2010-02-03 | Agata Dubas and Jadwiga Rogoża

On 30 January, the largest social and political protest in many years took place in Kaliningrad. Ten thousand people demanded better welfare conditions for the region and the resignation of the Kaliningrad governor Georgy Boos; they also called on PM Vladimir Putin to resign.
The underlying cause of the protest came from Moscow's long-term policy of prioritising Kaliningrad's integration with Russia while attaching secondary importance to the region's development. The policy of centralisation (which has been adversely affecting the region), as well as the changes to the functioning of the Special Economic Zone (which have harmed the interests of the local elite) have caused particular discontent. The frustration has been galvanised by the economic crisis, which has affected the region with a dramatic decline of the welfare situation. The mobilisation of the people and the local elite on such a scale therefore has its roots in the specific characteristics of the region, and does not foretell similar protests on an all-Russian scale.
 
From welfare demands to political issues
The demonstration in Kaliningrad is a follow-up to the protests in December against the increased transport tax imposed on the owners of motor vehicles, in which around five thousand people participated. This time, the protest saw twice this number of people, even though the local authorities had postponed the tax increase for another year shortly before the demonstration. The principal message of the protest concerned welfare issues (calls for a stop to increases in municipal charges, fuel prices and custom duties). However, demands were also heard concerning free entry visas to EU member states, as well as political demands including calls on Governor Boos and Prime Minister Putin to step down. The protest was co-ordinated by Kaliningrad politicians and activists (the regional branch of the Solidarity opposition movement and several deputies of the Kaliningrad parliament) who were joined by both the opposition party Yabloko, and the 'licensed' opposition, i.e. the communists and Zhirinovsky's LDPR. As a legal protest on such a scale, it has had the greatest success of any over the last several years as regards mobilising the passive Russian public against official policy.
The authorities in Moscow responded nervously to the largest regional protest in many years. Ilya Klebanov, the presidential envoy to the Northwestern Federal District, the deputy prosecutor-general of Russia Alexander Gutsan, and a delegation of United Russia, the Russian 'party of power', were urgently dispatched to the Kaliningrad District. The official in charge of contacts with Kaliningrad in the Presidential Administration was dismissed.
 


The specific characteristics of the Kaliningrad protest
 
The activation of the people in Kaliningrad, which is without precedent in recent Russian political life, has been caused by the buildup of a number of short- and long-term factors.
 
The two primary causes of tension in the region include the negative consequences of its specific geopolitical location on the one hand, and Moscow's policy towards Kaliningrad on the other.
Kaliningrad's geopolitical location as an exclave surrounded by EU member states has been creating a number of problems for the people in the region since the EU’s enlargement, and especially since the extension of the Schengen zone. The introduction of the visa obligation for inhabitants of Kaliningrad (who previously travelled to Poland and Lithuania in large numbers) has considerably curtailed their ability to travel and earn money. No agreement on local border traffic with Poland has been negotiated yet. Russia has called for the agreement's provisions to apply to the entire Kaliningrad District, rather than the border zone of 30–50 km as provided for in the EU regulations, which has been impeding the negotiations.
 
Moscow's finance and appointments policies have also been breeding discontent in Kaliningrad. Firstly, the region's economy has been adversely affected by the changes to the functioning of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) introduced in 2006. As a result of these modifications, Kaliningrad has lost its potential as an import and reloading centre (the scope of the preferential import duties was limited), but – contrary to the declared objective of the changes – the region has not transformed into a production and export centre (the new regulations were supposed to attract investors who would develop production in the region). The current SEZ model has failed to generate revenues for the region as planned. While it is true that the new regulations have attracted more than fifty investors to the region, and that these companies have invested a total of more than US$500 million, this has mainly benefited the federal budget, which has gained more than 700 million roubles in tax money in 2008, while the regional budget gained only 80 million roubles. At the same time the new rules, which promote large investors (usually from outside the region), have adversely affected Kaliningrad's own small and medium-sized businesses.
Secondly, tension has risen as a result of the appointment in 2005 of a governor from outside the region.The local elite has been increasingly dissatisfied with the rule of Governor Boos, who has been favouring large businesses from Moscow and St. Petersburg at the expense of the local entrepreneurs, and with his inefficacy in defending the interests of the region as more and more new taxes and unfavourable regulations continued to be imposed on Kaliningrad. Governor Boos's first term expires in September 2010; it is possible that the local elite will try to use popular discontent to pressure Moscow to replace him.
 
The economic crisis, which has caused a dramatic deterioration of the region's welfare situation, has proved to be the short-term factor which exacerbated the region's problems most severely. According to official statistics, the unemployment rate in Kaliningrad reached 10.2% in December 2009, and was one of the highest in the European part of Russia. The region has reported the highest rate of outstanding salary payments (this mainly concerns companies), which have more than tripled in 2009 (from around 150 million roubles in December 2008 to 470 million roubles in December 2009). This debt continues to rise (it increased by another 6.8 percentage points last month). The difficult situation on the labour market, combined with the rising costs of municipal services (and recently, the plans to impose a high transport tax), has triggered protests by workers and the public at large; more than a dozen such protests were staged in Kaliningrad in 2009 (including demonstrations against the increase in custom duties on foreign cars, and against outstanding salary payments).
 


Kaliningrad as hostage to Moscow's policy
 
Moscow's long-term policy, which has been unfavourable to the region, is the underlying cause of the economic and social problems Kaliningrad has been experiencing. The Russian authorities view Kaliningrad's geopolitical location as a threat, rather than an opportunity, especially in the context of EU enlargement. Contrary to Moscow's declarations, the measures Moscow has undertaken are designed to limit the opportunities for the people of Kaliningrad to benefit from contacts with the European Union. In addition, as was the case with other regions of Russia, Moscow has considerably tightened its administrative control over the Kaliningrad District (by appointing the new governor in 2005) and made it more financially dependent (the 2003 finance reform increased the revenues of the federal budget at the expense of the regional budgets). The specific location of Kaliningrad was not taken into account, and the region was denied a chance to develop its potential, because that would have had to involve more autonomy.
 
Co-operation: Iwona Wiśniewska
 

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