2008-05-07 | Jadwiga Rogoża

While Dmitry Medvedev takes the highest state office in Russia, real power remains in the hands of PM Putin in the immediate future

The official swearing-in of Dmitry Medvedev as president and the designation of Vladimir Putin as prime minister (7 May) complete the formal transfer of power in the Kremlin. However, the question of the final division of competences between the president and the prime minister is far from resolved. Putin, still the most influential politician in Russia, is actively taking measures to strengthen the prime minister's position in the system of government, the objective of which is to prevent Medvedev from gaining an independent position in the system of power. Medvedev himself has remained passive so far, and his ability to pursue independent policies is uncertain.

Putin dominates Medvedev's inauguration ceremony

Medvedev's very pompous swearing-in ceremony took place in the Kremlin in the presence of the outgoing President Putin, the speakers of both chambers of the parliament, and representatives of all levels of the authorities. The ceremony was dominated by Vladimir Putin, who acted as the new president's mentor. Putin accompanied Medvedev during most of the ceremony, and was also by his side as the presidential regiment paraded in front of the newly sworn-in president.

Two centres of power with Putin in a stronger position

The symbolic emphasis placed in the swearing-in ceremony on the duality of power - with a stronger position for Putin - is a good illustration of the situation surrounding Medvedev, who is taking office in the shadow of his predecessor. On the one hand, Medvedev is taking the de jure highest office in the state that is traditionally associated with strong, consolidated presidential power. Medvedev will have broad constitutional powers (only slightly restricted by the parliament), including the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, and to directly control the so-called presidential departments in the government (the ministries for foreign affairs, interior, defence, justice and emergencies) and the secret services. On the other hand, though, Medvedev's extensive formal powers will be counterbalanced by his relatively weak position in the power elite. Even though he has been Putin's trusted aide for eighteen years and has held important functions in the highest ranks of the Russian authorities for at least eight years, Medvedev has as yet built no political or business backing of his own. In the initial period after taking office as president and taking over the Presidential Administration, he will have to accept officials whom Putin previously appointed.

Putin strengthens the prime minister's office

The initiative is in the hands of Vladimir Putin, and his influence will restrain Medvedev's position to the greatest extent. Even though Putin takes an office which is much inferior to the president's power circle in terms of rank and constitutional prerogatives, with the real influence he has, he will remain the most important person in Russian politics, and will continue to be seen by the public as the political leader. As the head of the United Russia Party, Putin has consolidated his control of parliament. Moreover, he still informally controls the power institutions, the media and an extensive network of personal and business connections spanning all the major spheres of the economy and politics.

Recent months have shown how Putin's actions have strengthened the prime minister's office, which is being transformed from a purely 'technical' position into a more strategic and public office (see Appendix 1).
As the leader of the United Russia party, with more than three-quarters of the seats in the State Duma, Putin now has stronger control of the parliament. As a result, Medvedev will be unable to carry out any legislative initiatives that have not been agreed upon with Putin. Further changes are intended to increase the government's control over the regions' governors. The prime minister's public function will be reinforced by extending his press service, while many 'technical' tasks, for which the head of government has been responsible until now, will be transferred to the respective ministries. In addition, the number of deputy prime ministers will be increased (according to the media, eventually there will be eleven of them).
In practice, Prime Minister Putin will probably define Russia's development strategy, promote his line through the extended press service, and call to account the deputy PMs and ministers he controls, as they will be responsible for the respective spheres of the economy.

Prospects for the future

Measures to substantially change the prime minister and the president's constitutional powers, and make the PM the more influential decision-making centre in Russia, have not yet been taken. What the most important changes will be remains the subject of media speculation; for example, they have been devoting much attention to plans concerning the possible subordination of the so-called presidential departments in the government to the prime minister, and the creation of an investigative superbody that would consolidate the investigation services of all the power institutions, and would also be subordinated to the prime minister. Some of these ideas are quite realistic; for example, the presidential ministries could be subordinated to the prime minister by a three-fourths majority of votes in the State Duma, and Putin does control such a majority. Therefore, if Vladimir Putin decides to use his influence to further strengthen the prime minister's office, a 'creeping' change of the Russian system of government may occur, leading to the formation of a system founded on the prime minister's strong position.

Appendix 1

Legislative measures to strengthen the head of government

On 25 April, a draft law was tabled with the State Duma, under which around 500 tasks would be transferred from the government level to the level of individual ministries. These tasks belong to the domain of purely 'technical' competencies, and include assignments such as defining the format of documents to be used in the state administration, etc. Once the law is adopted, Prime Minister Putin will no longer have to personally sign the numerous 'technical' documents and regulations.

On 25 April, the outgoing Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov signed a regulation setting up three new departments within the government, including the press service department, the protocol department and the department in charge of preparing the prime minister's speeches. The rank of the prime minister's spokesman was at the same time raised to that of a deputy prime minister.

On 28 April, Vladimir Putin issued a decree which transfers the Presidential Administration's task of assessing the annual reports submitted by governors to the government (which will have to carry out such assessments based on a list of 70 financial, social and other criteria established by the Kremlin). The power to present candidates and dismiss governors remains with the president for the time being. On 29 April Putin signed a decree establishing a system for the assessment of local authorities, which is analogous to the system of assessing regional governors.
Compiled by Jadwiga Rogoża

Appendix 2

Dmitry Medvedev - Biography

Dmitry Medvedev was born in Leningrad in 1965. In 1987 he graduated from the Faculty of Law at Leningrad University, and in 1990 obtained a PhD in legal sciences, specialising in civil law. From that moment until 1999 (with some intermissions) he worked as a university lecturer. He met Vladimir Putin at Leningrad University in 1990.

In 1990 Medvedev joined the election staff of Anatoly Sobchak, candidate for the mayor of Leningrad. After Sobchak's victory, Medvedev became his advisor (1990-1995). Thanks to Vladimir Putin's protection, in 1991-1996 he worked as an expert in the International Affairs Committee of the St Petersburg administration (Putin was the committee's chief). In addition to his work in the St Petersburg administration, Medvedev was involved in business activities: he co-owned the Uran company, ran the legal consultancy firm Balfort (from 1994), and co-operated with a number of companies in the timber industry.

On 31 December 1999, after Boris Yeltsin stepped down and Vladimir Putin was appointed acting president, Medvedev became deputy head of the Presidential Administration and head of Putin's election staff. In October 2003, he became chief of the Presidential Administration (a function he held until June 2005).

In June 2000 he was appointed as chairman of the Gazprom board of directors. He has held this function until the present (with an intermission from June 2001 to June 2002, during which he was deputy chairman).

In June 2005 he was appointed deputy prime minister in charge of national projects addressing welfare problems (in November 2005, he became first deputy prime minister). At that moment he started to be promoted in the media as one of the potential candidates to succeed Vladimir Putin. The media have been representing Medvedev as a liberal and pro-Western politician (in contrast to Sergei Ivanov, the 'candidate of the power institutions').
Married since 1989, Dmitry Medvedev has a son born in 1996.

Compiled by Wojciech Konończuk

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