

New support packages for Ukraine. Day 873 of the war

Andrzej Wilk, Piotr Żochowski

The situation on the frontline

The Russians continue their advance towards Pokrovsk – they have taken three more villages (Yasnobrodivka, Yevhenivka and Voskhod) and have approached the line of the Vovcha River. To the east of it, Ukrainian forces are now only defending the village of Novoselivka Persha, which is flanked from the north and south. Russia also approached Vozdvyzhenka – the last Ukrainian point of resistance before the Pokrovsk-Konstyantynivka route. **Russia made further advances in the Toretsk urban hromada**, entering into a wedge between Pivne and Zalizne east of Toretsk and reaching the centre of Niu-York. On 14 July, they retook Urozayne south of Velyka Novosilka – the next village after Staromaiorske and Robotyne, which Ukraine recaptured during the 2023 summer counteroffensive. **Clashes over Krasnohorivka continue with varying results** – a Ukrainian counterattack led to the recapture of some areas on the south-western outskirts of the town, but Russian forces have pushed the Ukrainians out of more quarters in the centre.

Russian air attacks

In the second week of July, Odesa was the main target of Russia's missile strikes. The city and its surroundings were attacked four times (9, 10, 13 and 15 July) with Iskander-M ballistic missiles. On 10 July, port warehouses and one ship were damaged. In addition, on the same day, an energy facility in the Rivne region and a company in Voznesensk in the Mykolaiv region were hit. On 13 July, consecutive Iskander-M missiles hit a railway station and a railway depot in Budy, Kharkiv region. Ukraine reported two dead and 23 wounded. Russian missiles and drones again attacked Ukrainian airfields (Myrhorod in the Poltava region on 9 July and Starokonstyantyniv in the Khmelnytskyi region on 12 July), Poltava (13 July), the area around the city of Dnipro (14 July) and Nikolaev (15 July) and Kherson (16 July, a ballistic missile strike allegedly destroyed hangars). In total, from 9 July until the morning of 16 July, the aggressor is believed to have used 33 missiles (Ukraine claimed to have shot down eight) and 54 suicide drones (37 thought to be destroyed and four thought to have to Belarus for unknown reasons).

Ukrainian operations against Russia

The number of Ukrainian attacks deep into the enemy's rear has decreased significantly and in recent weeks this activity has been limited to drone strikes. The border regions of the Russian Federation and the vicinity of Moscow have been attacked four times, including successfully on 13 July (a fire at a fuel base in Tsimlyansk in the Rostov region) and 16 July (a fire at a low-voltage apparatus manufacturing plant in Korenevo in the Kursk region). After the incident with the US RQ-4 Global Hawk drone over the Black Sea (the US denies it was shot down by the Russians), the intensity of allied reconnaissance in the Crimea area decreased at the end of June, and Ukrainian strikes on the peninsula using Western-delivered missiles were de facto halted. Crimea was attacked only on 15 July using drones, which hit the installations of the air defence squadron at Cape Fiolent without major results. On two occasions (12 and 16 July), the Ukrainians carried out strikes against enemy installations in Mariupol. Following the attack on 16 July, part of the city was cut off from the power supply.

Western support for Ukraine

During the Nato summit in Washington on 10 July, Ukraine's partners confirmed earlier announcements and media reports that it would receive further air defence systems. The US, Germany and Romania will each provide a battery of Patriots, the Netherlands, together with undisclosed partners, will provide a 'pooled' fourth battery of this system, and Italy will provide a SAMP/T battery. The total value of the equipment is **over** \$1 billion. In addition, **Kyiv's** partners are planning deliveries of dozens of short-range systems (NASAMS, HAWK, IRIS-T SLM and IRIS-T SLS) and self-propelled **Gepard** anti-aircraft guns in the coming months. **One** day later, the Oslo government announced that Ukraine would receive a Norwegian-funded IRIS-T system battery in the autumn. President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed thanks for the support, but considered it highly insufficient. A few days later he announced that 25 batteries are needed to provide full cover for Ukrainian airspace.

