Medvedev's 'manifesto': political conservatism and economic adjustments

On 10 September, a popular independent website Gazeta.ru published a pro-liberal article calling for economic modernisation authored by President Dmitry Medvedev. Even if most of the concepts presented in the text will probably remain as just words, the article seems to signal the Russian leadership's readiness to make limited adjustments to its economic policy, including selective reforms in the crisis-affected sectors. It also signals Russia's openness to foreign investments and its intention to acquire high technologies. Nevertheless, these liberal economic declarations are accompanied by 'conservative' political concepts which affirm the existing political order in Russia and warn the West against interfering with Russia's internal affairs.
The president's 'manifesto', which outlines the main points of his autumn address to the Russian parliament, should not be interpreted as either an announcement of the forthcoming abolition of Putin's economic model, or an expression of Medvedev's ambition to reach for real power within the Russian ruling class. In fact, it seems to be a message from the entire ruling team addressed to foreign audiences, including investors, as well as the Russian political and business elites. It demonstrates that the Russian government is ready to boost closer economic co-operation with foreign countries, while emphasising their determination to define the course of domestic policy independently.

Politics: an affirmation of 'Putinism'

In those parts of the text which deal with politics, Medvedev admits that democracy in Russia is still frail and that civil society remains weak. At the same time, he demonstrates his conviction that a transparent and democratic multi-party system of government is gradually developing in Russia, and that an open society is forming. Medvedev then goes on to reject any 'revolutionary' change, and distances himself from importing democracy models from abroad.
The president's main intention seems to be to affirm the current line of Russia's domestic policy, and warn against any interference in Russia's internal affairs. This conservative rhetoric indicates that there is a consensus in the elite with regard to retaining the current model of 'virtual democracy', wherein the authorities create and strictly control the political institutions as well as the quasi-opposition parties, and thus prevent any serious political alternative from forming. This conclusion is further confirmed by Medvedev's statements of 15 September, including the support he has expressed for Putin's 2004 decision to replace the general elections of regional governors with appointments by the Kremlin (many liberal observers expected Medvedev to revise that decision).

Economy: a controlled opening

The core of the president's message concerns the economy. Medvedev identifies corruption, statism and dominance of the raw materials sectors as the main problems of the Russian economy; he calls for a modernisation of the economy through the implementation of new technologies, among other means. The radically liberal concepts presented in the article should be seen as merely a way for Medvedev to build his image as a champion of modernisation. Nevertheless, a number of proposals concerning economic modernisation and diversification may signal the Russian leadership's readiness to carry out a partial repair of certain economic sectors, the unprofitability of which has been exposed by the global economic crisis. Reforms are unlikely to be implemented in the raw materials sectors, as they are the foundation of financial stability for the current leadership. Therefore, the plea for abandoning the economic model built on raw materials which Medvedev and Putin have reiterated will most likely remain on paper. The 'modernisation' of the economy may consist in restructuring selected obsolete sectors which require constant budget subsidies. It is possible that Medvedev will be the face behind these reforms, which will be difficult, both economically and socially. The first measures may be undertaken as early as in the next few weeks: a partial restructuring of the Russian automotive sector, which is currently struggling with major difficulties, has been announced to take place this autumn.

Another important declaration presented in the text concerns the Russian leadership's openness to foreign investments and its ambition to acquire new technologies. The co-operation with Canada's Magna consortium, which has increased Russia's chances of taking over a stake in Opel, may serve as an example of the actions taken in this regard. Prime Minister Putin has acknowledged that this transaction is a good market move, which would be conducive to genuine integration between the Russian and European economies.

A voice from the leadership

Medvedev's liberal manifesto, and especially his criticism of Russian realities, published through an independent internet portal, has triggered many speculations about his alleged aspirations to gain independence and vie with Putin for real power. However, Medvedev's article does not seem to propose any alternative vision of Russia's development, or serve as an attempt at dismantling the system Putin created. It is rather an expression of the sentiments prevalent in the ruling elite, which is currently considering certain adjustments to economic policy as well as measures to develop new areas of the economy which could in future supplement the revenues from the raw materials sectors.

The president's verbal criticism of the phenomena occurring in the Russian economy should not be overestimated. The criticism of excessive bureaucracy, the centralisation of the economy and its dependence on raw materials is hardly a novelty in programme statements by Russian leaders. Similar views have been repeatedly put forward by both Medvedev and Putin (it is enough to recall Putin's programme address before he left the Kremlin in February 2008, in which he strongly criticised Russia's raw materials-oriented economic model and its centralised character). Many of Medvedev's 'liberal' statements (such as his criticism of the state corporations created towards the end of Putin's presidential term) stands in contrast to the actions he has taken (which have in fact broadened those corporations' autonomy), and his critical remarks about the government seem to be merely a controlled game in the context of his harmonious co-operation with PM Putin.

On the day following the publication of Medvedev's text (11 September), Vladimir Putin said in a meeting with foreign political scientists that there was not and would not be any competition between him and Medvedev, and that important decisions, including those concerning the 2012 presidential election, would be taken unanimously. This statement was certainly meant to emphasise Putin's status as leader, and may signal his plans to return to the Kremlin. This, however, is hardly a novelty, but rather a confirmation of his original intentions; on many occasions Putin 'refused to rule out' his return to the Kremlin. His position as the leader seems to have been acknowledged by the ruling elite, including by Medvedev; on 15 September Medvedev declared his support for the most important aspects of the internal and foreign policy initiated by Putin, and emphasised that his co-operation with the prime minister was excellent.

Jadwiga Rogoża

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