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A chance for a pro-European breakthrough in Moldova
EASTWEEK

2009-10-07 | Witold Rodkiewicz

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Coming to power of a new government in Moldova on 25 September means that the country will be ruled by genuinely pro-European political forces which, according to the new Prime Minister Vladimir Filat, treat European integration of Moldova as their 'absolute priority'. This may bring about a fundamental change in Moldovan domestic and foreign policy. To demonstrate pro-European sympathies of the new cabinet on 28 September Prime Minister Filat made Brussels the destination of his first foreign trip.
However, the new government will have to face a number of serious challenges. Apart from a deep economic crisis it will have to deal with political complications due to a likely blockage of the presidential election by the communist party, which in turn may necessitate early parliamentary elections. Moreover, the new authorities may be subjected to economic and political pressure from Russia, which may find unacceptable the sudden turn of Moldova towards the EU. Therefore, rapid financial aid from Western institutions, especially the EU, will be an essential condition of the new pro-European team's success.


A new quality

Vladimir Filat's cabinet represents a fundamental change in Moldovan politics. It is a broad coalition of those political forces in Moldova which decided to challenge the authoritarian political system which was built over eight years by the Communist party led by Vladimir Voronin. The main objective of the new government is to conduct deep internal reforms in order to prepare Moldova for European accession and to liquidate the consequences of eight years of attempts by Voronin's clique to turn the state into a tool for personal enrichment. The government's priorities are: economic liberalisation, restoration of rule of law, reforms of the law enforcement and the justices systems, restoration of pluralism in to the public media, eradication of corruption, decentralisation of the state administration and restoration of local government's autonomy. Although the coalition has political will to carry out the reforms, there is a risk that the new government will succumb to temptation to take over the existing system of informal links between politics and business instead of liquidating them. However, the coalition nature of the government creates a system of mutual control which may reduce the risk of corruption.

In foreign relations, the new government intends to give up President Voronin's policy of manoeuvring between the European Union and Russia, adopting instead a clear pro-European stance. Signing an association agreement with the EU, which would establish a free-trade zone and gaining a prospect for a visa-free regime with EU member states, are top priority issues. At the same time, the new cabinet does not want to change Moldova's neutral status or resign its membership of the CIS, hoping that it will thus be able to maintain correct relations with Russia.

What makes hopes for reform more realistic is that Moldova's new government represents not only new political forces but also a new generation of politicians, whose formative experience occurred already after the collapse of the USSR under enormous influence from Western cultural standards, who are mostly Western-educated, fluent in foreign languages and are used to speak Romanian (and not Russian) as the language of politics and business (such as Prime Minister Vladimir Filat, the Minister of Defence Vitalie Marinuta, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Iurie Leanca and the Minister of Finance Veaceslav Negruta). Their chances of achieving a political breakthrough in Moldova and breaking with the post-Soviet oligarchic political system are real. If the new team succeeds in staying in power for a longer period, one of the long-term effects will be the gradual cultural and linguistic 'Romanisation' of Moldova, which however is not to be confused with the politically dead programme of unification with Romania.


The challenges

The new government will have to respond to a number of extremely difficult economic and political challenges. In the short term, the most dangerous is the budget deficit resulting from both the deep economic crisis and the reckless fiscal policy of the previous cabinet. In the first half of 2009, GDP shrank by 7.8%, exports by 12.5%, imports by 28% and VAT receipts by 15%. According to estimates presented by the new minister of economy, the budget gap may reach 8.4 billion Moldovan lei (approx. US$760 million) at the end of this year. Such a big deficit may prevent public sector employees from being paid in the last months of the year.
Moldova does not have enough funds to make up such a large deficit. Therefore, external financial aid is becoming a very urgent issue. In this light, Prime Minister Filat's first visit to Brussels (29-30 September) proved to be a strong disappointment to the new government. The European Union promised merely €22 million before the end of the year, The International Monetary Fund can allocate larger funds but will probably be unable to disburse the first tranche before the beginning of next year.
The new cabinet's financial problems are aggravated by political complications resulting from its lack of a sufficient parliamentary majority to ensure the election of a new president. The government coalition holds 53 seats, while the other 48 belong to the communist party. 61 votes are necessary to elect a president. According to the existing legislation and the constitution, if a president is not elected within two months, new parliamentary elections have to be scheduled, however not before the end of this year. The coalition hopes to convince the communists to vote for its presidential candidate, Marian Lupu, the leader of the Democratic Party, which is a member of the government coalition. Since this is rather unlikely, the government is considering the option of shifting the date of parliamentary elections to 2011 by launching a procedure to amend the constitution. The coalition hopes that by that time it will have managed to start deep structural reforms to bring Moldova closer to European standards and to increase its public opinion ratings.
The new government may also expect additional difficulties resulting from Russia's reaction to the new political situation in Chisinau. For Moscow, the new team, with its pro-European tendencies and the 'Romanophile' label given to it by the communists, will be a difficult partner which Moscow may find hard to accept. It is unclear whether the Kremlin will decide that political stability in Moldova is in its interest. It is very likely that Russia will want to show its potential to put pressure on the new Moldovan government by, for example, raising the gas price or by increasing tension over the Transnistrian issue.

The pro-European turn in Moldovan politics, which is based on the aspirations and expectations of the most active and best-educated part of the society, may only have a chance of success if it receives real support from the European Union and international financial institutions as soon as possible. Since Moldova is not a big country, even some assistance which may seem insignificant from a Western perspective can decide whether the new government in Chisinau will be given a chance to implement its programme. The other post-Soviet countries will be watching closely what happens to the new government and how Brussels treats it. This offers the opportunity for the European Union to reinforce significantly pro-European tendencies in the CIS area. In turn, if the new government fails, the EU will be seen as less attractive by both elites and the general public in this region.