

New Year slowdown on the front. Day 1412 of the war

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The situation on the frontline

During the New Year period, Russian forces continued their offensive on most sections of the front in the Donbas, but the intensity of their actions decreased. There were slight shifts in their favour north and west of the Pokrovsk conurbation, in the south-eastern part of Konstantynivka and south of that city, as well as west of Siversk. Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area of the road from Pokrovsk to Dobropillia (fighting for Rodynske is still underway).

Fighting continues in the northern part of Kupiansk and in the vicinity of that city. The Oskil River is increasingly dividing them into areas of Ukrainian and Russian domination, but neither side has yet managed to establish permanent control over the occupied quarters in the northern part of the city (in previous weeks, the Ukrainians regained its western part, while the southern part remains under their control). Further shifts in Russia's favour took place south and west of Vovchansk and in Sumy Oblast, where Ukraine confirmed the loss of the border town of Hrabovske and the areas north of it.

The Russians established bridgeheads on the western bank of the Haychur River and also launched a probing attack towards Zaliznychne, west of Huliaipole. Russia has still not established full control over this town, and in one of the counterattacks, Ukraine managed to break into its centre. The Russians made further territorial gains in the western part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast (fighting is reported to be taking place along the Prymorske–Stepnohirsk–Lukyanivske line). However, attempts to break through Ukrainian defences in the area of Orikhiv were unsuccessful.

Russian air attacks

On 31 December and 1 January, the Russians carried out further attacks on infrastructure in Odesa Oblast. Fires broke out in and around the oblast's capital, and further areas were cut off from electricity, water and heating. On 31 December, two DTEK substations were reportedly damaged. A day later, in addition to energy facilities, the port infrastructure of Odesa and Izmail was targeted. On the evening of 30 December, the Ukrainian Navy

reported that two Panamanian-flagged bulk carriers, Emmakris III and Captain Karam, had been damaged in an attack on port infrastructure that took place that day.

On 1 January, the energy infrastructure of Volyn Oblast was the target of a massive drone attack. Damage occurred in Lutsk, among other places, and more than 100,000 consumers were cut off from electricity. In addition to energy facilities, damage was also caused to the rail depot in Kovel (a few days earlier, the local railway station had been hit). On 1 January, Russian drones also targeted energy infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast and railway infrastructure in Sumy Oblast (in Konotop, the station and freight wagons were damaged). The Russians continued to destroy the decommissioned thermal power plant in Kherson – the facility was attacked on 2 and 3 January, alternately with drones and artillery fire. On 3 January, damage to energy infrastructure occurred in Mykolaiv Oblast, and on 5 January in Kyiv Oblast (Slavutych was cut off from electricity, and train traffic was periodically suspended) and Donetsk Oblast (according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy, an energy generation facility was damaged).

As a result of the attack on Kharkiv on 2 January, a residential block was hit and the bodies of six victims, including a child, were recovered from under the rubble. Twenty-eight people were injured. A day later, enemy rockets struck a company in Cherkasy Oblast, and on 5 January – in Chernihiv and Poltava Oblast. According to the Ukrainian Air Force Command, from the evening of 30 December to the morning of 5 January, Russia used a total of 760 drones (including 480 strike “Shaheds”) and 15 missiles. Ukraine declared that it had neutralised 619 unmanned aerial vehicles and shot down one cruise missile.



Ukrainian operations against Russia

Ukrainian drones caused fires at further Russian fuel infrastructure facilities. On 31 December, a refinery in Tuapse in Krasnodar Krai and one of the piers in the local port were hit (according to the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces, the Tamaneftegaz terminal was damaged), as well as fuel depots in Rybinsk in Yaroslavl Oblast and in Lyudinovo in Kaluga Oblast. On 1 January, Ukrainian drones struck a refinery in Ilsky in Krasnodar Krai. On 30 December and 1 January, drone attacks caused local power outages in Moscow Oblast.

On 1 January, **Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) revealed details of a special operation in which the assassination of Denis Kapustin, commander of the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC), ordered by the Russian special services, was staged.** The Russians offered the perpetrators a reward of \$0.5 million. HUR carried out a multi-stage operation during which his death was staged. A video recording was created using two attack drones: the first “struck” the minibus in which Kapustin was allegedly travelling, while the second recorded the “effects of the attack” – the burning vehicle. The Russian clients considered it credible and transferred the money, which was then seized by Ukrainian intelligence. Kapustin declared his readiness to continue commanding the RVC unit.

Romania will allocate €50 million for purchases for the Ukrainian army in the US as part of the PURL (Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List) initiative. This was announced on 31 December by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest, Oana Țoiu. On the same day, the Croatian government announced its accession to the initiative. **Croatia will allocate €15 million for purchases under PURL.**

Ukraine's military potential

On 1 January, Ukraine began the next stage of its defence procurement reform. All purchases for the army – including weapons, ammunition, clothing, food and fuel – will be carried out by the Defence Procurement Agency, which reports to the Ministry of Defence. It will be responsible for comprehensive logistical support and the implementation of the procurement strategy. The ministry retains its political and supervisory functions in shaping procurement strategy. The DOT-Chain electronic defence procurement system will continue to be developed – its use has enabled the digitisation of approximately 70% of the circulation of documents relating to the supply of weapons and logistical goods.

On 2 January, the State Border Service reported that in 2025, over 13,000 men were detained while attempting to leave Ukraine illegally. Many of them repeated their attempts to cross the border. The highest number of attempts was recorded on the borders with EU countries, and approximately 1,400 on the border with Belarus.

On 4 January, the Ukrainian General Staff indicated that the number of women holding officer positions in the army had increased significantly over the past two years. At the beginning of 2023, women accounted for only 4% of the officer corps, while today this percentage is already 21%. In the near future, there are plans to train women as battalion commanders, which is expected to increase their participation in the command structures of combat units.

Russia's military potential

On 31 December, the Ukrainian Coordination Centre for Prisoners of War reported that the number of Russian soldiers surrendering is growing every year. On average, there are between 60 and 90 of them every week. Since June 2023, there have been more cases of Russian soldiers being taken prisoner than Ukrainian soldiers. The largest number of prisoners were taken in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. In 2025, the number of foreign mercenaries surrendering also increased – they now account for almost 7% of all Russian prisoners of war. 40% of them have a criminal record, only 7% have a higher

education, and 30% have not completed primary school.

The war and the internal situation in Ukraine

On 2 January, **Kyrylo Budanov, the former head of HUR, became the head of the Presidential Office** (see '[Ukraine: a New Year's reset of the state security management system](#)'). The scope of his tasks indicates that he will serve as the president's chief advisor on national security. Budanov's successor as head of the HUR is Oleh Ivashchenko, an experienced military intelligence officer, Budanov's former deputy and, since 2024, head of the Foreign Intelligence Service. **On the same day, Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Mykhailo Fedorov, the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation, as the new Minister of Defence.** His predecessor, Denys Shmyhal, is to take up the post of Minister of Energy. Both appointments require parliamentary approval.

