

Blackout in Kyiv. Day 1329 of the war

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The situation on the frontline

Fierce fighting continues north of the Pokrovsk conurbation, where both sides are trying to maintain the initiative. The Ukrainians have lost more of the territory which they recaptured in August and September as part of the elimination of the breach east of Dobropillia, mainly in the area of the key town of Shakhove, which is currently in Russian hands. However, they have regained further positions on the outer edges of this breach. Russia has made territorial gains in the vicinity of Myrnohrad, where it has reached the eastern outskirts of the city (in previous weeks, it had approached it from the north-east). Ukraine has managed to stabilise its defences in the southern part of Pokrovsk.

Russian forces expanded their territorial base for an attack on Kostiantynivka from the south-east. Only two localities remain under Ukrainian control there – Predtechyne and Ivanopillya. Part of the Ukrainian group west of the Donets-Donbas Canal is now surrounded, and their communication with the rear is hampered by attacks on Predtechyne, through which the only evacuation route runs. Russia also made further advances north of Siversk, in the Kupiansk area and in the Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy oblasts, but these have no significant impact on the situation.

In the north-eastern part of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Russia reached the River Yanchur, on the western bank of which the Ukrainians are organising another line of defence. It has also made slight progress in the western part of the region, where it has consolidated its position in the southern part of Stepanovsk and entered Prymorske, located on the River Dnipro. Reports by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GS AFU) of significant progress of 3.5 km in the vicinity of the village of Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv), where, according to Ukrainian OSINT (*open-source intelligence*) sources, only minor troop movements may have taken place, have not been confirmed.

Russian air attacks

On 10 October, Russia carried out one of the most severe massed attacks on the Ukrainian energy sector, which led to a blackout in, among other places, the left bank of Kyiv. In

addition to the thermal power plant in the capital (TETs-6), they damaged similar facilities in Dnipro (Prydniprovskia TETs), Kryvyi Rih and, according to some sources, in Zaporizhzhia, as well as the Kaniv, Kremenchuk, Middle Dnieper in Kamianske in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Dnieper (DniproHES) in Zaporizhzhia, as well as a number of smaller facilities (including the Brovary substation near Kyiv). Most likely, the attack on the power plant on the right bank of the capital (TETs-5) did not cause any serious damage. The crossing over the Dnieper via the hydroelectric power plant dams in Kaniv and Zaporizhzhia was periodically closed. According to President Volodymyr Zelensky, by the evening, electricity had been restored to 725,000 customers (including 540,000 in Kyiv), and various types of unscheduled power cuts were maintained in several areas of the capital and in the Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblast. Only the Odesa Oblast had its power supply fully restored. This means that several million Ukrainians were directly affected by the power cuts, and some also had their running water and heating cut off. There have also been casualties: a child was killed in Zaporizhzhia, ten people were injured in Cherkasy Oblast, and 11 or 12 in Kyiv.

Air strikes on energy infrastructure also took place in the days preceding the massive attack and afterwards, with Odesa being hit hardest on 11 October. The strike on the Usatove substation caused a blackout in part of the city and the surrounding areas. By the evening, power had been restored to 311,000 customers. On 12 October, the Russians attacked energy infrastructure in the Chernihiv, Donetsk (the thermal power plant in Sloviansk was damaged), Kyiv and Odesa (a blackout occurred in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy) oblasts. A day later, facilities in the Chernihiv, Donetsk and Odesa oblasts, as well as in Dnipropetrovsk, were attacked again, and on 14 October, facilities in the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts were attacked. On 13 October, the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that as a result of the attacks on energy infrastructure to date (which have been ongoing in the border regions for several weeks), power cuts, mainly emergency ones, are being maintained in eight regions. In the period preceding the attack on 10 October, Russian drones struck energy infrastructure in the Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy oblasts (10 October; according to some sources, the Kryvorizka TETs in Zelenodolsk was damaged) and Odesa (9 October; a blackout occurred in Chornomorsk).

