The UN Climate Change Conference started in Copenhagen on 7 December. Its objective is to develop a new agreement on greenhouse gas emissions for the coming decades, as the current agreement, the Kyoto Protocol, expires at the end of 2012. Because there are major differences between the interests of the states participating in the Copenhagen summit, Russia's position may substantially influence the content of the final compromise. For Moscow, climate change is an issue of secondary importance, serving rather as a bargaining card in its relations with other partners, especially the European Union. Therefore, Russia's position on the new document may be fairly flexible, depending on how the negotiations in Copenhagen proceed.
The consequences of climate change for Russia
Like many other states, Russia is concerned about the negative consequences of global warming, including forced migration from areas affected by natural cataclysms (droughts, floods) or difficulties with maintaining infrastructures built in the permafrost (which is melting). However, Moscow also sees some positive consequences of climate change, such as the possibility of opening up the Northern Sea Route via the Arctic Ocean, or easier access to resources in the Far North.
Russia in the Kyoto regime
With total greenhouse gas emissions reaching 2.2 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CDE) in 2007, Russia is the world's fourth largest atmospheric polluter after China, the USA and the European Union. The Russians participated in the formulation of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, although they ratified the document only in 2004, in return for extra concessions from the European Union. The Russian ratification was decisive for the Protocol's entry into force. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Russia committed itself to keeping its greenhouse gas emissions at or below the 1990 level until 2012 (the 1990 level being 3.359 billion tons of CDE; real emissions in 2007 were 34% lower).
Although Russian emissions have been cut considerably, Russia's economy remains much more energy-intensive than the economies of the USA or China (it generates US$1000 of GDP at the expense of 494 kg of oil equivalent, compared to 217 kg in the case of the USA and 226 kg in the case of China). Increasing energy efficiency has been identified as an objective in many government strategies and programmes (including the Concept of the Russian Federation's social and economic development to 2012, and the 2009 anti-crisis programme). However, the significance of this objective for Moscow is mainly economic and not environmental; Russia is facing an energy deficit due to the slow pace of development work on new fields, its high export commitments and its consistent wasting of energy.
Russia's position at the Copenhagen summit
Before the Copenhagen summit, the Russian delegation took the position that the post-Kyoto agreement should keep 1990 as the base year for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, on 18 June President Dmitry Medvedev said that Moscow was prepared to cut its emissions by 10-15% compared to the 1990 level by 2020. Such a commitment would in practice allow Russia to increase its emissions beyond the current levels (according to the most recent forecasts, Russia will not reach the 1990 levels of emissions before 2025). The Russian Federation has also proposed that the presence of forested areas be included as a factor in the calculation of real greenhouse gas emissions (22% of the world's forests, which absorb much of the carbon dioxide emitted, are situated in Russia). Finally, Moscow wants the emissions trading mechanisms provided for in the Kyoto Protocol to be included in the new agreement.
Russia has made its participation in the new agreement conditional on the inclusion of those states which so far have not been engaged in environmental protection. In particular, this refers to the inclusion of the USA and the leading developing countries such as China, India or Brazil.
Climate issues in Russia's internal and foreign policy
Moscow's priority is to stimulate and maintain a high rate of economic growth, and environmental issues have been subordinated to this objective. Therefore, Russia will not allow reductions in greenhouse gas emissions to impede its economic development. The sale of its huge surplus of carbon credits (more than 1.2 billion tons of CDE) could offer Russia a chance to at least partly modernise its energy-intensive economy. However, since the Russian authorities have been unable to agree on a mechanism for the redistribution of proceeds from the carbon credits surplus, no credits have been sold.
Russia should not be expected to change its current policy, which attaches secondary importance to environmental protection. The Russian authorities are making instrumental use of their participation in the climate change action, which they are treating as a bargaining tool (in particular in the relations with the European Union) and a way to have a say on key global issues. This approach was best demonstrated by Russia's accession to the Kyoto regime in 2004 in return for the European Union's consent to Russia's membership in the WTO.
Conclusions
The Russian authorities are aware of the huge discrepancies between the interests of the delegations participating in the Copenhagen summit (with regard to the size of the planned emissions reductions, the division of responsibility among countries, and the volume and financing of aid for the poorest countries), and know that working out a compromise will be difficult as a consequence. The dispute between the European Union and the USA in particular seems to be benefiting Russia by offering it more room for manoeuvre in the negotiations process. Russia will not harm its interests either by supporting the EU proposals (such as a 20% reduction of emissions by 2020), or by joining those countries that are calling for limited reductions (especially the developing countries). As a consequence, Moscow's position may once again prove to be of great significance for the outcome of the agreement on greenhouse gas emissions, as in the case of the Kyoto Protocol.