2009-04-22

Vladimir Voronin's team has survived the first, most heated phase of the post-election crisis, although political and social tensions persist and may lead to new demonstrations. However, it is more likely that the political situation will continue to normalise, strengthening the position of President Voronin, who will retain exclusive control of all state institutions for another term. As a result, the process of Moldova's Europeanization will remain stalled for another four years.

The protests and the reaction of the opposition

After three days of massive demonstrations (6-8 April) joined by between ten and thirty thousand people, the wave of protests has subsided. The demonstrations started spontaneously in protest against alleged ballot-rigging and the continued rule of the Voronin team. Many reports and video materials suggest that the acts of vandalism accompanying the demonstrations, such as arson at the presidential palace and the parliament building, committed by small groups using Romanian national symbols, were instigated by the agents provocateurs provocations organised by the authorities. This does not rule out the possibility that demonstrators may have also spontaneously waved Romanian flags and raised pro-Romanian slogans - pro-Romanian sympathies are strong among the young people of Chisinau who constituted the core of the demonstrations.

The three main opposition parties - the Liberal Party (PL), the Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) and the Party Alliance Our Moldova (AMN) - were clearly surprised by the demonstrations. The liberal-centrist groups have advocated a distinctly pro-Western course for Moldova and close relations with Romania, but, contrary to the allegations voiced by the authorities, they have not called for the incorporation of Moldova into Romania.
The opposition party leaders, Vladimir Filat (PLDM), Serafim Urecheanu (AMN) and Dorin Chirtoaca (PL), appeared among the demonstrators on 7 April. They accused the authorities of ballot-rigging and called for protests, while at the same time trying in vain to stop the protesters from attacking government and police buildings. On 12 April the opposition led a further peaceful demonstration with around fifteen thousand participants, but did not attempt to organise a continuing protest, and decided instead to pursue legal methods to obtain a revision of the election result. It refused to participate in a vote recount, but managed to obtain limited access to the voting lists. This revealed numerous instances of ballot fraud indicating that between 10 and 30 percent of the votes cast on 5 April had been cast by so-called 'dead souls'. The opposition then filed a protest against the election results with the Constitutional Court, demanding that the election be invalidated in view of the ballot fraud detected.
Opposition activists have also been publicising and documenting numerous instances in which young people detained by the police were brutally beaten or even tortured.

In general, the opposition failed to display sufficient determination and political will during the crisis. It was unable to propose a clear program of action that could channel and exploit politically the existing mass dissatisfaction with the regime. Neither was it capable of promoting a single leader. This was due, inter alia, to its sense of isolation caused by lack of support from international institutions and the EU, and the fear of repression (arrests) by the authorities.

The authorities' policy

The authorities tried to blame Romania for the demonstrations and to discredit the opposition by accusing it of attempting a coup d'etat and insinuating that it had been a tool in the hands of the Romanian intelligence services. Chisinau recalled its ambassador from Bucharest, expelled the Romanian ambassador and introduced a visa obligation for Romanian nationals as of 9 April. Romanian journalists were also expelled, others were denied entry into Moldova, some transport connections with Romanian were suspended, and the return of Moldovan students from Romania were blocked.
On 8 April, the police launched mass arrests of young people (officially, around 300 people have been arrested so far, but according to the opposition the number is at least 800). In many cases, the detainees were brutally beaten. Sergiu Mocanu, a prominent opposition politician, and Gabriel Stati, the son of one of Moldova's richest entrepreneurs who had been in conflict with Voronin, have been arrested on charges of organising riots.
At the same time, the authorities made token conciliatory gestures, clearly intended for the external audience. President Voronin called for national unity and reconciliation in the name of the country's European future and requested the prosecution authorities to amnesty the detained youths.
On 15 April the authorities agreed to a vote recount, although its result published on 21 April was almost identical to the original ballot's outcome - the ruling PCRM gained 60 seats in parliament, and the three opposition parties got 41.
However, these apparently conciliatory gestures are accompanied by a defamation campaign against opposition. Mocanu, Stati and some of the arrested youths remain in detention, and the authorities are not giving the opposition any opportunities to influence the country's course. Finally, on April 22 the Constitutional Court refused, on procedural grounds, to take into account the evidence of vote fraud filed by the opposition, thus giving the final legal imprimatur to the official results of the election.

The EU's policy

High-level European Union officials (Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Javier Solana) as well as diplomats and politicians from the EU countries representing international institutions (Petros Efthymiou, the special co-ordinator of OSCE observers in the Moldovan election, and David Wilshire, the chair of the Parliamentary Assembly's delegation from the Council of Europe) have recognised the result of the Moldovan elections. Their statements, which expressed no support for the opposition and suggested that the 'irregularities' were marginal and should be settled by Moldovan courts, in effect backed President Voronin and his regime. On 10 April Javier Solana announced that a fact-finding mission would be sent to Moldova to examine the events on 7-8 April, but no such mission has been delegated until now. The EU's special representative for Moldova Kalman Mizsei undertook to mediate between the authorities and the opposition, calling for national dialogue and reconciliation, which should however be based on the recognition of the official results of the 5 April elections. The EU's policy towards the Moldovan crisis has been a hostage to the report adopted on 6 April by the International Election Observation Mission (European Parliament, ODHIR, PACE) which, under the influence of the Russian delegation, expressed a generally positive assessment of the Moldovan elections.

Summary and conclusions

Although the social tension caused by police brutality and the recognition of election results by the Constitutional Court may trigger new demonstrations in Chisinau, the most heated phase of the post-election crisis in Moldova is, most likely, over.
It appears that without determined help from the European Union, the Moldovan opposition will not be able to force President Voronin to make any concessions. Consequently, Voronin's group will keep full control of the state apparatus for another four years. This means a further regression of the Moldovan political system towards a purely façade democracy in which one political and business group controls the political scene, the prosecutor's office, the courts and big business by formal and informal means. Moreover, it also means that the 'Europeanisation' of Moldova, which the European Union and the Voronin team have declared as a joint objective since 2005, will be possible only to the extent it will not threaten to dent the existing system of power and the businesses relations associated with it, as has been the case for the last four years.

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