Logistics remains a constant target. In Chernihiv Oblast, railway facilities near Nizhyn (7 and 8 October) and fuel depots in Pryluky (8 October) and – again – in the Nizhyn area (14 October) were damaged. Ukrzaliznytsia facilities were also attacked in the Kirovohrad Oblast (14 October). Damage to infrastructure was reported from Odesa (the port was attacked on 9 October), Chernihiv and Pavlohrad (12 October), Kharkiv (12 and 13 October), where seven people were injured as a result of damage to a hospital building, and Sumy (14 October). According to Ukrainian sources, between the evening of 7 October and the morning of 14 October, Russia used a total of 1,134 strike drones (including 465 on 10 October alone) and their imitators, as well as 34 ballistic and cruise missiles (32 on 10 October). Ukraine declared that it had neutralised 941 unmanned aerial vehicles and shot down 15–18 missiles.

Ukrainian operations against Russia

On 9 October, Ukrainian drones struck the Korobkovsky Gas Processing Plant in Kotovo, Volgograd Oblast. A fire broke out on the premises, as confirmed by satellite images. According to the SG SZU, on the same day, the Yefimovka control station, which serves several pipelines, was also hit in the same oblast. On 11 October, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported on a special operation that was thought to have caused a fire at the Bashneft-UNPZ refinery in Ufa, which has not yet been confirmed by other sources. On the same day, unmanned aerial vehicles once again hit the Luch thermal power plant in Belgorod, resulting in a failure of street lighting in the city.

As a result of a joint operation by the SBU and Special Operations Forces on 13 October, the fuel depot in Feodosia in occupied Crimea was hit again, causing a fire that lasted until the following day. According to the Ukrainian media, the drones damaged between five and 11 tanks. Power substations in Feodosia (satellite images confirmed a fire on the premises) and Simferopol were also hit, as well as, according to some Russian sources, a thermal power plant in Saky (two Neptune cruise missiles were said to have hit it). According to the German daily Die Welt on 9 October, the Ukrainians used heavy Flamingo cruise missiles to attack the FSB base in the north of the peninsula. Of the three missiles, one is thought to have hit 100 metres from the target. The date of the attack and its effects were not specified. On the same day, President Zelensky reported on the use of Flamingo and Neptune missiles “last week”. OSINT sources reported only on Ukraine’s use of Neptune missiles.



Western support for Ukraine

Almost 1% of Dutch GDP is allocated to military aid for Ukraine, announced Dutch Defence Minister Ruben Brekelmans during his several-day visit there. On 10 October, he signed a memorandum with his local counterpart on the joint production of drones (the details of the cooperation are to be worked out in the near future) and announced the transfer of another support package worth €200 million to the Ukrainian Defence Ministry for the purchase of anti-drone systems. Two days later, he opened the Dutch Defence Cluster in Kyiv, which is intended to coordinate and support cooperation between the defence industries of both countries on the Ukrainian market. In Odesa, he also discussed the implementation of the previously announced €400 million package, which includes support for the Ukrainian Navy. On 7 October, **the Dutch company Milrem Robotics announced plans to deliver 150 THeMIS unmanned ground transport platforms to Kyiv.** The order is being carried out in cooperation with another Dutch company, VDL Defentec.



Ukraine’s military potential

On 8 October, **the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted a regulation allowing state services involved in defence and civil protection activities to use civil airports and landing sites free of charge.** Free use includes infrastructure and radio-technical support (communications, landing systems and lighting) as well as the provision of aircraft handling

services. Their operators will be able to use the facilities in agreement with airport staff. The scope of free use will be determined “taking into account the conditions and operational situation”. The government’s decision is part of measures aimed at strengthening defence and increasing the efficiency of the use of state infrastructure during wartime.

On 10 October, **a ceremony was held in Lublin, Poland to sign contracts with the sixth group of volunteers for the Ukrainian Legion**. According to Vasyl Bodnar, Ukraine’s ambassador to Poland, several dozen Ukrainians living abroad have decided to join the military. He added that despite attempts to discredit the recruitment centre’s activities, recruitment is continuing uninterrupted. Those willing to join have the option of signing a contract for one year, three years or until the end of martial law. After recruitment, they are sent to a training ground near Lublin, where they are trained under the supervision of foreign instructors. The Ukrainian side provides the soldiers with uniforms and medical supplies, while Poland provides the infrastructure and training equipment.

According to data published on 14 October by the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine, **from January 2022 to September 2025, law enforcement agencies registered 235,646 cases related to unauthorised absence from military units and 53,954 proceedings related to acts of desertion**. There has been an increase in the number of such offences. In July, the total number of unauthorised absences was 202,977.

