China-Russia Dashboard:
a special relationship in facts and figures

China and Russia are closer today than in decades. To help understand this relationship at a time of historic geopolitical tension, this dashboard tracks and analyzes the economic, political, security, and social dimensions of their interaction and how it changes over time. It is a collaborative research effort of the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), and the Swedish National China Centre (NKK) and Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).

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Economics

China-Russia bilateral trade has grown steadily over the last decade and has intensified since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Following a sharp surge in 2022 and 2023, China–Russia trade stabilized in 2024 at USD 245 billion, more than double that of 2020. In 2025, bilateral trade fell 6.9 percent year-on-year, despite record monthly levels in December.

The trade balance has been relatively even in value, with only a slight Russian surplus. However, it is structurally imbalanced in the types of goods traded. Russia’s exports to China consist mainly of fossil fuels and other natural resources, while China’s exports are manufactured goods such as cars, tractors, electronics, and other consumer products. The value of Russian exports is thus sensitive to volatile energy markets, and part of the initial post-invasion value increase was due to higher energy prices.

Note: Nominal values

Last updated: 2026-04-28

Shipments of dual-use items from China to Russia surged in late 2021, likely driven by stockpiling and year-end production peaks. Exports then fell sharply after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine amid concerns about sanctions, yet quickly recovered, remaining historically high throughout 2022 and 2023. A renewed decline occurred following the US Treasury’s announcement in December 2023 of potential secondary sanctions on entities assisting Russia’s military-industrial base. However, Chinese exports rebounded in the second half of 2024, suggesting adjustments to circumvent these restrictions. As a result, dual-use shipments from China to Russia once again exceeded USD 4 billion in 2024. At the beginning of 2025, they declined again — mirroring the overall trend in China-Russia trade — but rebounded in the following months, and over the full year rose back above USD 4 billion.

Note: The data refers to dual-use goods included in the Common High Priority List, developed jointly by the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The list categorizes 50 items, each identified by a six-digit Harmonized System (HS) code, into four tiers. The full list is available on the website of the US Bureau of Industry and Security. The values represent a 3-month moving average and have been adjusted to reflect the HS 2022 Nomenclature amendments.

Russia’s energy exports to China form the backbone of their bilateral trade, steadily increasing in both value and volume. After 2022, China’s market acted as a safety net, allowing Russia to redirect fossil fuel exports from the West. However, the volatile nature of the exchange – especially in the case of oil, declining since 2024 and then shooting up in 2026 – shows how highly dependent this trade is on global energy prices.

Last updated: 2026-04-21

This chart shows Russian oil exports to China surged from 2022 onwards, reaching more than 108 million tonnes in 2024 – an increase of about 30 percent since 2022. The growing share of Russian oil in China’s imports is largely a consequence of Western sanctions, which forced Russia to redirect its crude exports – even at a certain discount. While China has become a key buyer, the value of this trade remains highly sensitive to price fluctuations and market conditions. In the first quarter of 2026, Chinese buyers ramped up imports from Russia, replacing lower imports from India and capitalizing on geopolitical instability.

Last updated: 2026-04-21

Russia’s coal exports to China have grown steadily, with a notable acceleration in 2023 due to Western sanctions. As Russian exporters lost access to EU markets, they intensified shipments to China. However, after a record high in 2023, volumes started to decline, suggesting limitations on further growth due to the rise in domestic output in China and diversification of coal imports.

Russian LNG exports to China have grown steadily, with a temporary dip in 2021 due to pandemic-related constraints. Chinese LNG imports from Russia nearly quadrupled between 2019 and 2025, reaching a record 9.9 million tonnes. The staggering growth in 4Q 2025 is due to China’s willingness to import cargoes from the US-sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 facility, showing its readiness to ignore US sanctions. However, early 2026 may indicate a return to the previous trend.

Russia began exporting pipeline gas to China in 2019 with the launch of the Power of Siberia-1, earmarked to reach its nominal capacity of 38 billion cubic meters per year by 2025. Gazprom indeed reached that level in 2025, exporting 38.8 bcm. With of the loss of Russia’s European market, China has become a crucial recipient of Russian gas. However, Russia needs additional pipelines to expand its market share further. So far, China has been hesitant to approve new projects while Moscow tries to push the project of the Power of Siberia-2 with its 50 bcm/y design capacity.

