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A painful blow to Ukraine's heating system. Day 1358 of the war

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The situation on the frontline

Russian forces have taken control of most of Pokrovsk and have effectively cut off the defenders in Myrnohrad and several other settlements to the west and south that remain under their control. Subsequent Ukrainian counterattacks aimed at unblocking the group have been unsuccessful. According to Ukrainian sources, two brigades remain in Myrnohrad, and in Pokrovsk – which is being entered by enemy motorised columns on one side (previously, only infantry subunits were operating there) and Ukrainian special forces on the other – several groups (Ukraine still holds several positions on the northern outskirts of the city). Small Ukrainian groups have left their positions on their own initiative and attempted to break out of the encirclement or have surrendered to captivity.

The aggressor's troops captured Uspenivka in Zaporizhzhia Oblast – the main Ukrainian fortified area on the western bank of the River Hanchur – and launched an attack towards Huliaipole. There are no major fortifications northeast of this key town, which allowed the invaders to capture subsequent towns relatively quickly. Yablukove, located less than 10 km from Huliaipole and serving as its last line of defence in this direction (there are only fields between it and the city and the main supply road leading north from it), remains under Ukrainian control. On 12 November, the Southern Defence Forces Command announced that Ukrainian soldiers had withdrawn from neighbouring Rivnopil, which significantly complicates maintaining defences north-east of Huliaipole. The Russians also made significant territorial gains in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, where they launched an offensive north of the area they had previously occupied, approaching the River Vovcha.

Ukrainian counterattacks slowed the enemy's progress in the vicinity of Kupiansk, but did not change the overall situation. Further neighbourhoods came under Russian control, including in the part of the city located on the eastern bank of the River Oskil. The Russian army made further slight territorial gains in Vovchansk and in the border areas of Kharkiv Oblast between that city and the River Oskil, as well as in other areas of operation in the Donbas – in the Lyman, Siversk and Kostiantynivka areas.

Russian air attacks

On the night of 7–8 November, the invaders carried out another massive missile attack on Ukraine's energy infrastructure. According to the Ukrainian Air Force Command, they used 45 missiles, including 32 Iskander-M and Kinzhal ballistic missiles, as well as 458 attack drones and their imitators. Nine missiles and 406 drones were reportedly shot down or otherwise neutralised. Among others, the Prydniprovska thermal power plant in Dnipro, the Trypilska thermal power plant south of Kyiv, and the Zmiivska thermal power plant in Kharkiv Oblast were damaged, as well as the hydroelectric power plant in Svitlovodsk in Kirovohrad Oblast and the power substations securing the operation of the Khmelnytskyi and Rivne nuclear power plants.

Damage to energy facilities, and consequently interruptions in the supply of electricity, water and heating, occurred in the Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Odesa, Poltava and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. A total blackout occurred in Kremenchuk, and a partial blackout in Dnipro, where a residential block was also damaged (three people were killed and 11 were injured). The Centrenergo company announced that as a result of damage to its Trypilska and Zmiivska power plants, it was completely suspending electricity production (the company's Vuhlehirska power plant in occupied Donetsk Oblast had already been lost).

The day after the attack, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that damage to substations had forced a reduction in energy production at the Khmelnytskyi and Rivne power plants. In addition to energy infrastructure, Naftogaz facilities in the Poltava and Kharkiv regions and a locomotive depot near Lubny were also destroyed.

Russia continued to destroy energy and transport infrastructure in the frontline and border regions in the days before and after the massive attack. Damage to facilities, mainly power substations, occurred in Chernihiv Oblast (5, 6 and 9 November), Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (5, 6, 7 November), Kharkiv Oblast (6, 7, 9 and 11 November), Zaporizhzhia Oblast (6, 7 November) and Odesa Oblast (7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 November). The most frequently targeted city was Pavlohrad (6, 7, 9 and 12 November), which is becoming the main logistics hub for defenders in the Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk and, partially, Donetsk oblasts. Russian missiles, drones and guided aerial bombs also struck Mykolaiv (5 November), Zaporizhzhia (7 November), Kramatorsk (11 November) and Kharkiv (12 November).

On 10 November, Kinzhal hypersonic missiles struck the main base of the Ukrainian Air Force in Starokostiantyniv, Khmelnytskyi Oblast. According to Ukrainian sources, between the evening of 4 November and the morning of 12 November, Russia used a total of 1,177 strike drones and their imitators (including 760 Shaheds) and 71–74 ballistic and manoeuvrable missiles. The defenders declared that they had neutralised 898 unmanned aerial vehicles and shot down eight to nine missiles.

Ukrainian operations against Russia

Ukrainian forces continued their attacks on energy and fuel infrastructure in Russia and the occupied territories. On 6 November, an oil processing facility at a refinery in Volgograd was damaged, resulting in the facility suspending operations. Two days later, a power plant in Belgorod and power substations in the Kursk and Volgograd oblasts were damaged, resulting in a temporary suspension of electricity supplies to some consumers. On 9 November, a power plant in Voronezh (where a fire broke out) and a substation in Taganrog (where a partial blackout occurred) were hit. Power plants in Oryol (5 November) and near Kostroma (6 November) as well as a refinery in Saratov (11 November) were attacked without serious consequences.

