captured Zaliznychne, west of the city, which they had been unsuccessfully attacking for several weeks.

The Russians are advancing southeast of Sloviansk. They have captured more villages and areas north of the M03 motorway leading to the city, approaching it at a distance of about 15 km. They are a similar distance from Kramatorsk. They also made further territorial gains between Siversk and Lyman, consolidating their positions on the southern side of the road connecting the two cities. According to some sources, they also reached the northern outskirts of Lyman, but failed to enter it from that direction.

Russian forces became active north of the Pokrovsk conurbation, where they launched an attack towards Druzhkivka. After months of fighting, they captured the key town of Shakhove and, according to some sources, two more towns to the north-east of it. Fighting continues in the centre of Kostiantynivka, where further neighbourhoods have come under Russian control. Russian forces also made progress south-west of the city, strengthening their position on the northern side of the Pokrovsk-Bakhmut road running through it. The Russians have also partially regained the initiative in Kupiansk, recapturing some of the previously lost neighbourhoods, and have pushed the defenders out of further areas east of the city, where Ukrainian logistics are hampered by the Oskil River. They also entered other border towns in the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, from which they were pushed out by Ukrainian counterattacks.

On 5 February, the American company SpaceX cut off the signal to Starlink terminals not registered in Ukraine, which contributed, among other things, to the deterioration of communications used by Russian units. However, this did not cause any serious problems for the Ukrainian forces, according to Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov, an adviser to the Ukrainian Minister of Defence responsible for this issue. The vast majority of Ukrainian users had managed to register the terminals they were using. For several days, Russian forces were forced to use mainly traditional means of communication which, according to some sources, limited their activity. On 9 February, Beskrestnov announced that the Russians had begun mass deliveries of their own terminals to the front line, enabling internet access via the Yamal and Express satellite series. They solved the problem of drone navigation by increasing their use of the Mesh network. It remains to be seen how far they will be able to replace the Starlink system, which they used because of its high availability, reliability and ease of use.

Russian air attacks

In another massive attack on energy infrastructure on 7 February, the western part of Ukraine was mainly affected. The Dobrotvir thermal power plant in Lviv Oblast and the Burshtyn thermal power plant in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (the latter temporarily suspended operations) were seriously damaged, as were substations in the Kyiv, Lviv and Rivne oblasts. The damage to the Western Ukrainian substation in Lviv Oblast (750/330 kV), through which energy imported from Hungary was transmitted, proved particularly dangerous for the energy system. Damage to energy infrastructure occurred in eight oblasts, and emergency power cuts were implemented in most regions of Ukraine. At the Khmelnytskyi and Rivne nuclear power plants, reactors were partially shut down and production capacity was reduced. Warehouses and a logistics centre were also damaged in Kyiv Oblast. According to the Ukrainian Air Force Command, Russia used 408 unmanned aerial vehicles (including 250 strike "Shaheds") in the attack, of which 382 were reportedly destroyed, as well as 37 cruise missiles (24 shot down) and two hypersonic missiles. The facilities under repair in Lviv Oblast were also targeted by enemy drones the following day, and on 9 February, a substation in Novovolynsk was damaged.

Russian drones constantly targeted **energy facilities in border and frontline regions**. Once again, the substation in Zaporizhzhia (4 February), the combined heat and power plant in Kharkiv (TEC-5) and the substation in Sumy Oblast (5 February), a thermal power plant (TES) near Sloviansk and a substation near Kropyvnytskyi (6 February), and a facility belonging to DTEK (most likely a substation) in Odesa Oblast (10 February). In addition, on 6 February, Russian artillery once again shelled the combined heat and power plant in Kherson. On 9 February, President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that, as a result of previous attacks, 1,400 residential blocks in Kyiv were still without heating.

Russian drones struck gas extraction and processing infrastructure in the Poltava and Sumy oblasts, as reported by Naftogaz on 8 and 9 February. Serious damage was reported in Poltava Oblast. The drones also damaged fuel depots in the Dnipropetrovsk (near Samara, 4 February) and Poltava (near Myrnohrad, 6 February) regions, as well as railway

infrastructure in the Chernihiv (in Snovsk, 8 February) and Sumy (near Konotop, 9 February) oblasts. On 3 and 9 February, Russian drones struck industrial facilities in Kharkiv, and on 4, 8 and 9 February in Odesa. In the last of these attacks, fires and damage also occurred in a residential part of the city, killing one person and injuring several others. Similar consequences were caused by a drone attack on Zaporizhzhia on the evening of 3 February (two people were killed and 11 injured) and an aerial bombing of Sloviansk on 10 February (two people were killed and seven injured).