On 10 July, the leaders of the US, the Netherlands and Denmark, in a joint statement, announced that 'the handover of F-16s is currently underway' and that Ukraine would start using them later this summer. They also stressed that Belgium and Norway had joined the 'air coalition'. All of the aforementioned countries apart from the United States still pledged to deliver decommissioned F-16s to Ukraine in 2023 and, according to announcements at the time, the first of these were due to reach the frontline early this year. According to declarations made in recent months, Denmark will send 19 aircraft, the Netherlands 24 and Belgium 30, with Brussels stipulating that deliveries are to end in 2028. On 10 July, Norway further clarified its contribution with the delivery of six aircraft, initiated in 2024. On the same day, the Swedish representative confirmed his readiness to hand over Gripen fighters to Ukraine, but after the completion of the F-16 delivery programme.

Ukraine has made no secret of its disappointment at the low number of aircraft and the postponement of their delivery, which was expressed by President Zelensky and Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba at the NATO summit. Kyiv expects to receive six aircraft in the summer and up to 20 in total by the end of the year, while it estimates its operational needs 128. Representatives of Western countries, on the other hand, point to the problems on the Ukrainian side in terms of language proficiency, the small number of qualified pilots and the

even smaller number of ground personnel, as well as the unsuitability of the air base, compounded by the increased attacks by Russia in recent months. Ukraine is not expected to be able to dislocate more than one squadron of 15 to 24 aircraft at home.

On 11 July, the Pentagon unveiled a new military support package. It is worth \$225 million and its most important element is the promised Patriot system battery. In addition to this, it included missiles for the NASAMS and Stinger systems, missiles for the HIMARS launchers, 155 mm and 105 mm calibre artillery munitions, Javelin and TOW anti-tank guided missiles, AT-4 grenade launchers and small arms ammunition. The funds have been allocated from the US Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) mechanism, allowing for the transfer of armaments from Army depots in the coming weeks.

New support packages have also been announced or announced by Lithuania (drones and small arms munitions), **Canada and Australia.** Canada plans to allocate \$380 million mainly to replenish the Canadian army's stockpile shortfalls after earlier equipment deliveries, and Australia announced the delivery of unspecified guided missiles, missiles for air defence systems, anti-tank weapons and ammunition worth \$250 million, making this package the most expensive delivered by Australia to date. Canada is additionally expected to contribute \$300 million to train Ukrainian pilots and maintain the F-16s. **Also on 11 July, NATO leaders made a pledge of continued support for Ukraine's security.**

Denmark's defence ministry announced on 11 July that 18 2S22 Bohdana self-propelled howitzers, the production of which was funded by Copenhagen, are due to arrive in Ukraine in the coming months. Although the components are currently being built outside Ukraine (in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and/or France), they are being presented as the flagship product of its arms industry, and that Denmark is involved in its capital support. **The Spanish Ministry of Defence, on the other hand, confirmed on 15 July the dispatch to Ukraine (via Poland) of the previously announced ten refurbished Leopard 2A4 tanks** – they are expected to be there mid to late July. In addition, the Ukrainian army will receive anti-tank missiles. One more military support package is also planned to be handed over in the second half of the year. According to previous announcements, Ukraine was due to receive more Spanish 2A4 leopards in June. Ten tanks of this type were delivered by Spain in 2023.

It is noteworthy that the **NATO summit – as well as the meetings of the so-called Ramstein Group held in recent months – did not take any new decisions on equipping the Ukrainian army with armoured weapons.** Most tanks and armoured combat vehicles were handed over by the West between 2022 and 2023, and the current deliveries - mainly of obsolete Leopard 1A5 tanks and Marder infantry fighting vehicles – are the result of decisions made several months ago. Exceptionally, the US opted for additional 'rescue' tranches of Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, however, these only allowed for replenishment of losses (there is no information that losses in Abrams tanks were to be replenished in a similar manner). The Ukrainian army's stock of armoured weapons is currently crumbling at a much faster rate than the replenishments are arriving, which is due not only to enemy activity but also to the technical wear and tear of what is very old weaponry. **While recent supplies have allowed the Ukrainians to overcome its shell hunger and increase the effectiveness of their defensive operations, the shortage of armoured weapons is preventing them from going on the offensive and making another attempt to retake lost territory.**

Czech President Petr Pavel presented a timetable for the delivery of artillery ammunition from the so-called 'Czech initiative' on 13 July. Ukraine was expected to receive the first batch of 50,000 shells in June, with a further 50,000 to be delivered in July-August, and 80,000-100,000 shells per month from September until the end of the year.

