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EASTWEEK
Weekly analytical newsletter on Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus and Central Asia (also available in Polish as Tydzień na Wschodzie)

Contents

No. 40(149) | 2008-12-10

Analyses

  • On 9 December, the parliament of Ukraine appointed Volodymyr Lytvyn as its new speaker. Subsequently, Lytvyn officially announced the creation of a coalition composed of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, Our Ukraine/People's Self-Defence and the Lytvyn Bloc. This means that early elections are no longer necessary. The parliament has regained its capacity to act, Yulia Tymoshenko has gained a certainty that she will keep the prime minister's post, perhaps even until the presidential election planned in early 2010, and President Viktor Yushchenko, who consistently opposed this coalition, has suffered another defeat, irrespective of whether or not the new coalition will prove effective and durable.

  • Between 5 and 8 December, Georgian politics witnessed several unexpected changes in the composition of the council of ministers and a number of other reshuffles and dismissals within the ruling team. These major reshuffles seem to be President Mikheil Saakashvili's attempt to strengthen his position in the state, in connection with the fact that several of his former close aides have recently moved over to open opposition. If this decomposition of the ruling team continues, a new force may emerge in Georgia's political scene in the coming months, which may be capable of challenging Saakashvili's power, and forcing the country's leadership to hold early elections.

 

Georgia: is Saakashvili's team starting to erode?
EASTWEEK

2008-12-10 | Krzysztof Strachota and Wojciech Bartuzi

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Between 5 and 8 December, Georgian politics witnessed several unexpected changes in the composition of the council of ministers and a number of other reshuffles and dismissals within the ruling team. These major reshuffles seem to be President Mikheil Saakashvili's attempt to strengthen his position in the state, in connection with the fact that several of his former close aides have recently moved over to open opposition. If this decomposition of the ruling team continues, a new force may emerge in Georgia's political scene in the coming months, which may be capable of challenging Saakashvili's power, and forcing the country's leadership to hold early elections.


The reshuffles

On 5 December, Prime Minister Grigol Mgaloblishvili (who has held this position since 1 November) informed the public about changes made to the government's composition in consultation with President Mikheil Saakashvili. The ministers for foreign affairs, defence and education were dismissed. On the same day, the president also dismissed the secretary of the Georgian Security Council. The second round of changes in the government occurred on 8 December; the vacant posts of the culture and defence ministers were filled, and the minister for the economy was replaced.

The cabinet reshuffle was unexpected, especially since only a month ago, the new PM's cabinet won the parliament's vote of confidence. The prime minister's explanations, that the changes had been necessitated by the need to speed up Georgia's economic reconstruction, sound unconvincing. The reshuffle should rather be seen as an element in the president's personal manoeuvring, and as an attempt to conceal the splits in the ruling team.


Is the ruling group starting to erode?

Georgia's political scene has recently seen several new political initiatives launched or supported by persons originating from the group which has ruled Georgia for the last five years, and who now openly oppose president Mikheil Saakashvili.

On 23 November, the anniversary of the 'Rose Revolution', a new opposition political party, the Democratic Movement/United Georgia created by the former parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze, held its founding congress. On 3 December, the former prime minister Zurab Nogaideli announced the formation of a new party, the Movement for a Fair Georgia. Burjanadze and Nogaideli, who were both close aides of Saakashvili, have announced that their objective would be early parliamentary and presidential elections.

On 8 December, a new opposition alliance was formed by the Republican Party and the New Right, which have both been in opposition for years. Their leaders have indirectly confirmed the correctness of media speculation, according to which talks are underway with Irakli Alasania; he has been invited to become the new bloc's front man (Alasania was Georgia's ambassador to the UN until 4 December, when he resigned at his own request; he is very popular in Georgia and highly esteemed abroad).


The essence of the current political struggle in Georgia

Georgia's political life in recent years has been characterised by the absence of any serious policy debate. The government team and most opposition groups agree as to the assumptions of the economic and foreign policy (NATO membership, relations with Russia, etc.). The opposition lacks human, organisational and financial resources and does not have the same access to the media as the leadership; the ruling group so far has been, and remains, the only group possessed of the tools necessary for serious political activity.

This situation has been very specifically influenced by Georgia's lost war with Russia. Some members of the ruling group believe the president's team - in other words, Saakashvili personally - to be jointly responsible for the outbreak of the war, its development and consequences. This sense of insecurity is pushing Saakashvili to seek the support of people unconditionally loyal to him, which makes both the country's political leaders and the general public even more uncertain and tired of the president. Some of Saakashvili's colleagues are therefore drifting towards openly anti-presidential positions. If this process does not stop, it will be they, and not the old opposition parties, that will pose a real threat to Saakashvili.

The social and economic problems which are very likely to occur this winter (including the state's difficulties in guaranteeing gas and electricity supplies), combined with possible further decomposition of the ruling team and the moves of more presidential aides to the opposition, may, in the medium term, exceed the critical mass needed to force the president to announce early elections.