The share of Chinese yuan (CNY) in Russia’s international trade increased sharply following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions. Before the war, settlements in CNY accounted for less than 2% of Russia’s total trade but rose quickly, reaching nearly 40% in January 2024. However, this growth trend halted after the US Treasury announced that it could impose secondary sanctions on third-country entities assisting Russia’s military-industrial base. Since then, the Central Bank of Russia has stopped publishing specific data on the yuan’s share. According to our estimates based on available official data, the share of CNY in Russia’s international trade has since dropped to approximately 30%. Meanwhile, the role of Russia’s domestic currency, the ruble, has increased notably.

Since official disclosures ended in February 2024, the estimate can no longer be reliably used in a consistent methodology, creating a structural break in the underlying data. At the same time, the growing use of routing through third jurisdictions and alternative payment mechanisms dilutes the mapping between “friendly-currency/ruble settlements” and actual yuan usage, making point estimates misleading.

China’s imports from Russia mainly consist of natural resources. Since February 2022, on average, more than 70 percent of the total trade value has been composed of mineral fuels (primarily crude oil). Other mineral products accounted for a further five percent, base metals seven percent, animal and vegetable products and foodstuffs six percent, and wood and paper four percent. Due to falling global oil prices and higher sanction-driven discounts on Russian oil, the value of mineral fuel exports declined in 2025, while the shares of other categories grew correspondingly.

Last updated: 2026-02-09

China’s exports to Russia are more diversified and consist primarily of manufactured goods. Since February 2022, on average, machinery and mechanical appliances made up around 24 percent of the total trade value. Vehicles (mainly passenger cars) accounted for 16 percent, electrical machinery and equipment 15 percent, and textiles, footwear, and headgear approximately 11 percent.

Last updated: 2026-02-09

In April 2025, China introduced new export controls on several medium- and heavy-rare-earth-related items, including some magnet-related products. Exports of rare-earth permanent magnets then fell sharply across destinations. Russia’s drop was comparably deep, but its return to pre-control levels was slower than that of some other partners. There is no clear evidence of special treatment for Moscow: despite the “strategic partnership,” licensing delays, customs scrutiny, and the new traceability regime appear to have mattered more than geopolitics. The lag was likely reinforced by weaker Russian industrial demand, especially in automotive and other motor-intensive sectors, while some demand may also have shifted into more complex imported goods.

Last updated: 2026-03-26

Western sanctions have forced Russia to sell its oil at a discount to global prices. This total selling discount has two components: higher transport costs charged by intermediaries, and a “buyer’s discount” driven by the stronger bargaining power of the few remaining key buyers. While transport costs have been the larger share, the buyer’s discount captured by China and India remains significant.

For China, the buyer’s discount peaked at about 18% in 2022 before easing to around 5%, with another rise in late 2025 following new US sanctions targeting buyers. Between April 2022 and February 2026, China’s average discount was 7.7%, saving an estimated $18.3 billion.

Note: China’s percentage discount on Russian crude oil is derived from Chinese customs data, comparing the monthly average import unit price of Russian crude oil with the monthly average import unit price of crude oil from non-sanctioned sources (i.e., all countries except Malaysia and Indonesia, which likely consist largely of sanctioned and discounted Iranian oil).

Last updated: 2026-03-26

Chinese exports of passenger cars and trucks to the Russian Federation have risen sharply since 2023, following the withdrawal of Western carmakers from Russia. The influx of Chinese finished vehicles effectively filled the supply gap. Exports peaked in 2024, surpassing 1 million passenger cars and reaching nearly 70,000 trucks. In 2025 volumes declined significantly – by 42% for passenger cars and 72% for trucks. Nevertheless, export levels remained well above their pre-2022 baseline. The contraction largely reflects the market saturation as well as introduction of protectionist measures by the Russian authorities, aimed at curbing imports and shielding domestic producers from further declines in output.

This map highlights China–Russia cooperation in the Arctic, alongside Chinese activities and selected key Russian installations in the region.

China has gradually expanded its Arctic engagement. It became observer state in the Arctic Council in 2013 and increasingly describes itself as a “near-Arctic state” as well as a “great polar power”. Much of its activity focuses on scientific research and resource projects, while no Chinese military installations are known. Russia’s much larger footprint in the Arctic reflects geography: around half of the Arctic coastline lies within Russian territory, and the region has long been central to Russia’s military, economic, and energy strategy. Focusing on China-Russia activities, this map features only a selection of key Russian military installations and omits Russian economic, research, and energy installations that have no direct Chinese involvement.