On the evening of 8 February, the Russians carried out two missile strikes on Kyiv and Vasylkiv, located to the south of it. According to sparse Ukrainian reports, the targets were most likely strictly military facilities (including the airport in Vasylkiv). Russia reportedly used 11 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, only one of which was shot down, which is the worst declared air defence effectiveness rate for the Ukrainian capital since 2022. Kyiv was also attacked by drones on 5 February. At that time, fires and destruction were reported in three areas of the city. On 6 February, the Russians struck the Kropyvnytskyi area with Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, where, according to some sources, the target was the Kanatove air base. According to Ukrainian data, from the evening of 3 February to the morning of 10 February, Russia used a total of 1,399 drones (including 870 Shaheds) and 63 missiles, including the massive attack on 7 February. The defenders declared that they had neutralised 1,218 unmanned aerial vehicles and shot down 24 cruise missiles (all on 7 February) and one ballistic missile.

On 9 February, the Ukrainian Land Forces Aviation Brigade "Kherson" reported the loss of a Mi-24 helicopter, which, according to some sources, was shot down by an anti-aircraft missile fired from a "Shahed". The mission that was being carried out when the aircraft was shot down was to combat Russian unmanned aerial vehicles. Reports of some drones being equipped with old-type R-60 short-range missiles have been circulating for several months, following their downing by Ukrainian air defences. If confirmed, this will be the first case of the successful use of an unmanned platform as a substitute for a fighter aircraft. In May 2025, the Ukrainians shot down a Russian aircraft over the Black Sea by firing an R-73 missile from a surface drone.

Russian operations against Ukraine

On 6 February, an assassination attempt was made in Moscow on the first deputy head of Russian military intelligence, Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseev. The Russian media describe him as one of the main curators of the Russian volunteer formations participating in the war against Ukraine. Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) considers Alekseev to be one of those responsible, among other things, for gathering data for Russian missile and air strikes on Ukrainian territory and for "legalising" the Russian presence in the occupied territories by organising so-called referendums. He is also responsible for violating the rights of prisoners of war – the defenders of Mariupol.

On the same day, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Ukraine was involved in the assassination attempt and that it confirms "that the Zelensky regime is focused on constant provocations aimed at disrupting the negotiation process". The version about the

involvement of the Ukrainian services was reiterated by the Federal Security Service, which reported the arrest of the perpetrators of the assassination, who had allegedly confessed to cooperating with the Ukrainian secret services. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha denied the Russian accusations, stating that Kyiv had not been involved with it.

The circumstances surrounding the assassination attempt on Alekseev are unclear. On the one hand, he was a natural target for the Ukrainian secret services, but on the other hand, the FSB's quick disclosure and arrest of the perpetrators raises doubts. It cannot be ruled out that the assassination was the result of internal disputes between the FSB and military intelligence, and that the accusation against the Ukrainian services is a ploy to disrupt the peace negotiations.

On 9 February, HUR warned that Russia was planning to use a network of so-called 'pacifist' organisations in Europe for anti-Ukrainian activities during the Munich Security Conference on 13–15 February. The Russian intelligence services intend to carry out a large-scale hybrid campaign involving anti-Ukrainian street actions in Germany, supported by coordinated disinformation activities. The main participant in this campaign will be Friedensbewegung ("Peace Movement") – a decentralised network of anti-war and pacifist groups and initiatives in Germany, currently – according to HUR – largely controlled by individuals linked to Russian intelligence services. Russia will attempt to whitewash its policy towards Ukraine, undermine Western aid to Kyiv, and promote slogans such as "support for Ukraine is provoking World War III", "the EU and NATO are aggressors", and "Russia does not pose a threat to Europe".