On 10 July, Ukraine concluded *an agreement with Luxembourg on security cooperation and long-term support*. It mentioned that Ukraine received military assistance worth a total of €170.4 million between 2022 and 2023, and will receive an additional €80 million this year. Luxembourg pledged to maintain a similar financial aid dynamic in the following years, subject to parliamentary approval. **A day later, Ukraine signed a *security cooperation agreement with Romania*.** The document emphasises the importance of cooperation to strengthen security in the Black Sea region and support Bucharest in the demining of sea lanes. Together with its partners, Romania will ensure the operation of a training centre for F-16 aircraft pilots and will donate a battery of the Patriot missile system. **Ukraine has already concluded 23 security cooperation agreements.**

On 11 July, the NATO summit in Washington hosted a meeting of the representatives of the 22 NATO countries plus the EU and Japan that have already signed security cooperation agreements with Ukraine or will soon do so (Slovenia and the Czech Republic). **To highlight the importance of these agreements, a *multilateral document entitled the Ukraine Compact* was presented.** Its signatories pledged to fulfil their obligations under the bilateral agreements, such as supporting Ukraine's urgent defence and security needs, including by continuing to provide training, advanced military equipment and defence industry cooperation.

Ukraine's military potential

The deadline to update registration data in enlistment offices passed on 16 July. According to the defence ministry, more than 4 million conscripts have done so, including 2.7 million via the 'Reserv+' app. According to estimates provided by the chairman of the parliamentary committee on economic development, Dmytro Natalukha, more than 11.1 million men aged between 25 and 60 have been mobilised, meaning that almost 36% of conscripts have updated their data. From 17 July, representatives of enlistment offices will be able to send a summons to citizens by post, and the sending of a document will equate to its delivery. Those who have failed to update their data or report for military service will be fined between 17,000 (over \$400) and 25,500 hryvnias (over \$600). On 10 July, the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine said that since the beginning of the year, 116 cases under Article 342 of the Criminal Code related to resisting attempts to hand in mobilisation summonses had been opened. Only 43 cases were brought to trial. In addition, 240 cases under Article 114 of the Criminal Code on obstructing the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were initiated, of which only 30 went to trial. According to data posted in the Opendatabot open database, in 2024 military commissions imposed more than 11,700 fines for avoiding military registration after being summoned (in 2023 there were more than 10,300).

On 13 July, Alyaksandr Lukashenka announced that tensions on the border with Ukraine had been 'eliminated' and ordered the withdrawal of units staying in the area. He added that Ukrainian troops had also left the border area. The Belarus regime's change of stance, which had been escalating the alleged Ukrainian threat since the second half of June, is an example of **Belarus's policy of posturing**. Lukashenka is demonstrating his 'peaceful' stance and his desire to de-escalate tensions in the region, while announcing that he will soon discuss Ukrainian issues with Vladimir Putin. On the same day, Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) spokesman Andriy Yusov stated that there were no additional threats from Belarus, and on 14 July, HUR head Kyrylo Budanov conveyed that he did not rule out that Russia would attempt an attack on Ukrainian territory from the north (Sumy and Chernihiv directions) in the coming months.

A sociological survey by the Razumkov Centre was published on 15 July. **Almost half (46%) of those surveyed believe that evading conscription is not shameful**, 29% have the opposite view and 25% did not take a position. When asked whether "the time has come for negotiations with Russia", 43.9% of respondents were in favour of starting such negotiations, although they overwhelmingly rejected the possibility of negotiating peace on Russian terms (82.8% disagree with the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the regions annexed by Russia, and 83.6% disagree with the recognition of the occupied part of Ukraine as Russian territory). The commentary to the survey emphasises that it does not include opinions expressed in the armed forces.

