2009-05-06 | Wojciech Górecki

On 30 April, the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev and the leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia signed agreements under which the borders of these para-states will be protected by Russian border guards for the next five years. Russian border troops were deployed there on 2 May. These agreements, which both Tbilisi and NATO have protested against, have made the two republics even more dependent on Moscow and, in the Kremlin's view, serve to legitimize the Russian military presence on Abkhazia and South Ossetia's borders with Georgia. They also mark another step towards strengthening Moscow's position in the region (at the expense of the eroding influence of the West). The agreements were concluded on the eve of the NATO military exercise in Georgia (launched on 6 May). Russia had protested fiercely against this exercise, describing them as a provocation, and resorted to veiled threats against Georgia and the West.
The Kremlin has been increasingly assertive in demonstrating to the West that it considers Georgia and the entire Southern Caucasus to be a zone of its exclusive interests, where it will not tolerate any Western military presence. Moscow's strategic objective is to make the West informally accept this state of affairs. This does not seem possible without a change of government in Georgia. It should therefore be expected that Russia will continue taking measures intended to discredit Mikheil Saakashvili's team abroad, and will declare its support for the Georgian opposition. It cannot be ruled out that Russia will attempt to destabilise the situation in Georgia, possibly in the immediate future; according to the Georgian authorities, Russia was involved in the attempted military putsch in Mukhrovani on 5 May. In the longer term, it is also likely that Russian armed forces might intervene if unrest breaks out in one of Georgia's provinces; currently the most likely trouble spot is ethnically predominantly Armenian Javakhetia region.

Relations between Moscow and Tbilisi

The relations between Russia and Georgia were frozen after the conflict in August 2008. Leading Russian politicians, including President Medvedev and Foreign Minister Lavrov, have said on several occasions in recent weeks that dialogue with Tbilisi could only be resumed on the condition that President Saakashvili stepped down. These statements appear to have been intended as support for the Georgian opposition, which has been protesting and demanding the president's resignation since 9 April. The Kremlin is aware that the chances for a pro-Russian turn in Georgian politics are next to none. It hopes, however, that, with the continuing erosion of the Georgian state, a weaker group could come to power that would be more susceptible to Russian pressure and more willing to take Russia's interests into account (by suspending the process of integration with NATO, or authorising the takeovers of transport and energy enterprises by Russian businesses). In return, Georgia could expect some concessions, such as facilitations in the movement of people or better access for Georgian goods to the Russian market).

Moscow's relations with the para-states. The border agreements

Russia is the only state (apart from Nicaragua) to have recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Its relations with the two republics are based on identical treaties on friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, which Moscow signed with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali in September 2008. The treaties state that the parties will conclude a number of detailed agreements, including agreements on military co-operation that will, inter alia, regulate the presence of Russian military bases in the para-states. No such agreements have been signed so far, perhaps because of additional conditions set by Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, although the bases are in fact already in operation. Numerous Russian statements have indicated that 3,700 Russian troops will be deployed in each of the para-states, and that they will remain there for at least several decades. The fact that military agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia have not been signed may also be due to Moscow's cautious attitude and its preference to reach its goal in small steps, testing the West's reactions along the way.
The agreements under which the Russians will guard the borders of the para-states are apparently one such test; they came into force with immediate effect, and the Russian border troops started developing the necessary infrastructure at the beginning of May. The agreements were strongly criticized by NATO, among others; according to the Alliance, they infringe the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement which provided for the pullout of Russian and Georgian troops to positions held before 8 August 2008.

Moscow's reaction to the planned NATO exercise in Georgia

The agreements were signed on the eve of Cooperative Longbow'09 and Cooperative Lancer'09, two military exercises taking place between 6 May and 1 June as part of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme; these exercises will involve the Vaziani base near Tbilisi, which was used by the Russians until 2001. Their signature appears to have been intended to demonstrate that Georgia and the entire Southern Caucasus belong to Russia's exclusive sphere of influence, and Moscow will not accept any Western military presence there.
Moscow has known about the exercise for many months, but it has been protesting against it since mid-April, claiming that due to the proximity of the Russian border, they are a provocation staged by NATO. Minister Lavrov has said that the exercises would not contribute to stability in the Caucasus, and President Medvedev stated that the Kremlin would follow it closely and "take appropriate steps if necessary". The president also recalled that conflict broke out last year shortly after a similar exercise, which may be interpreted as a veiled threat to Georgia.
Several NATO members and partners have cancelled their participation in the exercises, including Estonia and Latvia (which stated economic difficulties as the reason), as well as Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Serbia (presumably under Russian pressure).
Georgian authorities claim that the attempted putsch which took place on 5 May in the tank battalion stationed at Mukhrovani, east of Tbilisi and not far from Vaziani, was inspired by Russia.

Tentative forecast

It seems that Moscow will continue its current policy of discrediting the Georgian authorities internationally and hindering Georgia's integration with Euro-Atlantic structures, while the restoration of a sphere of influence in the Southern Caucasus remains its strategic objective.
It is possible that attempts will be made to destabilise the situation in Georgia, for example by exploiting the existing internal tension in the country and the general weakness of its state institutions. Such attempts may be made in the coming weeks or even days, while the NATO exercises are still underway. The mutiny in Mukhrovani may be an indication that such attempts might fall on a fertile ground. At this stage, the most likely trouble spot appears to be Javakhetia, a region bordering on Armenia with an ethnic Armenian majority, which is not well-disposed toward the Georgian authorities. The situation in Javakhetia has been tense for the last few months, since the arrest of several Armenian activists accused of espionage for Russia. Larger-scale riots could break out in the province, which would trigger an intervention of the Georgian police, which in turn could lead to an intervention by the Russian army "in defence of Russian citizens" (a Russian military base existed in Javakheti until 2007, and some inhabitants have obtained Russian passports).

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