Russia’s military potential

On 10 October, the Ukrainian Centre for Countering Disinformation reported that **Tatarstan had drastically reduced the amount of one-off payments for recruits signing contracts to serve in the Russian army**. The amount fell from 2.7 million roubles (approximately \$34,000) to 400,000 roubles (approximately \$4,900). The data was posted on the website of the local military commission, but the regional authorities did not issue an official comment on the matter. Ukrainian experts point out that this step is evidence of the deteriorating financial situation in the regions of the Russian Federation. Rising war expenditure is straining local budgets, which are no longer able to maintain the previous level of financial incentives for volunteers, and federal subsidies are being reduced.

On 13 October, **Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) published data on 145 companies belonging to or managed by the Russian holding company Technodinamika, which is part of the state-owned corporation Rostech. According to HUR, 86 of them are still not subject to international sanctions**. Technodinamika plays a key role in the Russian military-industrial complex, manufacturing artillery and missile systems, ammunition, gunpowder, drones, aircraft engines and protective equipment for the military. Among the companies not subject to restrictions are the Federal Centre for Soyuz Technologies and the Morozov Plant, manufacturers of engines and solid fuels for the Topol-M, Yars and Iskander complexes – and the Ufa Engine Production Association – a manufacturer of components for Kh-101 and Kh-59M2 cruise missiles.

On 13 October, the website of the “I Want to Live” project (created under the auspices of HUR, which encourages Russian soldiers to surrender) reported that **314 Belarusian citizens**

had been killed while fighting against Ukraine in the Russian army, and that there were still more than 1,300 Belarusians in its ranks. According to the analysis, the average period from signing the contract to death on the front line is about six and a half months. Most of the dead served in units of the 150th Mechanised Division, and many of them were recruited in Russian prisons. The report also highlighted the participation of soldiers from the 5th Independent Spetsnaz Brigade from Maryina Horka near Minsk in the clashes.



Russian operations against Ukraine

The State Investigation Bureau continues its efforts to expose individuals who have committed treason or collaborated with Russia. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, proceedings have been initiated in 2,780 criminal cases concerning crimes against national security. Of these, 1,895 proceedings concern treason, 696 concern collaboration, and 46 concern aiding the enemy and incitement to action.



The war and the internal situation in Ukraine

According to data from the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, on 1 September, 1,326,552 Ukrainian citizens had war veteran status. Most of them received it after the Russian invasion began (before 2022, 556,467 people had this status). After the aggression began, this number increased: in 2022, 12,871 soldiers were granted veteran status, a year later it was 324,018, in 2024 it was 267,263, and in the first nine months of 2025 it was 165,933. These people are entitled to free land allocation (up to 2 hectares for agricultural use, 0.12 hectares for a garden or building plot, from 0.10 hectares in cities to 0.25 hectares in rural areas). The state also provides benefits to the families – including the parents, spouses and children – of fallen soldiers, including discounts on housing and utility bills and other forms of social support.



The situation in the occupied territories

On 8 October, the government's Centre for National Resistance (CNR) announced that **the Russian occupation authorities were continuing to "re-educate" Ukrainian children from the occupied territories of Donetsk Oblast**, taking them to the Russian Federation under the pretext of participating in "cultural trips". In September, more than 600 schoolchildren were forcibly removed from the region. They were sent to St Petersburg as part of the "Cultural Map 4+85" propaganda project (this refers to the four occupied regions of Ukraine + the remaining administrative entities of Russia), which is intended to promote Russian national identity. The CNR emphasises that the number of these "trips" has increased sharply – from 14 last year to 142 this year. Children are indoctrinated with ideas of the unification of Russian lands and the glorification of the occupiers.

On 10 October, the Ukrainian Centre for Countering Disinformation (CCD) reported that **the occupation administration in the temporarily occupied part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast had commissioned scientific research on “Ukrainian nationalist ideology”**. The project, worth 6.6 million roubles (over \$78,000), will be carried out by the Moscow-based International Academy of Business and Management, previously known for organising pro-government forums and propaganda events such as “The Fortress of Russian Civilisation Under Siege”. The project plans to organise a series of meetings and conferences with the participation of about 300 people, including scientists, teachers and religious figures from the occupied territories. The project is part of the Kremlin’s broader strategy of systematically destroying Ukrainian culture, history and identity by labelling it “extremism”.

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