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EASTWEEK
Weekly analytical newsletter on Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus and Central Asia (also available in Polish as Tydzień na Wschodzie)

Contents

No. 16(125) | 2008-05-07

Analyses

  • While Dmitry Medvedev takes the highest state office in Russia, real power remains in the hands of PM Putin in the immediate future

  • The serious conflict between Tbilisi and Moscow concerning the future of Abkhazia and South Ossetia coincides with an extremely important parliamentary election in Georgia. Continued Western support for Georgia depends on whether the Georgian authorities pursue a non-confrontational and responsible policy towards both these challenges - and Western support is of fundamental importance for Tbilisi.

 

Georgia looks to the West
EASTWEEK

2008-05-07 | Krzysztof Strachota

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The serious conflict between Tbilisi and Moscow concerning the future of Abkhazia and South Ossetia coincides with an extremely important parliamentary election in Georgia. Continued Western support for Georgia depends on whether the Georgian authorities pursue a non-confrontational and responsible policy towards both these challenges - and Western support is of fundamental importance for Tbilisi.

Georgia is facing two major political challenges. Firstly, in relations with Russia, tension has escalated over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, increasing the risk of an outbreak of armed conflict. Secondly, the campaign before the parliamentary elections, which should have served to resolve the internal crisis which started in autumn last year, is taking place in this tense atmosphere. Both these challenges are of fundamental importance for Tbilisi's relations with the West. Western support is Georgia's most important asset in its confrontation with Russia, while integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures (mainly NATO) is the country's strategic objective. Avoiding an armed confrontation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and holding an election that will be recognised as democratic, are preconditions for continued and strengthened support from the West. In this context, the West's policy on Georgia is of crucial importance for this state's security, as a further escalation of the crisis is expected in the coming months.


Georgia's problems

In mid-April, Moscow launched its most serious anti-Georgian political campaign in recent years in connection with the conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia: it announced an institutionalisation of its co-operation with the separatist authorities; declared its readiness to defend them in case they are attacked by Georgia; expanded the Russian military contingent in Abkhazia, and downed a Georgian spy aircraft over Georgian territory. The Russian media have been preparing public opinion for an armed conflict with Georgia in the defence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The purpose of these measures seems to be to provoke Georgia into taking military action, discredit the idea of its membership in NATO, and more generally, to discourage the West from becoming more involved in the Southern Caucasus.
The early parliamentary elections (to be held on 21 May) are another serious problem for the Georgian authorities. The ballot is a consequence of the serious political crisis that culminated in November 2007. It is intended to abate the social and political tension that has prevailed in Georgia since the early presidential election on 5 January. Both the authorities' reaction to the November protests (including the declaration of a state of emergency), and the presidential election process, which was not free of controversy, have led to opposition protests and damaged Georgia's image in the West. The Georgian leadership needs to regain full legitimacy and reliability in the eyes of the West, in order to ensure internal stability and strengthen Georgia's international position. The election should therefore be held as planned, irrespective of the conflicts with Russia, and should meet democratic standards.


The West from Georgia's point of view

The West is the main reference point for the entire Georgian political class. A consensus has been developed concerning integration with Euro-Atlantic structures (as reaffirmed in the referendum on NATO membership). Moreover, the West is a source of inspiration and support for the ambitious state reform programme which has been implemented since 2003. Finally, it is perceived as the only potential counterbalance to Russian dominance in the region. The West occupies a key position in all Georgian plans to solve the conflicts, from proposals concerning mediation and guarantees for the peace process, to the modernisation of the army. The political line which Georgia has been pursuing depends completely on Western support, as does the current leadership. However, Western support hinges on Georgia's success in avoiding an escalation of conflicts and in democratising the state.
The numerous and strong declarations made by Western politicians in recent weeks concerning the recognition of Georgia's territorial integrity, together with calls on Russia to stop pressuring Georgia, have been immensely helpful for Tbilisi, although the Georgian government itself has also been called on to avoid escalating the crisis.


Georgia on its challenges

In spite of the huge challenges that the Georgian authorities have been facing recently, both their reactions to Russia's actions and their internal policy have been very moderate. The response to Russia's actions has consisted primarily of a diplomatic offensive in the West, while Tbilisi has refrained from the measures it often applied in previous years, such as militant rhetoric, demonstrations of force in the conflict regions, or skirmishes and incidents with the other side (which in the past frequently involved casualties on both sides). It appears that in the current situation, Georgia sees armed confrontation as a last resort in case its armed forces or civilian population came under attack, or in case Russia recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Georgia authorities can be expected to remain particularly cautious, especially in the run-up to the parliamentary elections.
As regards the elections itself, the authorities are trrying to avoid an escalation of tension in the country. Some election law amendments demanded by the opposition have been implemented. According to a preliminary OSCE report, the scale of pre-election infringements (such as the use of administrative means by the ruling party) has decreased substantially - even though the problem has not been eliminated completely, as the opposition strongly emphasises. Unlike in similar situations in the past, the authorities are refraining from aggressively playing up the conflict with Russia against the opposition (for example, disseminating materials intended to discredit opposition politicians by suggesting they have links to the Russian secret services). According to pre-election polls, the ruling United National Movement is unquestionably the frontrunner with a showing of 44%. The estimated results for its opponents are 12% for the United Opposition bloc, 11% for the Christian Democratic Movement and 7% for the Labour Party. Even though the United National Movement will probably lose its constitutional majority in parliament, keeping in mind the position of the West and the need to regain legitimacy, the authorities will probably decide to abide by democratic standards in the election process.


Conclusions

1. The actions of the Georgian authorities suggest that the country's leadership views the situation over the conflicts and, to a lesser extent, the issue of the elections, as a serious challenge and a test of their credibility in the West. Therefore one can hope that Georgia will continue to avoid escalating tension in the conflict regions, and will hold a parliamentary election that will generally meet democratic standards and therefore be seen as valid.
2. Georgia may start a more active policy on the conflicts after the parliamentary elections and, more importantly, after a possible adjustment to the policy of Western states.
3. Given the assumption that Russia's current actions are designed to destabilise the situation in Georgia and discourage the West from proceeding with NATO enlargement, Moscow should be expected to continue escalating and instigating tension. Since the stakes for Russia are high, it is likely that it will provoke armed incidents in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the coming months.
4. Both Tbilisi and Moscow view the West as an important factor, indeed as a de facto participant, in the Georgian-Russian conflict over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This has been clear from, among others, Georgia's policy in recent weeks. Any action (or failure to act) by the West will substantially influence further developments. If the West remains passive, the most probable outcome will be a Russia-dictated military resolution to the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts within the next two or three years.