2009-04-22 | Maciej Falkowski

Turkey and Russia have in recent weeks visibly stepped up their efforts to develop a framework agreement that would end the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Having marginalised the roles of the USA, the OSCE and the European Union, the two countries are imposing certain solutions on Armenia and Azerbaijan, which are in fact being forced into a compromise. The dynamics of developments, the pressure Moscow and Ankara have exerted, and the conciliatory declarations by Armenian and Azeri officials all indicate that a compromise is very likely to be reached in the near future. If signed, the agreement could significantly change the geopolitical architecture of the Southern Caucasus. It would be a step towards stabilisation of the region, considerably strengthen Russia and Turkey's influence there, and undermine the position of the West.

Russia and Turkey putting pressure on the conflict's parties

A number of high-level visits and talks held in recent weeks have demonstrated that Russia and Turkey have stepped up their efforts to solve the Karabakh conflict. The talks have been held as of last August, since the outbreak of the Georgian war. The most important of them include the Azeri president Ilham Aliyev's visit to Moscow (16-17 April), the visits of the Russian diplomacy chief Sergei Lavrov and the Turkish foreign minister Ali Babacan to Yerevan (16 April), and a series of visits by Turkish officials to Baku. Moreover, the Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan and the Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan are expected in Moscow next week. These meetings are a continuation of the visits paid in recent months such as the Turkish president's Abdullah Gul's trips to Yerevan and Moscow, and the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev's and the Russian foreign minister's visits to Baku.
It is not clear to what extent Russia and Turkey have co-ordinated their positions or are co-ordinating their actions. However, the main element in these efforts consists in putting pressure on Yerevan and Baku and convincing them to conclude a compromise. The role of the two parties of the conflict is in fact limited to approving or tactically objecting to the solutions Moscow and Ankara are imposing.
The gestures which Armenia and Azerbaijan are making seem to show that Russia and Turkey's activities have been effective. It is extremely significant that Baku has abandoned its militant rhetoric and has been making conciliatory gestures to Armenia (during his visit to Moscow, President Aliyev spoke about guarantees of security for the Karabakh Armenians and the possibility to leave the Lachin corridor between Armenia and Karabakh under Armenian control). For his part, the Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan stated during his visit to Iran on 15 April that Yerevan is willing to normalise its relations with Turkey without any initial conditions (this means that Armenia would be ready to refrain from officially raising the issue of Turkey's recognition of the 1915 massacres of Armenians as genocide). Also important are Turkey's repeated statements that Ankara will not open its borders with Armenia before at least a preliminary agreement on Karabakh is reached. The purpose behind these declarations has been to appease Azerbaijan and make it more prone to compromise.
The West has played a marginal role in this process. However, if an agreement is developed, it will have to accept it, probably under the aegis of the OSCE Minsk Group. The US administration has nervously been trying to join the peace process (President Obama met the Armenian and Azeri foreign ministers in Ankara on 6-7 April, and the US diplomat, OSCE Minsk Group co-chair Matthew Bryza has repeatedly visited Baku and Yerevan). However, these efforts are unlikely to succeed.

The main points of the agreement

It is very probable that the framework agreement on solving the Karabakh conflict will be signed, possibly in the next few weeks. It should not be expected that the parties will resolve the main contentious issue, the status of Karabakh (the decision on this matter will probably be postponed for a decade, or indeed several decades). However, compromise is possible on several important points, including the pullout of Armenian troops from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (with the exception of the Lachin and Kelbajar regions); the return of Azeri refugees to these territories, the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia, opening the Armenian-Turkish border and unblocking the transport routes via Armenia; and the deployment of a (probably Russian) peacekeeping force in Karabakh.

Geopolitical consequences of the compromise

If signed, the new agreement on Karabakh could radically change the current geopolitical architecture of the Southern Caucasus. First of all, it would stabilise the situation in the region and minimise the risk of a new outbreak of Azeri-Armenian armed conflict. Opening the Turkish-Armenian border and unblocking the transport routes between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan would also end Armenia's isolation and enable the country to participate in transport projects in the Caucasus.
The compromise would also strengthen Russia's position in the region. Russia would probably gain the status of the agreement's main guarantor, and Russian peacekeeping troops would be deployed in Karabakh, offering Moscow an important instrument to pursue its own policy in the region and put pressure Armenia and Azerbaijan. Another important element in the new order would consist in a rapprochement between Russia and Azerbaijan, including in the energy sphere (during his visit to Moscow, Ilham Aliyev voiced support for the idea of exporting Azeri gas to Russia and increasing the capacity of the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, and he also distanced himself from the Nabucco gas pipeline project).
Turkey's position in the Caucasus would also be strengthened. A success in Nagorno-Karabakh would demonstrate that Ankara is an important player in the region, capable of developing and implementing political solutions of its own. Opening the border with Armenia would also be a success for Turkey (Ankara's normalisation of relations with its neighbours is currently among its top priorities), and would thus represent a solution to the '1915 problem' at the political level.
On the other hand, the compromise would considerably undermine the regional position of the West, and especially the United States. This would be another blow to the USA's Caucasus policy, after the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. If a compromise was devised without the USA's involvement, and if the United States were not awarded the status of the agreement's guarantor (which would then be taken by Russia and Turkey) this would be a painful defeat exposing Washington's weakness in the region. A success for the Russian-Turkish initiative would probably also lead to a cooling in relations between the USA and Azerbaijan.
It seems, however, that a possible agreement on Karabakh would not adversely affect the prospects for energy co-operation between Azerbaijan and the West. The fact that Azerbaijan is currently distancing itself from the Nabucco project should rather be seen as a tactical concession to Russia and an expression of disappointment with the lack of progress on this project. Even if Baku decides to co-operate more closely with Russia in the energy sphere, diversification of oil and gas exports will remain a priority of Azerbaijan's foreign policy.

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