In addition, the Ukrainian General Staff claims that drones destroyed a warehouse of "Shaheds" at the airport in occupied Donetsk (6 November), damaged an installation at a refinery in Orsk (11 November) and hit an oil terminal in Feodosia in occupied Crimea (11 November) and the Stavrolen chemical plant in Budyonnovsk in Stavropol Krai (12 November). Ukrainian Special Operations Forces reported damage to the Hvardiiske fuel base (6 and 10 November) and fuel depots near Simferopol (6 November), as well as the destruction of an S-400 launcher and ammunition depot in occupied Crimea (also on 6 November). According to Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR), chemical plants in the city of Sterlitamak in Bashkortostan were also targeted on 6 November.

Western support for Ukraine

Kyiv received 21 Patria 6×6 armoured personnel carriers from Latvia, as announced by the Ministry of Defence in Riga on 5 November. The handover of the vehicles took place during Ukrainian Defence Minister Denys Shmyhal's visit to Latvia.

Copenhagen approved the 28th military aid package for Ukraine, worth $210 million. This was announced on 11 November by the Danish Ministry of Defence. The funds will be used to support domestic arms production, purchase weapons and military equipment in the US, and to purchase fuel for the army.

Ukraine's military potential

On 7 November, **Defence Minister Shmyhal announced an increase in the base salary for soldiers to 60,000 hryvnia (over $1,400) from the beginning of 2026**. Contracts will be concluded for a period of one to five years. Soldiers who sign a contract for a longer period – from two to five years – will be guaranteed a 12-month deferral of mobilisation after completing their service.

On 11 November**, the Prosecutor General's Office announced that in 2025, there had been a sharp increase in the number of proceedings concerning unauthorised absence from military units and desertion**. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, law enforcement officers have registered a total of 311,327 proceedings (255,000 for unauthorised absence from the unit and 56,200 for desertion). Between January and October this year alone,

162,500 proceedings were initiated for the unauthorised abandonment of military service and 21,600 for desertion. The number of these cases this year has already exceeded the total for the previous three years.

Russia's military potential

Approximately 10,000 North Korean soldiers have been deployed near the Russian-Ukrainian border, South Korean MP Lee Sung-kwon said on 5 November, citing data from the National Intelligence Service (NIS). According to this data, since September this year, North Korea has sent another 5,000 military construction workers to Russia. Their task is to participate in projects described by the Russian side as "infrastructure reconstruction". However, South Korean intelligence services are observing signs of preparations for the further deployment of North Korean personnel, including combat training. In turn, HUR estimates that North Korea currently meets 35–50% of Russia's ammunition needs.

On 6 November**, Reuters reported that the South African government had launched an investigation into the participation of 17 of its citizens in the Russian-Ukrainian war**. The circumstances of their recruitment and the methods used to transport them to the war zone are being investigated. The men, aged between 20 and 39, were allegedly offered well-paid jobs, which turned out to be an attempt to recruit them into mercenary formations operating in the occupied territories of the Donbas. In August 2025, the South African authorities warned against fake job offers in Russia that were circulating on social media. At that time, there were also reports that some South African women had accepted job offers in drone production.

According to HUR data, approximately 1,500 foreigners from 48 countries serve in the Russian army. The largest numbers were recruited from Nepal (over 600), Sri Lanka, China, India and African countries, including Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo and Uganda. They were offered remuneration, insurance and the possibility of obtaining a Russian passport after several months of service.

On 10 November**, the Kommersant daily reported that Russia had begun recruiting reservists for State Combat Reserve Army (BARS) units, which are tasked with protecting critical infrastructure and combating drones**. Reservists will receive military personnel status and the associated benefits, social guarantees and remuneration. Vladimir Putin signed the relevant law on 4 November. However, before it came into force, the authorities in some regions began the process of forming new units. In Leningrad Oblast, the BARS-47 unit was created to combat drone attacks and sabotage attempts. Similar recruitment is underway in Tatarstan, Bashkiria and Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, where there are petrochemical plants that have been repeatedly attacked by Ukrainian drones. In the border oblasts of Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk, BARS units have been operating since 2024. In border areas, they have an extended range of responsibilities – in addition to protecting industrial facilities, they also combat sabotage and reconnaissance groups, support the evacuation of the population and participate in activities under the "anti-terrorist operation regime".

According to data provided on 4 November by the Polish Border Guard, between 26 August and 26 October this year, at border crossings with Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, as well as at air and sea crossings, over 98,500 checks were carried out on Ukrainian citizens aged 18–22 who entered **Poland**. These statistics cover the number of border crossings, not the actual number of people, which means that one person could have been counted several times if they crossed the border more than once. During the same period, over 45,300 men in this age group left Poland and returned to Ukraine.