Cooperation between China and Russia is most visible in energy and transport infrastructure. The flagship example is Yamal LNG, where Chinese companies provide financing, construction, and long-term purchase agreements. However, several planned projects have faced delays and uncertainty, partly due to sanctions and financing challenges.

Despite growing interaction, cooperation remains selective and pragmatic. Russia has historically been cautious about large-scale Chinese involvement in its Arctic region, which it views as strategically sensitive. At the same time, Chinese companies have been risk-averse when investing in Russia, particularly under the current sanctions environment and geopolitical risks. As a result, China-Russia cooperation in the Arctic is expanding but remains limited.

Sources: Belfer Center, CSIS, Oxford Energy, SWP, The Bulletin, UI

Security

Joint Russia-China military exercises have grown significantly in number, size, complexity, and geographic scope since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since the first one in 2003, they have conducted 97 joint exercises – 32 since Russia started the war on February 24, 2022.

In 2024, they held 11 joint exercises across ground, naval and aerial domains, including their first naval patrol in the Arctic Ocean, first coast guard patrol, and their first aerial patrol that entered the US air defense identification zone. In September, China participated in Ocean-2024, Russia’s largest naval exercise since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In 2025, the number of joint drills was lower – seven in total – but these broke some new territory. Russia and China held their first joint submarine patrol in August. In multilateral formats, they conducted a border defense drill with Mongolia in September, and held the first-ever multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) exercise in Iran in December. Joint exercises are now becoming more routine, with some taking place annually.

It remains unclear whether China participated in the early-2026 trilateral naval exercise with Russia and Iran amid the significant US military buildup in the region prior to the Iran war in February.

Last updated: April 20, 2026

Since 2003, Russia and China have conducted 97 joint military exercises across various domains and formats. These include ground, naval, aerial, para-military and multi-domain exercises, as well as army competitions and computer simulations. The number of exercises per year has increased in recent years, reaching an all-time high of 11 in 2024, but decreasing in 2025.

Since 2022, most joint exercises – 20 of 34 – have consisted of naval drills and patrols, accounting for all recent growth in joint exercise activity. Between 2009 and 2022, Russia and China conducted only a few such exercises annually. However, in 2024 alone, 7 of 11 exercises were naval, and in 2025, 4 of 7 have been naval drills and patrols.

Last updated: April 20, 2026

China has significantly reduced its arms imports from Russia in recent years. This trend is driven by China’s growing self-sufficiency in military production and has been accelerated by Russia’s declining arms exports amid the war in Ukraine. The overall importance of Russian deliveries to China has diminished – in 2025, Russia accounted for a smaller share of China’s total arms imports for the first time in the period under review.

Last updated: April 21, 2026

Politics

This timeline tracks China-Russia bilateral engagements in three key domains – heads of state, diplomatic, and military – since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022. The frequency of these interactions surpasses that of any other bilateral relationship for both China and Russia. Between February 2022 and May 2026, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin interacted 19 times through in-person meetings or phone calls. Top diplomats Wang Yi and Sergey Lavrov spoke 34 times, including bilateral discussions and within multilateral settings. Military leaders from both sides – such as Sergei Shoigu, Andrey Belousov, Dong Jun, Li Shangfu, and Wei Fenghe – held 15 engagements during this period. Other than the frequency of engagements, the trend in key messaging shows growing alignment on strategic coordination in multilateral platforms and a stronger tone in opposing unilateral actions such as sanctions and military interventions by the United States.

Last updated: May 5, 2026

The graph shows that voting alignment between China and Russia declined in both the General Assembly and the Security Council from 2018 to 2024, with the steepest drop after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In 2025, however, this trend reversed, and voting alignment increased in both bodies. The number of adopted resolutions in the General Assembly also increased sharply that year to 192, up from around 85 to 100 in the years prior.

Voting coordination remains stronger in the Security Council, where the two countries almost never cast directly opposing votes, though this did happen in November 2024. Resolutions rarely proceed to a vote when a permanent member has signaled its intention to veto, meaning some disagreements are not shown in recorded voting. In this graph, which only shows adopted resolutions, divergence in the Security Council occurs when one votes yes and the other abstains.