Ukrainian operations against Russia

Between 4 and 8 February, Ukrainian drones and missiles struck energy infrastructure in Belgorod Oblast several times. A combined heat and power plant in Belgorod and two substations (both of which had been attacked previously) were damaged, exacerbating problems with electricity, water and heating supplies (several hundred buildings in the regional capital remain without heating). On 10 February, drone strikes damaged a substation in the Rylsk area, which, according to Russian data, deprived 28,000 residents of Kursk Oblast of electricity and partially of heating. On 7 February, they caused a fire at a chemical plant in Redkino in Tver Oblast (which produces rocket fuel components) and, according to the Ukrainian General Staff, also at the Balashovo fuel depot in the Saratov Oblast (most likely this refers to Balashov or Balakovo, which are located there).

In January, Ukrainian forces are thought to have carried out a "series of successful attacks" on facilities preparing for the launch of Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles at the Kapustin Yar training ground in Astrakhan Oblast. This was announced on 5 February by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The attacks were to be carried out using "Ukrainian-made long-range strike weapons" – FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. This information has not yet been confirmed.

Western support for Ukraine

The United States has agreed to sell Ukraine spare parts for weapons and military equipment worth $185 million, the Associated Press reported on 7 February. The package includes vehicle parts such as engines, gearboxes, braking systems, wheels and tyres.

Finland will provide Kyiv with a 32nd military aid package worth €43 million. This was announced on 5 February by the Finnish Ministry of Defence. As is customary, Helsinki has not disclosed the contents of the package, but has stated that it will include products from the Finnish defence industry.

Poland has prepared its 48th military aid package worth PLN 200 million ($56 million), as announced by Prime Minister Donald Tusk during his visit to Kyiv on 5 February. It will mainly consist of armoured weapons. Both countries agreed that, if necessary, they would adapt previous agreements on the supply of weapons and military equipment to the current situation on the front line. **Ukraine has offered Poland an exchange of its own drones for Polish-owned MiG-29 fighter jets**, as announced by President Zelensky.

NATO countries plan to allocate $15 billion in 2026 for the purchase of weapons and military equipment for Ukraine in the US under the PURL (Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List) **mechanism**. This was announced on 3 February by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who was visiting Kyiv. It is thought that the Japanese government informed NATO that **Japan intends to join the PURL and would co-finance the purchase of non-lethal equipment in the United States**,. Japan's intentions were announced on 10 February by the local television station NHK.

Sweden and Denmark will jointly purchase Swedish Tridon Mk2 short-range air defence systems for Ukraine. Stockholm's contribution is expected to amount to €200 million, and Copenhagen's to €46 million. This was reported on 3 February by Swedish Defence Minister Pål Jonson. The number of systems has not been disclosed, but it should be enough to complete an air defence battalion. Deliveries are expected within a few months.

Ukraine's military potential

On 4 February, President Zelensky announced that **55,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine**. He also mentioned that a significant number of defenders are considered missing. Some of them may be in Russian captivity or in the temporarily occupied territories.

On 9 February, **Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets pointed to an increase in the number of complaints about the work of military commissions**. He emphasised that in 2022, only 18 complaints were received from Ukrainian citizens regarding violations of their rights, in 2023 there were 514, and a year later – already 3,312. In 2025, 6,127 complaints were filed, which, according to him, confirms a systemic crisis in

the mobilisation process. The most common allegations concern conscripts being brought to the commission under physical coercion, superficial medical examinations, violations in the consideration of cases for deferral of conscription, and the unlawful detention of those mobilised in the commissions until they are sent to military units.

Russia's military potential

On 4 February, HUR reported that **North Korean troops are still participating in the war against Ukraine**. According to intelligence data, since January, North Korean units stationed in Kursk Oblast have been shelling Ukrainian border towns. One of the goals of their participation is to acquire practical skills in operating drones. Since October 2024, approximately 3,000 North Korean soldiers who have gained combat experience have returned to their country.

The war and the internal situation in Ukraine

On 4 February, **the President of Ukraine appointed Oleh Luhovskyi as acting head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine (FISU)**. Luhovskyi had been deputy head of the service since 2024 and was appointed first deputy in 2025. In May last year, he was part of the Ukrainian delegation participating in negotiations with the Russian Federation in Istanbul. His predecessor, Oleh Ivashchenko, has been head of military intelligence since 2 January.

On 5 February, delegations from Ukraine, Russia and the US agreed to exchange prisoners in a 157-for-157 formula. It was the first such exchange in five months. As part of all exchanges to date – according to data from the Ukrainian Coordination Staff for Prisoners of War, there have been 71 in total – approximately 6,000 prisoners have returned to Ukraine.

