2009-08-31 | Maciej Falkowski and Wojciech Konończuk

Violence has escalated in recent weeks in the eastern part of the Northern Caucasus, i.e. the region comprising Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan. On 17 August in Nazran, Ingushetia, an attack against the local Interior Ministry headquarters took place, in which 25 people were killed and nearly 300 injured. In the second half of August, eight police officers were killed in three suicide attacks in the Chechen capital Grozny. In Dagestan, attacks against representatives of the institutions of force occur almost daily. Radical underground Islamic organisations are responsible for the current escalation of violence; however, the activities of the Russian institutions of force may also be responsible, as they have been seeking to destabilise the situation in the region in order to obtain additional powers in the fight against terrorism.

Escalation of violence

In June and July, several local politicians and members of the security bodies were assassinated in Ingushetia and Dagestan. For example, the Dagestani interior minister was assassinated, and on 22 June, a failed assassination attempt on the Ingush president Yunus-bek Yevkurov took place. The constantly deteriorating situation in Ingushetia is the most unstable; acts of violence have been taking place there on a regular basis since autumn 2008. Under the authoritarian rule of President Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechnya had remained the most stable among the three republics until last week. However, the recent attacks in Grozny demonstrate that Chechnya too has been affected by the escalation of violence.

Although violence is a permanent phenomenon in the Northern Caucasus, the current wave of terror attacks and armed actions is comparable only to the events of 2002-2004, when large-scale terror acts were a habitual occurrence (not only in the Caucasus but also in Moscow).

Underground Islamic organisations step up activity

Responsibility for most of the terror attacks has been claimed by underground Islamic armed organisations, and especially the Chechen commander Dokka Umarov. The declared objective of the Islamic militants, who are likely associated with international terror organisations, is to overthrow the local authorities, separate the Caucasian republics from Russia and establish a Caucasus Emirate in their territories, with Sharia law as its legal system. The Islamic militants, who are a major military force, mainly target the institutions of force (at the republican level), as well as members of the authorities and any Muslim clergy co-operating with the government.

The main reasons for the increased activity and radicalisation of the underground Islamic armed organisations include the central and local authorities' persistent inability to solve the region's social and economic problems, as well as the activities of the institutions of force, which have been persecuting those Muslim communities which have not been associated with official Islamic organisations, as well as violating human rights on a massive scale, under the pretext of fighting 'international terrorism'. As a result, the Islamic militants are gaining popularity, as they claim they will dismantle the current political system built on clan and mafia relations. The militants also attack people who do not abide by Sharia law; in one example, they shot seven prostitutes in Buynaksk, Dagestan, this August.

Is the destabilisation designed to serve the interests of the federal institutions of force?

While the Islamic militants are capable of organising a series of attacks, it cannot be ruled out that the current wave of violence has been made possible by the federal institutions of force (some of the attacks may have taken place as a result of provocations staged by the siloviks, or their failure to take adequate preventative action, as was the case with, for instance, Shamil Basayev's raid into Dagestan in summer 1999). It is notable that the escalation of violence occurred immediately after President Dmitry Medvedev lifted the anti-terror regime in Chechnya this April (the regime had been in place since 1999). The decision displeased the federal institutions of force, because it entailed a limitation of their powers in Chechnya; it provided for a reduction of the number of troops stationed in the republic. It is also notable that many acts of violence have recently occurred in Chechnya, where the militants had been relatively weak in comparison to the situation in Ingushetia and Dagestan, and where President Kadyrov has been in control of the internal situation. It should also be noted that it is almost exclusively members of the local, and not the federal, institutions of force who die in the attacks. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the destabilisation has been provoked or made possible by the Russian siloviks in order to prove to the Kremlin that the local leaders are unable to ensure stability in the region, and that the powers of the institutions of force in the Caucasus should be extended.

Moscow's helplessness

The central authorities have as yet undertaken no firm response to the destabilisation in the North Caucasus (so far, only a government meeting devoted to the situation in the region has been scheduled). It might appear that the policy towards the North Caucasus region is not being co-ordinated by a single decision-making centre, and that decisions are being taken by several bodies including the Kremlin, the Interior Ministry, the Federal Security Service and the Defence Ministry. The Kremlin is presumably still engaged in its long-standing dispute about what choice of policy options to take with regard to the Caucasus; either employing strictly forceful methods, or expanding the competences of the authorities at republic level. In recent years, the Kremlin has been implementing both these policies inconsistently, failing to achieve the expected results.

The fact that the Kremlin has not been following any clear policy line in its dealings with the Caucasus is apparent in the contradictory decisions taken recently by the Russian authorities. On the one hand, Moscow has strengthened its military presence in the region (three regiments of the Interior Ministry forces were deployed in Dagestan in August alone) and stepped up direct supervision over the local institutions of force. On the other hand, the anti-terror operation regime in the Nazran region (imposed after the attack on Yevkurov) was lifted on 24 August, and the president of Ingushetia, who is strongly backed by the Kremlin, said he was opposed to extending the regime to the entire republic (which the siloviks have been advocating), and pledged both to increase the size of the Ingush police force from 4,000to 7,000officers and to meet the human rights activists to discuss the situation in the republic.

Whichever option Moscow chooses to follow, its measures are unlikely to solve the Northern Caucasus' problems, which have been accumulating for years, or stabilise the situation in the region. If Moscow opts for the forceful variant, the popularity and activity of the Islamic militants will continue to rise. Any attempt to limit the powers of the federal institutions of force, on the other hand, may prompt them to take actions that will cause even more instability in the region. In the immediate future, one should therefore expect further acts of violence; nor can an outbreak of armed conflict on a larger scale be ruled out either.

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