The operation of border checkpoints serves as a barometer of China-Russia bilateral relations. Traditionally, the Chinese side has been more proactive in promoting trade through these checkpoints, while the Russian side has shown more caution, primarily due to concerns over China’s growing role in the development of the Russian Far East. As a result, infrastructure improvements on the Russian side have progressed slowly. However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the end of China’s COVID lockdowns, these checkpoints have become significantly busier, with trade volumes reaching record highs. There has also been notable progress in expanding capacity to facilitate bilateral trade – for instance, the construction of bridges across the Amur River and the expansion of checkpoint facilities. The increasing activity at these checkpoints reflects a broader trend of China-Russia alignment and highlights Russia’s growing dependency on China, suggesting Moscow is now prioritizing its relationship with Beijing, while becoming less concerned about China’s influence in the development of the Russian Far East.

Last updated: February 10, 2026

Society

The number of Chinese exchange students in Russia has grown steadily over the years, increasing from approximately 30,000 in 2020 to over 50,000 in 2024, a 72% increase. Similarly, Chinese students have accounted for a growing share of all foreign exchange students in Russia, rising from 9.4% in 2020 to 13.6% in 2024. As a result, China has surpassed other countries and is now the third-largest country of origin – its student numbers nearly matching those of the top two, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

While Chinese students at the bachelor’s level make up the largest group in absolute numbers, China is by far the leading country of origin for master’s students. In 2024, its 16,411 master’s students represented approximately 36% of all master’s students in Russia.

Explainer paragraph: Key figures in China-Russia bilateral relations indicate a closer alignment across various domains, highlighting stronger strategic coordination in political narratives and military cooperation. Both Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have set the tone for these relations, not only based on their respective geopolitical positions but also by promoting a shared worldview and ambition to build an alternative global order – one in which China and Russia play a greater role as stabilizing powers. This ambition is further articulated by their chief diplomats, Wang Yi and Sergey Lavrov, who emphasize the goal of establishing a multipolar world order and the democratization of international relations. Military leaders from both sides have also called for deeper cooperation, aiming to enhance stability not only between China and Russia but also within the broader global system.

Sources:

Quotes from Chinese representatives: CNN, SCMP, Chinese Ministry of Defense, SCMP,

Quotes for Russian representatives: CNBC, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Reuters, Global Times

The number of tourist visits between Russia and China grew steadily for years, peaking in 2019 with nearly 1.9 million Russian visits to China and over 2.3 million Chinese visits to Russia. However, tourism between the two countries collapsed during the COVID-19 pandemic and further declined following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with visits dwindling to just a few thousand in 2021 and 2022.

In 2023, tourism rebounded significantly in both directions, though it remained far below pre-pandemic levels – less than a third of the peak recorded in 2019. As a share of total tourist visits to Russia, Chinese tourist visits peaked at 7.7% in 2019, plummeted to 0.3% in 2021 and 2022, and recovered to 5.8% in 2023.

Beijing and Moscow reacted in close rhetorical alignment to the US-Israeli strikes on Iran and the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, jointly condemning the attacks as violations of sovereignty, international law and diplomacy. Statements from senior leaders, foreign ministries and UN representatives in both countries stressed that Iran was in the midst of negotiations with the United States, portraying the strikes as a “betrayal of diplomacy” that deliberately undercut ongoing talks and sharply escalated regional tensions. Both sides called for an immediate ceasefire and a return to political dialogue, framing the crisis as a test case for defending the norms of state sovereignty.

Notably, in the Chinese readout of the Lavrov-Wang Yi call of March 1, Sergey Lavrov is quoted as stressing Russia’s readiness to step up coordination with China, including through the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – a forward-leaning coordination signal that is not mirrored by Wang Yi in the Chinese account. The Russian readout, by contrast, presents the exchange more symmetrically, emphasizing shared positions rather than Russian initiative. As of March 3, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has not officially reacted to the most recent escalations.

Sources:

Quotes from Chinese representatives: PRC MFA; Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN; X

Quotes from Russian representatives: Moscow Times; RUS MFA; Permanent Mission of RUS to the UN; RUS MFA

The presidents of China and Russia were relatively restrained in their public statements after the US capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026. They spoke largely in generalized terms about international order and sovereignty, refraining from explicitly mentioning Venezuela in subsequent weeks. However, their foreign ministry officials and representatives at the United Nations directly named and condemned Washington for its actions. They consistently framed these as violations of international law, as destabilizing for the international order, and as undermining the interests of the broader international community. Chinese and Russian representatives also depicted the United States as a unilateral bully, using the Venezuela episode to present themselves as more restrained, law-abiding, and responsible great powers.