2009-10-21 | Jadwiga Rogoża

Following the regional elections of 11 October which brought a landslide victory for the pro-government United Russia party, the remaining parties, who suffered a crushing defeat, staged a public protest. The parties represented in the State Duma (the Russian parliament) - the communists, A Just Russia and the Liberal Democrats - boycotted the parliamentary sessions for several days and announced that they will try and annul the election results in court. The protest by the losing parties, including the 'licensed opposition' (a moderate opposition which acts in consultation with the government) is an expression of their genuine frustration with the defeat. However, its significance is purely symbolic, as these parties are aware of their limited influence on the election process, and stand no chance of annulling the election results in the courts. Moreover, their protest is rather conformist, as it is not aimed at Vladimir Putin, the leader of the winning party and the political patron of the 'managed' elections.

Elections raise much controversy

The local elections that took place in Russia's 76 regions were accompanied by numerous reports by observers and journalists who publicised cases of electoral irregularities which were aimed at improving the results of the pro-government United Russia party. The most glaring examples of such irregularities occurred in the Northern Caucasian republics. However, it was the Moscow city Duma that raised greatest controversy, as it is the most prestigious and influential of the regional parliaments. The Moscow elections brought a landslide victory for United Russia, while the remaining parties suffered a crushing defeat, including for the so-called 'licensed opposition'. Out of 35 seats in the Moscow city Duma, United Russia will occupy an absolute majority of 32 seats, while the remaining 3 will go to the communists.
According to many observers, this outcome is a result of manipulations by the Moscow government, including the mayor Yuri Luzhkov, who is a member of United Russia. Experts pointed out that the election turnout was artificially raised (by adding ballot papers marked with votes for United Russia), and the protocols of district polling stations were amended to favour United Russia. To illustrate this, the media presented the case of disappearing votes cast for the democratic Yabloko party. The party leader Sergei Mitrokhin and his family voted for his party in the Khamovniki district of Moscow. However, the protocol of the district polling station later showed that not a single vote was cast for Yabloko; nor were any of the ballot papers considered invalid. Mitrokhin also pointed out that no one dared to 'manage the votes' in the polling station where Vladimir Putin was voting, which produced a rather remarkable outcome: results were significantly different than elsewhere, with the communists winning 33.7% of the votes cast, United Russia receiving a mere 26%, and Yabloko a remarkable 24%.

The frustration of the 'licensed opposition'

The bitter defeat in the prestigious Moscow regional parliament provoked vehement protests by the 'licensed opposition'. The representatives of communists, Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democrats, and A Just Russia on the one hand, and the democratic Right Cause and Yabloko on the other, are preparing materials for a court procedure to re-examine the election results. On October 14, deputies from the parties represented in the State Duma (the communists, the Liberal Democrats and A Just Russia) left the session chamber and boycotted the sittings for several days in protest against the 'managed' elections. They also demanded that the head of the Central Electoral Committee be dismissed, and that their declarations be heard by President Medvedev (the meeting with the president was eventually scheduled for October 24).
The protest by the losing parties is caused by their genuine frustration with the defeat. However, this discontent has been censored by the parties themselves, and is directed mainly against the head of the Central Election Committee, Vladimir Churov, and Moscow's mayor Yuri Luzhkov. The protesters have shied away from criticising Vladimir Putin himself, who is the leader of the victorious United Russia party.
The manner of the losing parties' protest also falls into the category of a recurring ritual. After the first heated speeches and the declaration of boycotting parliament (wherein Vladimir Zhirinovsky was particularly active), the parties' deputies soon returned there. Moreover, this protest is not the first such post-election demarche: the communists and Yabloko have repeatedly referred the results of parliamentary elections to the court (their evidence was never acknowledged), whereas the Duma sittings have been repeatedly boycotted by the communists (the most recent such boycott took place in 2008) and Zhirinovsky's party (after the regional elections of March 2009). The losing parties are in the habit of parading their discontent, even though they are perfectly aware that they are unable to have their demands met (for example, dismissing the head of the Central Electoral Committee is outside Duma's remit) and that their boycott will not disrupt the parliament's work (more than three-quarters of the deputies belong to United Russia).

The 'virtual reality' of the party scene

The Russian party scene has become increasingly marginalised as real power is concentrated within the narrow ruling elite headed by Vladimir Putin. At the moment, the party scene is moulded by negotiations and arrangements between the parties and the government, and not so much by political competition or the outcome of elections. As a result of such arrangements, a certain 'virtual party scene' reflecting the interests of the ruling elite has developed on the federal level. The main actor on this scene is United Russia, which is supported by the government and predominates in all the regional parliaments. However, this seemingly influential party has in fact hardly any leverage on important political and economic decisions, and is a mere instrument of the ruling elite for fulfilling its orders and commands. Other parties act as a 'licensed opposition'; this means that they consult their key decisions with the government, and in return receive certain support. Genuine opposition groups are usually completely marginalised. The ruling elite is inclined to keep up the appearance of pluralism (provided that United Russia dominates) and maintain several different parties in the parliament. The outcome of the elections to the State Duma reflects this attitude: at the moment, four parties are represented in the national parliament.
In contrast to federal politics, where a controlled pluralism prevails, the situation on the regional level is largely dependent on local interests and businesses. This most often means that United Russia's position is even stronger, simply because the most influential local elites have joined this party. This has in fact become a political tradition in Russia, prevalent since the 1990s; the local elites have eagerly joined successive incarnations of the so-called 'party of power' (i.e. the party representing the interests of the national ruling elite), which in turn made that party the important centre of influence. During regional elections, the local elites do not care about maintaining any appearances of pluralism, and usually concentrate on providing the 'party of power' with a good election result, which makes the remaining parties even more vulnerable. As a result, these elections may bring about such controversial results as in Moscow, one of Russia's most liberal cities, where the 'party of power' is set to win almost all the seats in the city Duma.

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