2009-09-02 | Marek Menkiszak

The intensive historical campaign which has been ongoing in Russia in recent weeks, in connection with the seventieth anniversary of World War II, culminated on 31 August and 1 September with statements by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. The main message of these statements was that any attempts at building security in Europe without Russia as a key player were doomed to failure. This suggests that - unlike in the case of the previous propaganda exercises of this kind - one of the aims of the present campaign is to convince the West of the necessity to build a new security order in Europe, and to neutralise the resistance of those European states which are critical of Russia (especially Poland and the Baltic States).

The message from Putin and Lavrov

On 31 August, Poland's Gazeta Wyborcza published an article authored by the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Moderate in tone, the message of the text was addressed both to Poland and to European public opinion. Addressing the Poles, the Russian PM suggested that we should not concentrate on difficult history, and instead follow the example of France and Germany and give a "pragmatic" dimension to policy towards Russia (for example, by being open to co-operation in the energy and transport sectors, etc.). This would constitute a positive breakthrough in Polish-Russian relations.
However, Putin's letter also contained another message, addressed to the European public: "The entire experience of the interwar period - from the peace of Versailles to the outbreak of World War II - proves that it is impossible to create an effective collective security system without involving all the states in Europe, including Russia." The Russian prime minister made a similar point on 1 September in his speech during the ceremonies in Gdansk, where he said that before the war European states failed to build a collective security system, and history showed that co-operation with extremists at the expense of the security of other states was a source of tragedy.
A similar message, though expressed at greater length and more aggressively, was presented by the Russian head of diplomacy Sergei Lavrov on 1 September in his article published by the Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper, and in his lecture to students of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) on the same day. In the article, Lavrov emphasised that the lesson of World War II was still valid today because ( as then) the main systemic defect of European security consisted in "the absence of an open system of collective security that would extend across the Euro-Atlantic region."
In his lecture, the Russian minister criticised the West for having opted to expand eastwards after the end of the Cold War, instead of building a new collective security system with Russia. Lavrov also accused the West again (the first instance being his address to the OSCE in Vienna on 23 June) of having encroached on the Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the Russian head of diplomacy praised the change in US policy under the Obama administration as being a manifestation of "constructive pragmatism". He also suggested that Russian-American co-operation could become an important element in the global order, and that co-operation between Russia, the United States and the European Union could lay the foundation for a new Euro-Atlantic order. Finally, Lavrov said he hoped that Russian initiatives concerning a new order of European security would be accepted.
The Russian minister also strongly criticised those who expressed disappointment with the USA's new policy. He directly attacked the authors of the letter sent by members of the Central and Eastern European elites to President Obama, accusing them of having attempted to persuade Washington to resume the policy of confrontation with Russia. He also once again accused certain NATO members (without naming them) of anti-Russian phobias, and repeated the allegations concerning the falsification of history. He said that Russia would actively oppose this, and that any attempts at "taking away our victory" would be regarded as stepping overa "red line" in politics.

Conclusion: The international objectives of Russia's historical campaign

In the current historical campaign, which relies on clichés of Soviet historiography, the Russian authorities are drawing clear analogies between the situation in the 1930s and the current situation in Europe. By defending the Soviet policy of that time, the Russian leaders are implying that the European powers and certain states in Central and Eastern Europe were co-responsible for the outbreak of World War II, because they allegedly refused to create a collective security system with the Soviet state. This is meant as a lesson for Europe, the message of which is that Russia must not be ignored, and that a new security order should be created in which Russia would be a key player. In practice, this would mean recognising the CIS as a Russian sphere of influence, and that Central Europe would be considered as a partly demilitarised area. In this context, one of the aspects of the current Russian campaign appears to be an instrument for pressure on the West (which is a new phenomenon), as well as a measure to neutralise the objections of those European countries who are critical of Russia (especially the Baltic States and Poland) and stand against such a new European order. The latter group of countries is therefore to be forced, by pressure from Moscow, to revise their policies along the lines of 'pragmatism' and stop opposing Russia's proposals, or - given the change in US policy - to be left in a kind of political isolation in the Euro-Atlantic area, and discredited as Russophobes struggling with long-standing historical problems with Russia.

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